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ABSTRACT
An important question has pervaded the field of labor-management 
relations for over fifty years: Is political bias present in the 
decisions rendered by National Labor Relations Board members in unfair 
labor practice cases?
This study develops and tests a model of Board member decisions in 
selected unfair labor practice cases over the period 1962-1983. By 
studying 2147 decisions made by seventeen individual members, a 
relationship was found among the decisions and several variables of 
political party affiliations, personal background factors of members, 
and conditions within the procedure by which allegations of unfair labor 
practice violations are processed for decision. Political congruency 
between Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents 
was found to exert a pro-management bias on decisions. Procedural 
process variables found significant included employers as the party 
initiating the charges of ULP violations; support of the administrative 
law judge of the allegations irrespective of whether the filing party 
was a union or an employer, and dismissal by ALJs of charges filed by 
unions. Personal background factors found to be significant included 
the age of the member at the time of the decision, with older members 
more likely to decide favoring unions over employers than younger 
members, and the type of undergraduate degree possessed, with members 
having been awarded degrees in business/economics less likely to make 
decisions in favoring unions over employers than members with 
non-business/economics degrees.
vii
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Results were analyzed using the logit technique. Logit is a 
non-linear probability model particularly suited to analyzing 
dichotomous variables ‘(e.g., pro-union/pro-management decisions, 
Democratic/Republican member). Logit provides insights (where 
categorized data are involved) that are not available from more commonly 
used techniques (e.g., regression analysis and analysis of variance) 
which are based on assumptions (e.g., that the dependent variable is 
continuous or at least ordinal) and were therefore not appropriate to 
this study.
Practical implications of the results of this study are described 
and thoughts are offered for future research concerning the roles of the 
regional director and the administrative law judges in decisions.
viii
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is a federal agency
created in 1935 by Congress to administer the basic law governing
relationships between employers in the private business sector and labor
organizations. The NLRB was established by the National labor Relations
Act and is the agency that administers the act.* Congress established
the NLRB for the purposes of ensuring that employees could exercise the
rights provided them under the act and to protect them, as well as the
2general public, from certain unfair labor practices.
Administration of National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA is administered by a five-member Board and a General
3Counsel, which is largely independent of the Board. The Regional
Director is responsible for issuance and prosecution of formal
complaints concerning violations of the Act, and supervises the agency's
4regional, sub-regional and resident offices. The five-member Board 
acts as a judicial body in deciding cases submitted to it. The Board 
primarily resolves contested cases which have been appealed on some
* The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 (Wagner Act) as 
amended by the Acts of 1947 ( To£ t:-Kar tley Act), 1959 (Landrum-Griffin 
Act), and 1974, Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
2 Unfair labor practices are defined in Section 8 of the act and 
the rights of employees are primarily set forth in Section 7.
3 Duties and functions of the NLRB are described in Appendix A.
4 A listing of each of these three types of offices as well as a 
map indicating the territorial boundaries of regional and sub-regional 
offices is included as Appendix B.
1
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
2
basis such as an allegation that the facts have been improperly 
interpreted.^
Presidential Appointments
Section 3 of the Act provides that members of the five member Board
be appointed "by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate." Each member is appointed for a term of five years, except that
any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the member being succeeded. The terms are staggered,
with the term of one member expiring each year. Any member of the Board
may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of
duty or malfeasance in office, and for no other cause. Historically,
however, none of the members appointed to the Board since its creation
in 1935 has ever been so removed. The President also designates who
shall serve as chairman. A member or a chairman may be re-appointed to
Aserve additional five year terms.-
The General Counsel of the Board is appointed, in a procedure 
essentially the same as that of Board members, by the President for a 
term of four years. A General Counsel may be reappointed for additional 
four-year terms. Historically, of all the General Counsels or Acting 
General Counsels, only the original General Counsel and three others 
have served longer than forty-eight months.^
This process is discussed in Chapter 3 and the basic procedures 
are illustrated in Appendix C.
^The frequency with which reappointments has occurred is provided 
in footnote 9.
 ̂ The First General Counsel, Charles Fahy, served five years 
(Sept. 1935-Sept. 1940). Additionally, the tenures of George J. Bott 
(Sept. 1950-Dec. 1954), Arnold Ordman (May 1963-June 1971), and William 
A. Lubbers (Dec. 1979-April 1984) exceeded four years. A list of 
General Counsels is provided in Appendix F.
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Transient Nature of the Board 
During the five decades since enactment of the National Labor 
Relations Act, the Board has included forty-one members appointed during 
the administration of nine presidents, from Franklin D. Roosevelt tog
Ronald Reagan. During the most recent ten years, under presidents 
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, eleven individuals have been appointed 
as members of the five-member Board. This level of member turnover, 
coupled with the Act's provision for the term of one member to expire
9each year, underscores the fragile and transient nature of the Board. 
Presidents have an opportunity, therefore, to appoint a majority of the 
members to the Board by no later than the completion of the third year 
of their administrations.
Changing Interpretations by Changing Boards 
As administrations change, and as new appointments to the Board are 
made, both labor and management have contended that the philosophy of 
the Board shifts. When a given Board renders decisions reflecting its 
interpretations of the Act in conjunction with the facts of cases, its
Names and dates of service of these appointees are shown in 
Appendix E.
9 A member may be renominated for additional terms. This 
renomination potentially could reduce the rate of turnover. In reality, 
however, since 1947, when the size of the Board was increased from three 
to five, only eight of the thirty-one appointees have served at least 
five years (Abe Murdoch, Aug. 1947 - Dec. 1957; Phillip Ray Rodgers,
Aug. 1953 - Aug. 1963; Boyd S. Leedom, April 1955 - Dec. 1964; John H. 
Fanning, Dec. 1957 - Dec. 1982; Frank A. McCulloch, Mar. 1961 - Aug. . 
1970; Gerald Brown, April 1961 - Aug. 1971, Howard Jenkins, Aug. 1963 - 
Aug. 1983 and John A. Penello, Feb. 1976 - Jan. 1981). Of the nine 
members appointed within the most recent five years (1981-1986), only 
five are still members (Donald Dotson, Mar. 1983; Wilford Johanson, May 
1985; Marshall Babson, July 1985; James Stephens, Nov. 1985; and Mary 
Cracroft, Nov. 1986). Members John Van de Water, John Miller and 
Patricia Diaz Dennis served fourteen months (Aug. 1981 - Dec. 1982), 
three months (Dec. 1982 - Mar. 1983), and thirty-nine months (May 1983 - 
August 1986) , respectively.
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decisions frequently are disputed. The current Board, as were prior 
Boards, is controversial. Consistent with the observations of Sloane 
and Witney,^ organized labor leaders decry the "Reagan" Board as 
pro-management, whereas, management, in a similar manner, viewed the 
Carter Board as pro-union.
Accusations from both sides abound that the Board is politically 
biased in its ULP case decisions.
The Question of Political Bias
An important question, therefore, pervades the field of 
labor-management relations: Is political bias present in decisions
rendered by the Board in Unfair Labor Practice cases?
Sloane and Witney state that what the Act does is to establish 
broad guidelines, but it is up to the agency to apply the law to 
particular situations. In this application, the agency has considerable 
authority. In the vast majority of the cases, however, the courts have 
sustained the decisions on the grounds that the agency possesses 
expertise that should be given full faith and credit by the judiciary.
It logically follows, the authors add, that how the law will be applied 
depends to a great extent on who sits on the Board because members are 
chosen who generally represent the socio-economic philosophy of the 
President. Sloane and Witney observe that, in general, unions have 
criticized the policies of Republican-appointed Board members, whereas 
employers have displayed the same attitude toward members appointed by 
Democratic chief executives.
^  Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law, Fifth 
edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985) pp. 127-128.
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Assessment of Political Bias in Board Decisions
The question of political bias has been the topic of considerable
study. Ross^ pointed out, however, that the methodology used in much
of the scholarly work on this topic might be characterized as judgmental
12assessments based on case analysis. Delaney, Lewin and Sockell , 
noting this same pattern, recommend that researchers support their 
arguments with more facts and place less reliance on non-quantitative 
analysis. They also recommend that researchers might examine whether 
inconsistencies in Board decisions due to its composition (i.e. 
political bias) are ^.rci.ally offset by stability in lower-level Board 
policies. This study, therefore, empirically assesses the political 
nature of the NLRB and extends existing research to investigate whether 
bias is present in decisions made in Unfair Labor Practice cases.
^  Philip Ross, The Government as a Source of Union Power. 
Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1965.
12 John T. Delaney, David Lewin and Donna Sockell, "The NLRA at 
Fifty: A Research Appraisal and Agenda", Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October, 1985), 46-75.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This chapter outlines some of the research that has been carried
out in political appointments, judicial decision-making, voting
behavior, and political bias in regulatory agencies. The works selected
are illustrative rather than exhaustive, with emphasis placed on major
works, on seminal and more recent studies, and on research in which
quantitative techniques have been applied. In some instances, the
13findings cited were not the primary focus of the research. The 
studies cited represent various theoretical orientations, methodological 
specifications and degrees of rigor. Studies range, for example, from 
impressionistic viewpoints by "Board watchers", to simple percentage 
calculations of votes for management or labor, to more intricate 
statistical treatments involving such calculations as coefficients of 
determination and correlation with levels of significance. Irrespective 
of the range of study approaches and developmental techniques, a number 
of inferences, interpretations and conclusions emerge.
The format of this chapter includes a brief historical overview of 
the circumstances surrounding the first change of the Board from a 
majority membership of Democratic-appointed members to Republican- 
appointed members. This historical overview is followed by a review of 
the empirical findings of studies and the methods used in those studies. 
The chapter closes with a summary of the findings of studies reviewed 
and discussions of the purposes and significance of the study.
For example, Gormley (discussed later in this Chapter) set out 
to test his "revolving door" hypothesis and serendipitously found that 
the voting behavior of FCC Commissioners was much more sensitive to 
political party affiliation than to broadcast-related employment ties.
6
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Historical Overview
During the earliest years following the Board's inception, there
was no doubt in the minds of many observers that the indications of
political bias in NLRB decision were irrefutable. Until Board members
in fact, however, had been appointed by an opposing (non-Democratic)
administration, any contention of political bias could only be pure
speculation. The following historical overview, therefore, is included
for the specific purpose of establishing a locus from which much of the
literature of the past four decades has emanated.
First Republican Members
Albert C. Beeson was nominated in 1954 by Republican President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to fill one of three Board vacancies. In July and
September of 1953, two prior vacancies had been filled by President
Eisenhower's appointments of Guy Farmer, both as Member and as Chairman,
14and of Philip Ray Rodgers. The appointment of Beeson, if confirmed by 
the Senate, would mark the first time in the history of the Board that a 
majority of its Members would have been appointed by a Republican 
President. From 1935 through 1952, the 14 Members who had served on the 
Board had been appointed by Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. 
Opposing Viewpoints
Organizations generally regarded as pro-management, such as the 
national Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), at that time were vocal concerning the Eisenhower 
appointments as well as the past performance of the National Labor
Guy Farmer was appointed to fill two years of Chairman Paul 
Herzog's unexpired term at the time of his resignation. Phillip Ray 
Rodgers was confirmed for a full five year term replacing John M. 
Houston.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
8
Relations Board. Organizations such as NAM and the Chamber were 
conveying the discontent from within the ranks of management with the 
overall manner in which the NLRB had been applying the provisions of the 
Act under Democratic Presidential appointments of Board Members.
The Chamber of Commerce, for example in 1953, expressed the 
following sentiment during Senate Labor Hearings:
Certainly, management has cause to doubt seriously whether the 
Board as presently constituted, is able with intellectual honesty to 
administer the Taft-Hartley Act as Congress wrote it and intended it to 
be. As long as any Board members and key staff members apply the 
one-sided philosophy of the Wagner Act, we cannot have the balanced 
labor-relations policy sought by the Congress in that act.
A dispassionate review of the decision of the Board seems to 
disclose a studied attempt to evade the clear-cut intent of Congress, as 
expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act^and to revert to the principles 
established under the Wagner Act.
During those same Hearings, the Chamber went on to say:
Now, we think that there should be a clean sweep and an opportunity 
for the new administration; if there are any present members of the 
Board or their staff that are good, they can be reappointed, but if they 
are not good then they can be eliminated as they should have been if 
they are no good. This new administration should have an opportunity 
for a clean sweep and to appoint^ghe type of men,..Lhat should have been 
appointed in the first instance.
The first two appointments by President Eisenhower, Guy Farmer and 
Phillip Rodgers, were confirmed by the Senate with iitcie fanfare. 
Neither Farmer nor Rodgers had had extensive professional association 
with management. Farmer had been an NLRB trial examiner and Associate 
General Counsel who, however, left the agency to practice labor law,
iJ In U.S. Senate, Labor Act Revisions; Hearings before the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session 
(Washington, D.C. 1953).
16 Ibid., pp. 157,159.
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primarily with management clientele.^ This career pattern was and
continues to be a not uncommon occurrence. Phillip Rodgers had taught
political science at the university level and immediately prior to his
18appointment had been a staff member of the Senate labor committee.
Scrutiny by Senate
Such near-perfunctory Senate approval as had occurred with nominees
Farmer and Rodgers was not to be the case with nominee Albert Beeson.
Beeson had been a director of industrial relations in industry. In that
position he had a strong management orientation, including representing
employers in contract negotiations with unions, authoring policies
concerning personnel matters which were central issues in strike
situations, and representing management in cases before the NLRB.
Furthermore, if his nomination were to be confirmed, Beeson would
represent the third Eisenhower appointment, thereby tipping the balance
19to a Republican-appointed majority. The two carryover members, Abe 
Murdock and Ivan Peterson, had been appointed by Democratic President 
Truman.
In contrast to the review received by Farmer and Rodgers, the 
review of Beeson's background was extensive. Beeson's experience in
U.S. Senate, Nomination of Guy Farmer to be a Member of the 
National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1953).
18 U.S. Senate, Nomination of Phillip Ray Rodgers to be a Member 
of the National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1953).
19 U.S. Senate, Nomination of Albert Cummins Beeson to be a Member 
of the National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1954; 
hereafter cited as Beeson Nomination Hearings, 1954.
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management was assailed by Democratic members of the Senate. Beeson 
was characterized as ill-suited for the position of impartial 
adjudicator of cases in which the parties were unions and employees. 
Democratic Senators expressed alarm over Beeson's views that he would 
join the two prior Eisenhower appointees (Farmer and Rodgers) in 
redressing what he referred to as an imbalance in which labor was 
favored by the old Board. Allegations were made that Beeson still 
maintained ties with his former employers, and that such unsevered ties 
would adversely affect Beeson's ability to make impartial judicial 
determinations in administering the Act.
Although the confirmations of Guy Farmer and Philip Rodgers had 
been met with ambivalence by Democratic members of the Senate, these 
same Senators now viewed the Beeson nomination quite differently.
Senate Democrats viewed the nomination as smacking of the NAM - Chamber 
of Commerce urgings that a Republican President make a "clean sweep" of 
the allegedly pre-union propensities of the National Labor Relations 
Board, as expressed in the Senate Labor Hearings previously discussed. 
Democratic Impression of Board Posture
The debate over the nomination of Beeson which ensued saw Democrats 
arguing that the independence of the NLRB must be assured, and that 
unlike governmental posts in executive departments, the Board must be 
free of the direct influence of Presidential philosophies. This 
argument is one which had not received much Democratic push during the 
pre-1953 years under the administrations of Democratic Presidents Truman 
and Roosevelt. The question of whether motivation for this distinction
See Beeson Nomination Hearings, 1954; and 100 Congressional 
Record, 1970-2005(1954).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
11
(independent agency vs. executive position) lay in party strategy to
retain the "old" Board's pro-labor leanings or in genuine concern for
freedom from Presidential influence went unanswered. Irrespective of
motivation, the impression which the Democratics intended to convey
clearly was the latter. This impression was succinctly expressed by
21Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy:
Members of the Senate, regardless of party, recognize that 
their responsibility with respect to Presidental nominations is a 
unique one. The President is entitled to have his policies carried 
out by those whom he feels represent his philosophy. The President 
is entitled to appoint to the various posts in his administration 
those whose capabilities meet the standards he demands. But today 
we are speaking of a nomination to the National Labor Relations 
Board. It is not a policymaking branch of the administration which 
should be filled by one whose philosophy of labor relations is in 
keeping with the views of the political party in power. It is not 
a tripartite body, to which representatives of labor and management 
should be appointed. Its members do not serve at the pleasure of 
the President, nor for a term of years concurrent with the
Presidential tenure. . . .
The National Labor Relations Board is instead a quasi-judicial 
agency, whose primary function is to interpret and apply the basic
labor relations law of the land. . . Board members are, in effect,
judges; and their decisions are of tremendous importance in the 
determination of the legal rights of labor and management.
Thus, Members of Congress have a special obligatio^Jjo review 
with care the nominations to this quasi-judicial agency.
In a vote, the ratio of which would be a harbinger of the
persistence into the 1980's of contentions of political bias in NLRB
decisions, Beeson won confirmation by a count of forty-five to
forty-two, nearly identical to the existing Republican-Democratic member
distribution in the Senate. The debate battle lines thus were drawn;
the question would persist for decades to follow: Does political bias
exist in decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board?
Senator Kennedy in 1961 would succeed Eisenhower as President. 
In 100 Congressional Record, 2004 (1954).
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Investigative Methods and Empirical Findings
There have been many articles written and studies conducted dealing 
with the National Labor Relations Board and its role in the labor 
relations of the United States. Any attempt to analyze these in toto 
would be overwhelming. A more productive approach is to analyze 
relevant literature by certain categories which should facilitate 
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of this study as set forth 
in Chapter 1. In this section, therefore, four categories of the 
literature will be discussed: 1) political appointments, 2) judicial
decision-making, 3) voting behavior, and 4) political bias in regulatory 
agencies.
Political appointments encompass more than merely the process or 
mechanics per se in filling positions in decision-making bodies. 
Invariably, underlying agendas are suspected to exist that can affect 
the outcomes which result from the decisions made by those appointees. 
How those outcomes are affected, be it by design or intent on the part 
of the appointing authority or not, is crucial. If legislation is to 
achieve the objectives envisioned by the legislators that conceived and 
enacted it, the individual members of the boards and commissions created 
to adjudicate disputes must be free to make objective decisions 
insulated from biasing influences.
A vote cast in a dispute is the output of (to borrow a term from 
general systems theory) "transformational activities" which meld the 
intricacies of judicial decision making with the behavioral aspects of 
the individuals. The quality of that output is gauged against the 
measure of the extent to which the vote is based exclusively on the 
facts of the dispute, relative to the provisions of the legislation. If
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the regulatory body system - either through behavior of its voting 
members or through its judicial decision-making process - is permitted 
to be contaminated by political influences introduced through the 
appointment process, the output will be of poor quality.
An examination of these four categories of literature, therefore, 
provides guidance for the design of this study to determine the presence 
of political bias in NLRB unfair labor practice decisions.
Several points concerning these categories are appropriate here.
First, because the quasi-judicial nature of the Board and its role as
23adjudicator is not unique to labor-management relations , much of the 
relevant literature is to be found outside of the field of business, 
particularly within the legal and political science fields. Second, 
while these categories provide a useful basis of analysis to underpin 
this study, they are neither all-inclusive nor mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, they are some what overlapping. Separation into the four 
topical categories, therefore, has been made with a recognized degree of 
arbitrariness. This arbitrariness, however, is compatible with the 
overlapping nature of the material. Finally, the studies chosen are 
important for both their content in conceptual development as well as 
their methodology. The content and methodology are intermeshed and to 
separate them in the review would be an unduly artificial exercise. 
Separation of matters of conceptual issues and methodology will be 
reserved for the Summary section of this Chapter.
Dichotomies other than labor-management would include 
creditor-debtor, producer-consumer, vendor-purchaser, injurer-injured 
party, landlord-tenant.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
14
Political Appointment
Four early research endeavors between 1937-1971 concerning members of
regulatory agencies focused on the appointment process itself. Those
research efforts stemmed from more pragmatic questions, such as the
identification and analysis of major regulatory problems. The federal
24government was the prime mover in the conduct of such studies and
justified their financing on the basis of intending to institute changes
for improvement.
In making appointments of justices to the U.S. Supreme Court,
25Hanberg concludes that presidents have an opportunity to affect future 
policy long after their administrations have ended. The tenure of Justice 
Douglas, for example, extended from his appointment by President Roosevelt 
until the appointment of his successor by President Ford, some thirty-six 
years later. In making appointments, therefore, Presidents stress their 
need to choose a person who will hold policy views compatible with their 
own. Hanberg classifies four presidents as liberals (Democrats Roosevelt,
President's Committee on Administrative Management, 
Administrative Management in Government of the United States; 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937). Budget 
Bureau, President of United States, Digest of recommendations of 
Commission on Organization of Executive branch of Government, classified 
by possible method of effectuation; prepared by Division of 
Administrative Management; (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1949). Organization of Executive Branch of Government 
Commission [1953-1955], Final Report to Congress; (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955). Judiciary Committee, U.S. 
Senate, Report on regulatory agencies to Pres.-elect [by James M.
Laudis] submitted by Chairman of subcommittee on Administrative 
Practices & Procedures; (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1960). President of the United States, New regulatory 
framework, report on selected independent agencies (President's Advisory 
Council on Executive Organization); (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1971).
25 Roger Hanberg, "Presidential Predictions of Supreme Court 
Justices: Behavior", Journal of Political Science, 1975, pp. 146-149.
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Truman, Kennedy and Johnson), and two presidents (Republicans Eisenhower 
and Nixon), as conservatives, and uses those classifications as 
independent variables to predict judicial performance , General ability 
of these variables to predict behavior was good. Behavior which was 
different from expectation was explained via case analyses of individual 
justices, concluding that the intervention of personal friendship and 
historical change were c'ne most prominent reasons for sucb^differences. 
Justice Jackson, for example, is described by Hanberg as having 
undergone dramatic change in behavior following his experience at the 
Nuremberg (World War II crimes) Trials. Justices Reed and Frankfurter 
also are given as illustrations of justices whose ideologies were 
overtaken by events. Hanberg further concludes that future behavior 
over the short run can accurately be predicted on the basis of 
presidential party of the appointee. Inability to predict such behavior 
is a function of two principal non-history variables: friendship ties
or political expediencies.
Subsequently, the results of two ambitious government-financed 
studies were released. One of these was a longitudinal study of two 
commissions extending over five presidential administrations 
(1949-1974), and the other was a cross-sectional study of seventeen 
agencies (e.g. boards and commissions). The major conclusions and 
methodologies of these two studies are reviewed here.
Two years after the results of these two studies were published,
26the longitudinal study of Graham and Kramer concluded that a nominee's 
performance as a commissioner can best be predicted by three variables:
James M. Graham and Victor H. Kramer, Appointments to the 
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communication Commission and the 
Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, April 1976)
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the individual's background, experience and philosophy. Performance 
depends first and foremost on independence in his or her actions, guided 
solely by the recognitions that actions must be in the public interest, 
and nothing else. Fortitude to reach their own reasoned judgments and 
courage to stand by them are essential. The authors further conclude 
that, contrary to other research conclusions and widespread cynicism 
notwithstanding, the regulated industry itself is a prime source of 
commissioners capable of being and having been outstanding performers.
This study was conducted principally via oral interviews and by 
using published and unpublished data. Approximately 150 structured 
interviews were held. Thirty-nine of these interviews were conducted 
with former commissioners themselves, and the remainder with individuals 
who had been directly or indirectly involved with the process. The 
chief sources of published and unpublished data were presidential 
libraries (e.g. those of presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy) and 
collections ul papers of others (e.g. the Senator Kefauver collection at 
the University of Tennessee). Analysis was highly interpretive, 
subjective and judgmental, with conclusions by the authors conditioned 
upon their analysis within acknowledged limitations of the study methods 
and information.
The authors give no indication of any evidence or information that 
would indicate that performance by a commission is politically swayed. 
Such results, however, could result from the collection technique of 
self-appraisal and the judgmental analysis. Attribution theory suggests 
that in self evaluations, individuals will credit their action to 
"internal" factors such as judgment and expertise, rather than to 
"external" factors such as political pressure.
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In its eighteen-month comprehensive study of seventeen federal
27regulatory agencies, the Committee on Government Operations concluded, 
in part: (1) that a comparatively large number of regulators appointed
come directly from the ranks of their regulated industries and areas of 
activity, (2) that regardless of the administrations involved 
(Democratic and Republican, alike) the Senate seems willing to confirm 
virtually all appointments, (3) that agencies tend not to be "balanced" 
according to viewpoints and backgrounds, (4) that frequent charges of 
conflicts of interest stem from former relationships of appointees, (5) 
that Congressional oversight to assure that Congressional mandate is 
carried out by the agencies occurs frequently only on an ad hoc basis, 
and (6) that administrative proceedings (e.g. case resolutions) take too 
long, with delays (intentional or otherwise) unnecessarily too frequent.
The primary methodology of this study was a questionnaire completed 
by more than 1500 respondents (e.g. attorneys practicing before the 
agencies). Questionnaire data were supplemented with interviews (e.g. 
in hearings and symposia) with involved individuals such as 
administrators, administrative law judges, practicing laywers and public 
interest representatives. The questionnaire included items (answered on 
Likert-type scales) concerning matters such as the commissions' 
integrity, legal ability and technical knowledge. The primary method of 
analysis was calculation of percentages and cross-tabulations.
Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate,
Study on Federal Regulation Vol I: The Regulatory Appointment Process; 
Vol II Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies; Vol III 
Public Participation in the Regulatory Process; Vol IV Undue Delay in 
Regulatory Administration; Vol V Regulatory Organizations and 
Coordination; Vol. VI; Framework For Regulations, and Case Studies in 
Federal Regulation; 6 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977).
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Those conclusions by the Committee are important to this study of 
bias in NLRB decisions. If regulators tend to come from within their 
own ranks (e.g. management and labor), and presidents represent 
political parties with pro-labor and pro-management ideologies, there is 
an exposure to bias which must be considered. Since the Senate cannot 
be looked to as a dependable filtering agent, the need to understand the 
nature of political bias is underscored. If biased decisions can be 
eliminated, or controlled, fair decisions based on fact will be 
forthcoming. As a result, fewer decisions should be appealed and the 
usage of delaying tactics diminished. The time consumed by
administrative proceedings, therefore, could be reduced.
28A later study by Schott and Hamilton represents a still different 
approach. This study focuses on one administration - that of Lyndon 
Johnson - yet does not consider that administration in vacuo, but 
includes contrasts and examples to the appointment processes of other 
administrations. The study draws a sample from among an estimated 433 
PAS (Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation) Johnson cabinet 
and agency appointments. Data were collected from primary recorded 
sources, from a questionnaire survey of appointees and from interviews. 
Many of the conclusions were consistent with those of the 1970*s studies 
of Graham and Kramer and the Committee, but from the specific 
perspective and mode of the Johnson administration. The consensus of 
those surveyed and interviewed, for example, was that the criterion of 
shared views was an especially salient feature of the Johnson selection
28 Richard L. Schott, and Dagmar S. Hamilton, People, Positions and 
Power. The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson. An Administrative 
History of the Johnson Presidency, No. 2 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1983).
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process. The only quantitative element of the study is a brief 
statistical description of the appointees based on returns from the 
questionnaires. President Johnson's admitted criterion of shared views 
adds credence to the concept of political bias. Whether or not this 
potential bias is indeed transmitted to the member vote requires testing 
objectively.
Judicial Decision-Making
The institutional setting of a Board member is a five-year
appointment that can accurately be described as a quasi-judicial
29tribunal. The Board sits in the executive branch of government
Appointment is by the President, with approval by the Senate. The
duties of the Board, however, are essentially judicial. Federal judges,
too, are appointed by the President with approval of the Senate. There
is a parallel, therefore, in the institutional setting of federal judges
and Board members.
The studies selected for inclusion in this section, therefore, have
been chosen because they explore matters of judicial decision making,
both in the truly judicial setting of federal judges and the
quasi-judicial setting of the NLRB.
30Peck examined the accuracy of the Board's self-assessment that it 
is a quasi-judicial agency that does not engage in rule-making 
activities, but limits its activities to the ad hoc resolutions of 
issues in particular cases which come before it. Peck concludes that
29 If not by law, by fact and by history.
30 Cornelius J. Peck, "The Atrophied Rule-Making Power of the 
National Labor Relations Board," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 70:729 
(1961) pp. 729-761.
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the Board is demonstrably wrong in its self-assessment, and rule-making
is exactly what it has engaged in. This conclusion is reached through a
review of actions by the Board in a number of areas (e.g. contract-bar,
unit determination, hiring halls, economic strikes). Peck's evaluation
is that the Board clearly has abandoned the quasi-judicial approach, and
has engaged in substantive rule-making with respect to the standards
governing the exercise of its jurisdiction. Except for the use of 1959
fiscal year statistics comparing the caseload of the NLRB to that of the
U.S. Supreme Court (as support of the impossibility of an ad hoc
approach) Peck's analysis is judgmental, relying on interpretation of
cases and other actions such as press releases by the Board.
31The Board's function, according to Petro, is to adjudicate 
disputes in accordance with national law and constitutional due process 
concepts. Based on his observations of a cross-section of selected 
decisions, however, he concluded that the Board was and had for many 
years been substituting its own policies for those declared by Congress 
in the National Labor Relations Act. He suggests that one of the 
characteristic defects of the NLRB is that it is continually forcing the 
facts to fit its predetermined policies - instead of fitting Congress' 
law to the facts as they exist.
32Using Rivers Manufacturing Co. as an illustration, Petro states 
that the Board frequently adapts and tailors the facts so they will 
produce the results it wants. The key point, Petro states, is that
31 Sylvester Petro, "Expertise, The NLRB, and the Constitution: 
Things Abused and Things Forgotten," Wayne Law Review, Vol. 14 (1968) 
pp. 1126-1163.
^  Rivers Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 376 F. 2nd 511,515 (6th Cir., 1967).
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short-term political appointees of the NLRB simply cannot help adjusting
their practices in accordance with the policies of the administration in
power. A given administration has no basis for its appointments to the
NLRB other than furtherance of its policies and political ambitions or
payment of its political debts. If a Board member wishes 
re-appointment, he must satisfy the administration then in power that he 
can be relied upon to act in accordance with that administration's 
labor-policy views. Hence, Petro says that it was no surprise that 
President Kennedy, with large unions as his principal political 
supporters, quickly achieved a blatantly pro-union majority of members 
displacing the pro-management "Eisenhower" Board.
33Later, three significant conclusions were drawn by Cook in an 
investigation of sentencing behavior of federal judges in draft cases. 
First, that where law and precedent provide weak guidelines rather than 
mandates, the choices of decision-makers are affected strongly by his or 
her political association and personal history. Second, that judges 
treat sentencing as policy decisions. Their decisions can either 
support or impede policies, and they clearly perceive the relationship 
between their decisions and public policy. Third, that associations 
with "policy specific" groups (e.g. political party affiliation) bias 
decisions in the direction of the commitment or philosophy of that 
group. The investigation also suggested that Democratic judges 1) are 
more liberal (i.e. milder sentences) than Republican judges, but 2) that 
their liberalism tends to be dampened (i.e harsher sentences) under 
incongruent circumstance (Republican environment in the locale of the
33Beverly Blair Cook, "Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges:
Draft Cases - 1972," Cincinnati Law Review, vol. 42 (1973), pp. 597-633.
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decision) as opposed to congruent circumstances (i.e. Democratic judge 
in a Democratic environment). Republican judges, however, demonstrated 
no appreciable difference in sentencing behavior in congruent or 
incongruent environments.
The Cook study examined 1852 draft cases by 304 federal district 
judges in 1972. Regression was used to develop a model. The predictive 
capability of the model was tested using the sentences of a district 
judge in the 7th Circuit during fiscal year 1973. Predictive capability 
was analyzed with differences (actual severity lower than predicted) 
explained on the basis of a trend toward lighter sentences.
In the development of a representation model of judicial decision-
34making, the basic finding of Gibson is that the sentencing behavior of 
criminal court judges is influenced by representational role 
orientations and environmental attributes. The approach used and the 
results achieved by Gibson essentially track those of Cook. Gibson uses 
twenty-six judges of district court in twenty-five counties in Iowa. A 
sample of 2,715 cases initiated during the two-year period 1972 and 1973 
(and concluded by 1974) which resulted in convictions were used since 
this study focuses on sentencing behavior. Three control variables were 
used: 1) Nine characteristics of cases and defendants (e.g. defendant’s
sex, age, previous convictions, plea), 2) attitudes and value of 
criminal justice officials, and 3) policies and practices of pre-trial 
decision makers. Using path analysis, Gibson's findings include the 
suggestion that judges are responsive to the environment in which they
James L. Gibson, "Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of 
Judges: A Representation Model of Judicial Decision Making," Law and 
Society, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1980), pp. 343-370.
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work (e.g. incidence of crime accounts for one-sixth of the variance in 
sentencing behavior). Representative role orientations (e.g. "trustee",
"delegate") measured using Likert response sets, were strong.
35In one investigation, Irving, Taylor and Wallace contend that the
decisions by members of the Board frequently are inconsistent with the
facts in a case. They purport that the Board often ignores, misuses or
assumes facts in order to reach a preconceived result. The authors add
that the Board does this more out of purpose than as the result of
ignorance, because it is bent upon establishing its preconception. From
a review of ten case decisions, they suggest that the Board is
stubbornly inattentive to the individualized facts of the particular
cases under review. The problem, as the authors see it, is one of
attitude, not of administrative procedure. No matter what procedural
changes may be instituted, the Board's decision, they conclude, would
still be controlled by attitude. The only solution to the Board's lack
of realism, the authors recommend, is to look for greater realism
through future Board appointments. They suggest that reliance by the
Board on "empirical" studies in making decisions (as was done in support
36of their decision in Shopping Kart Food Markets ) creates more problems 
than it solves.
If the findings of Peck, Petro, Cook, Gibson and Irving et al are 
accurate, we may speculate that the judicial decision-making may not 
adhere wholly to the provisions of the Act. We may suspect that
35 John S. Irving, Jr., Carl. L. Taylor and Barbara Childs Wallace, 
"General Empirical Studies: Not a Substitute for Proof in Individual
NLRB Proceedings," University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 1981, No. 2. 
pp. 99-113.
36 28 NLRB 1311 (1977).
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influences such as congruencies and incongruencies of their ideologies 
and the ideologies of their appointees may have some effects on their 
decisions.
Voting Behavior
The field of decision-making or "voting" behavior, with its focus 
on the individual as the voter (e.g. judge, commissioner, Board member) 
rather than on the structure within which the decision is made (e.g. the 
court as an institution or the law, as rationally developed, being 
administered by an agency) is relatively new. An underlying question - 
how do attitudes and belief systems of the decision-maker, as an 
individual, affect his or her choices? - has led to examinations of an 
array of variables. Among the more prominent variables examined have 
included: 1) influence of appointing authority, 2) personal make up,
and 3) environmental conditions.
Influence of Appointing Authority
Disclosures brought to light in the course of the investigation of
the National Labor Relations Board by the Special Congressional
37 38Committee were analyzed by Smith in one of the earliest studies of
Board members' voting behavior. The author asserts that NLRB behavior
is a sole result of the type of persons in whom administration of the
Act has been entrusted. The prejudices of the members are directly
related to the authority responsible for their appointment. Smith
relies on case histories to support contention of partiality in its
employer-union decisions.
37 Authorized by H.R. 258, 76th Congress, 2nd Session (July 20,
1939).
38 Howard W. Smith, "NLRA - Abuses in Administrative Procedures," 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 27 (1941) pp. 625-32.
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Most important decisions by commissioners of regulatory agencies
inherently involve value judgments which are correlated with the party
affiliation of the appointing authority. This conclusion by Nagel and 
39Lubin was derived from their analysis of decisions by twenty groups of 
commissioners: seven agencies (Civil Aviation Board, Federal
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade 
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, National Labor Relations 
Board and Securities and Exchange Commission) for three time period 
years (1936, 1946 and 1956) - there was no Civil Aviation Board in 1936. 
The twenty groups included 100 individuals as decision-makers. Only 
non-unanimous decisions were considered (based on their rationale that 
these were more controversial with more differences to be accounted for) 
which represented five percent of total decisions. The assignment of 
Democratic-Republican labels of liberal-conservative was based on 
history, urbanism, working class and ethnic-group orientation of 
Democratic party relative to Republican Party. Tendencies (pro-liberal, 
pro-conservative) in decisions were found to be dampened, but not 
reversed, in cases of re-appointments of commissioners by an authority 
of an opposing party. This dampening affect is explained on the basis 
that reappointments are motivated more on inertia and less on 
ideological considerations than are initial appointments. Some 
conclusions concerning background characteristics are interesting.
Alumni of high-tuition schools tended to be more liberal, as were 
non-lawyers. Whether an individual had been a former professor or a
Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin, "Regulatory Commissioners and 
Party Politics," Administrative Law Review, Vol 17 (Fall 1964) pp. 
39-47.
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corporate executive did not make a difference. Liberal commissioners
tended to be more likely to dissent than conservative commissioners,
regardless of which party dominated the agency (reasoned as liberals
being more innovative and non-conforming).
40DeLorme raised two questions generated from perceptions of 
partisan observers which he sought to answer by an analysis of voting 
records of Boards consisting of a majority of members nominated under 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, and Nixon-Ford administrations: (1) To
what extent does the voting behavior of NLRB members reflect the labor 
relations philosophy of the Presidents who appointed them?; and (2) Is 
there any observed tendency of individual Board members to vote pro­
union or promanagement affected by the election of a new administration 
whose labor relations philosophy is different from the President who 
appointed these Board members?
DeLorme analyzed 1250 unfair labor practice decisions which
"involved novel questions or set precedents that may be of substantial
41importance in the future administration of the Act." Votes by
42individual Board members on the three aforementioned Presidents'
43Boards were inspected. A decision was classified as either
40 Charles D. DeLorme, Jr. and Norman J. Wood, "NLRB Voting on 
Important Unfair Labor Practice Decisions: 1955-1975." American
Business Law Journal vol. 16 (1978) pp. 223-229.
41 This classification of decisions is found in each Annual Report.
42 These were obtained from the Decisions and Orders of the NLRB of 
each year included in the study period.
43 A "President's Board" was defined as beginning during the fiscal 
year wherein his designated Board Chairman served in that capacity for a 
twelve month period.
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promanagement if the Board dismissed a union's unfair labor practice 
complaint or upheld a management complaint, and as prounion if the Board 
upheld a union unfair labor practice complaint or dismissed a management 
complaint. Sample percentage calculations were made showing that voting 
by the two Republican Presidents' Boards (Eisenhower and Nixon) were 
preponderantly promanagement, whereas the Democratic Kennedy-Johnson 
Board was prolabor. No statistical test of significance, however, was 
performed.
A comparable analysis was made of percentages of prolabor and 
promanagement votes cast by individual Board Members. Inspection of the 
voting record of individual members who were carryovers from one 
President's Board to another indicated that his voting pattern was 
apparently not materially affected by the election of a new President of 
a different political party.
DeLorme concluded that the voting behavior of NLRB members reflects 
the labor relations philosophies of the President who appointed them 
because each President appointed an NLRB majority which was 
promanagement (Eisenhower, Nixon) or prounion (Kennedy-Johnson). Once 
appointed, however, a member of the NLRB did not alter his promanagement 
or prounion voting tendencies if the other major political party won the 
Presidency.
Personal Makeup
Personal makeup has focused on education; background 
characteristics of achieved attributes and ascribed attributes 
(particularly age, religion, place of birth and ethnicity); career 
experiences (both prior and prospective); reference groups (including 
religious affiliations and political party affiliations), and 
decision-making values and attitudes.
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Many of these suspected predictors of voting essentially are
nominal and therefore less useful in parametric statistical techniques
than are ratio and interval variables. Notable exceptions here are age
and education, while others have been transformed into interval
measures, such as calculating the number of miles between the birthplace
44and the decision site of the decision-maker.
Political party affiliation has been found to be a relatively good 
predictor of a judge's vote in both criminal cases and in civil cases
involving economic issues. Such has been the consistent conclusion by
45 46 47 48Ulmer , Goldman , Feeley and Nagel , the latter being one of the
more prolific researchers in this area. Nagel has investigated a
variety of facets of judicial backgrounds to establish specific
decisional propensities of judges. Two of Nagel's studies are
particularly noteworthy because of the relevancy of their content and
their methodology to this study. In a study of multiple correlations of
judicial backgrounds and decisions, Nagel investigated eight background
44 Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "The Federal District Courts and Urban 
Policy: An Exploratory Study (1960-1967)", No. 12, Frontiers of
Judicial Research, edited by Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968) 373-404.
45 E. Ulmer, "The Political Party Variables in the Michigan Supreme 
Court," Journal of Public Law, Vol. 11 (1964) pp. 352-370.
46 F. Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Court of 
Appeals, 1961-64," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60 (1966) pp. 
374-392.
^  M. Feeley, "Another Look at the 'Party Variable' in Judicial 
Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court," Polity,
Vo. 4 (1971) pp. 91-107.
48 Stuart S. Nagel, "Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds 
and Decision," Florida State University Law Review, Vol 2, No. 2 
(Spring, 1974) pp. 258-270.
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variables (political party affiliation, pressure group affiliation, 
ethnic affiliation, pre-judicial occupation, education, attitudes, age 
and size of hometown) and two decision tendencies: to decide for the
defense (in criminal cases) and to decide more "liberally," in economic 
cases (e.g. for tenant in landlord-tenant cases or for labor in 
union-management cases).
All of the background variables were scaled by Nagel to assume only
one of two values, as were the two dependent variables. In both
criminal-case and economic-case decisions the political party
affiliation had the highest correlation coefficients with coefficients
relating to occupation, education and age much lower. In a similar 
49earlier study Nagel had comparable findings. That earlier study, 
however, did not involve correlation. Percentages were calculated for 
each of the two groups and the differences between group percentages 
were evaluated on the basis of the probability that the differences were 
attributable to chance. Significant differences were found for 
political party affiliation, religion (protestant, Catholic) and 
attitudes (high liberalism, low liberalism).
Environmental Conditions
Booker and Trafford^ examined seven environmental conditions as 
potential predictors of prolabor or promanagement NLRB decisions: size
of union population; percent change (from prior year) of union
49 Stuart S. Nagel, "Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases , 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 53 (1962) 
333-339.
Gene S. Booker and Cris L. Trafford, "Environment and NLRB Bias: 
A Quantitative Study", Labor Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April, 1966)
pp. 202-210.
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population; unemployment percentage rate; number of work stoppages 
(current year and one-year earlier); Board member age (when initially 
appointed), and board service tenure of Board member. The years covered 
were 1937-1963, separated into three periods: Pre-Taft-Hartley
(1937-1947); Post-Taft-Hartley (1948-1963); overall (1937-1963), and 
additionally into six-year moving periods. Based on a series of 
correlations, the authors' major conclusions were that higher 
pro-union/pro-management decision ratios were engendered by fewer work 
stoppages and by increased unemployment, whereas increased union 
membership is accompanied by lower pro-union/pro-management decision 
ratios. Younger members appeared to display a pro-union bias. Board 
service was deemed ineffective (small correlation) in biasing the 
decisions of a Board member.
Political Bias In Regulatory Agencies
As was indicated in the previous section, regulatory agencies are 
quasi-judicial. The filling of decision-making positions within these 
agencies via less-than-lifetime political appointments creates exposure 
to political bias in decisions rendered. This section therefore 
includes studies which address political bias in agencies as a group, 
and the NLRB iv. particular. Unlike most other regulatory agencies’’* the 
authorizing statute of the National Labor Relations Board does not 
require some bipartisan appointments. The exposure to political bias in 
Board decisions, therefore, is particularly threatening.
For example; Civil Aviation Board, Federal Communications 
Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission, 
Interstate Commerce Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Historically, the Eisenhower Board was the first Board with a
Republican-appointed majority. This condition triggered a number of
52 53early analyses with parallel conclusions, by Wirtz, Ratner ,
54 55Finley , and Scher , the latter of which involves the most definitive 
approach.
Seymour Scher posits that "independent" regulatory commissions are 
not divorced from politics. So-called "independent" agencies are 
subjected to much of the same kinds of activities designed to affect 
them as are those presumably "non-independent" executive agencies. The 
appointive process is seen as crucial to have the agency read the law as 
the regulated parties themselves would. Since who fills agency 
positions formally involves the President and the Senate they logically 
become the target of activity by clientele to influence those 
selections. Scher contends that Presidents fix their stamp on the 
policies developed by the independent commissions by using the 
appointment process with no reluctance to appoint "their" members, and 
in the last analysis it is at this appointment stage that the vigor or 
drift which will characterize these agencies is determined. Scher uses 
a case study of one agency, the National Labor Relations Board, during
52 W. Willard Wirtz, "Two Years of the New NLRB", American Bar 
Association, Section of Labor Relations Law, Proceedings, 1955, pp.
4-15.
53 Mozart G. Ratner, "Policy-Making by the New 'Quasi-Judicial' 
NLRB," University of Chicago Law Review XXIII, 12 (1955).
54 Joseph E. Finley, "Labor Act Upside Down - NLRB: Now an
Employer Agency?", Public Affairs Institute (Washington, 1958).
Seymour Scher, "Regulatory Agency Control Through Appointment: 
The Case of the Eisenhower Administration and the NLRB," The Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1961), pp. 667-88.
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one presidential administration, that of President Eisenhower, to 
support his position and contentions. Scher's use of a case study 
focuses on the dynamics of the appointment process and the attempts of 
clientele to influence the process. Hard evidence of affecting 
decisions via the process is provided through illustrative post-1954 
decisions by the "Eisenhower Board".
In 1977, Hugh Heclo"^ interviewed nearly two hundred individuals 
who had served in various agencies. These individuals had been 
appointees of Presidents from Herbert Hoover through Jimmy Carter.
Heclo made no attempt to obtain a random statistical sample. His aim 
was "to weigh rather than to count opinions and to counterbalance 
self-serving statements with responses from other participants whose 
views could be expected to be self-serving in a contrary direction.
Thus I sought out Republican and Democratic appointees...Such as it was, 
my sample was drawn by using the real scales by which people are weighed 
in Washington - that is, their reputations." Reliability of the 
information collected is subject to the perceptions of the appointees, 
and as Heclo states,"... how perceptively I have heard what was being 
said. The analysis is mine, not the interviewees'."
Heclo concludes that the performance of presidential appointees is 
strongly affected by the policies of the administration, rather than 
"personal motives, jockeying for position, and directionless power." He 
further concludes that appointees take their oaths of office seriously 
and that vast numbers of them struggle hard to conduct the public's
56 Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers - Executive Politics in 
Washington (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1977).
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business and are concerned about the substance of the policies with 
which they have been entrusted.
William T. Gormley^ set out to test the "revolving door 
hypothesis" through a study of nonunanimous votes cast by the seven 
members of the Federal Communication Commission in 299 cases during a 
two-year period from 1974 to 1976. The revolving door phenomenon refers 
to an exchange of commissioners/employees between a regulated industry 
and its regulatory body. The revolving door hypothesis, in effect, 
states that a regulatory commissioner with previous or prospective ties 
to a regulated industry is more likely to vote in support of the 
regulated industry's interests. Gormley did find support for the 
hypothesis. More striking, however, it was revealed that political 
party identification of the appointing President did a much better job 
of predicting voter behavior than the anticipated variable of prior 
background of commissioners. Gormley suggests from these results that 
regulatory agencies could change dramatically as Presidents appoint 
members of their party to regulatory agencies.
Gormley employed two analysis techniques widely used by students of 
judicial behavior: bloc analysis and Guttman scaling. Bloc analysis
permits analysis of large bundles of votes for which the direction (e.g. 
liberal vs. conservatism, pro-broadcasting vs. anti-broadcasting) need 
not be determined. It aided Gormley in showing which members were of 
the same voting bloc. Guttman scaling, on the other hand, requires that 
the votes be characterized as having a particular direction, after which
William T. Gormley, Jr. "A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis 
at the FCC", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(November 1979) 665-683.
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dimensions (clusters of votes which lead to consistent voting responses) 
may be indentified. Gormley used Guttman scaling to compare the 
behavior of commissioners with contrasting employment backgrounds and 
political affiliations. Thus bloc analysis revealed the extent to which 
selected commissioners voted together, while the Guttman scaling 
revealed the extent to which the commissioners supported particular 
interests.
58In a quantitative study of Unfair Labor Practice Cases, Roomkin 
developed a regression model containing economic variables (e.g. 
unemployment rates, number of strikes) and aspects of the Board's 
administrative processes (e.g. extent of delay) in an attempt to explain 
the filing behavior of individuals. Among the eight independent 
variables Roomkin used was the Political composition of the Board 
represented by a dichotomous variable, when the majority of Board 
members were appointed by Democratic or Republican administrators, 
respectively. Roomkin relies on "conventional wisdom" (Democrats more 
prounion than Republicans) to hypothesize higher filing rates by unions 
and lower filing rates by employers during periods of Democratic 
control. Using data over the fiscal year period 1952-1975, Roomkin's 
results included the finding that the political affiliation of Labor 
Board members is a statistically significant regressor for 
union-initiated cases only. No evidence emerged, however, that unions 
actually won more cases under Democratically-dominated Boards.
58 Myron Roomkin, "A Quantitative Study of Unfair Labor Practice 
Cases", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 (January, 
1980) pp. 245-56.
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One major study which is both recent and which applies quantitative
59analysis is that of Cooke and Gautschi . The authors developed a model 
which contained individual characteristics of the Board member; 
characteristics of the alternatives, and environmental factors, a total 
of ten factors. Individual characteristics included five factors: a
match between political affiliation of the member and the appointing 
party (two factors, Democrat-Democratic and Republican- Republican), 
prior employment in a management position; place of residence prior to 
appointment (SMSA/non-SMSA), and age (at time of decision). The former 
four factors were valued in binary terms, whereas the latter was scaled 
with actual age in years. Three factors addressed case alternatives: 
who initiated the unfair labor practice charge (Employer or Union) and 
what was the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (support or 
reject). Although four combinations (two-by-two) are possible, the 
authors excluded the cell of "initiated-by-union/supported by ALJ". The 
final two factors were environmental: percentage of Senate that was
Democratic in year of decision, and year of decision (to reflect trend 
influence). A sample of member decisions in novel cases was used for 
the period 1954-1977. Ten cases were used from each year of the period, 
with a total sample size (member decisions) of 892. Their data were 
analyzed using McFadden's conditional logit technique. Among the 
factors of individual characteristics, political affiliation was 
concluded to be a good predictor whereas age, prior management 
employment and place of residence were not. The factors concerning
59 William N. Cooke and Frederick H. Gautschi III, "Political Bias 
in NLRB Unfair Labor Practices Decisions", Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 35 (July 1982) 539-49.
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characteristics of the alternatives as well as the two environmental 
factors were insignificant.
Twenty-nine decisions (made by the Board since it has been composed
of a majority of members appointed by President Reagan) which reverse
prior Board decisions, have been analyzed by former member of the NLRB, 
60Peter D. Walther. Walther states that the present Board decisions are 
not, in fact, anti-union and are not a deviation from historically 
established Board principles. In fact, Walther posits, it was the 
liberal Board decisions of the late 1970's and early 1980's (i.e. the 
Carter Board) which were reversed, that were deviations. What can be 
described as a more pro-management complextion is the result of the fact 
that, as Walther puts it, "to get from left field back into center 
field, one must move to the right."
The evaluation by Klotz^* parallels that of Walther. Klotz 
concludes that the Reagan Board has not changed the central concepts of 
labor law, and protests by organized labor that decisions by 
the Board are undermining the law are erroneous. The Reagan Board, he 
contends, is merely restoring a proper balance between labor and 
management in a number of areas. Klotz bases his conclusions on an 
analysis of selected (but unidentified) case decisions in which the 
"Reagan Board has overruled some overly pro-union and unsound decisions 
of the Carter NLRB or prior Boards. It has also revised certain NLRB 
doctrines that federal appellate courts rejected." In support of his
^  Peter D. Walther, "The NLRB Today", Labor Law Journal, Vol. 36, 
No. II (November 1985), pp. 803-817.
^  Gary W. Klotz, "The NLRB: Balance is Restored", Detroit Times,
March 6, 1986, p. 8.
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"proper balance" evaluation, Klotz cites comparative statistics between 
the Reagan and Carter Boards. For example, the Carter Board decided 
against employers eighty-five percent of the time, in 1979 and 1980, 
compared to fifty-five percent of the time by the Reagan Board, in 1983 
and 1984. The "proper balance" of Klotz is equivalent to Walther's move 
"back into center field". Under the Reagan appointees, the author adds, 
the Board is more pro-employer than in the past, but continues to 
protect employee rights and to promote collective bargaining. The 
Carter Board, however, was decidedly pro-labor, and the Reagan Board’s 
shift to "proper balance" does not warrant organized labor's 
allegations. Labor's allegations are characterized as partisan 
exaggerations.
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Summary
Despite empirical ambiguities, coupled with theoretical 
differences, two issues emerge. First, a degree of dysfunctional 
judicial behavior seems unavoidable. These behaviors reportably include 
ignoring or tailoring facts in a case to fit preconceived conclusions 
and creating provisions which do not in fact exist in the Act. Second, 
these behaviors share some common correlates in background 
characteristics cf members.
The contention of this study is that individuals bring to their 
positions as Board Members certain beliefs, attitudes and values. These 
personal makeups in combination with the quasi-judicial role of members, 
the ambiguity of the Act, and the intricacies of the labor management 
dispute, give rise to varying interpretations of what each member views 
as the facts of the case and the provisions and meanings of the Act. 
Each case to be decided is a separate cluster of these variables and 
from each cluster flows an observable behavior - a vote. Not all 
members share the same backgrounds and ideologies, and they vote 
differently, even when given the same set of facts and the same 
criterion provided in the written act. Because the votes differ, 
allegations of bias, and of political bias specifically, abound among 
both members of organized labor and of management. This study examines 
those intricacies to see if there is a link between the votes cast by 
members and the political influences emanating from the appointing 
authority that is sufficiently strong to justify the contentions of 
bias, and explores the possibility that bias could be partially offset 
or dampened by stability below the Board level (the recommendation of 
Delaney, Lewin and Sockell previously noted in Chapter 1).
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Purposes of the Study
The purposes of this study were to assess the validity of (A) the 
commonly reported belief that decisions at the Board Member level are 
strongly affected by the union-management philosophies of political 
parties in the U.S., and (B) the proposition that the effects of 
political influence on the Board's decisions are partially offset by 
stability below the Board level.
Some of the specific questions that were investigated are (1) Is
there a tendency for a member's decision to vary relative under
conditions of Board unanimity? (2) Is there a tendency for a member's 
decision to vary with age? (3) Is there a tendency for a member's 
decision to favor either management or the union when both the member 
and appointing authority have the same political party affiliation? (4) 
If there is a tendency to favor either management or the union, does it 
remain constant over time? and (5) Does organizational stability below 
Board Member level affect the tendency for a member's decision to vary?
The study design takes into account the process by which decisions 
regarding unfair labor practice charges are made as well as the
individual Board members making decisions. Hypotheses are addressed to
various factors affecting members' decisions.
The process by which ULP charges are decided is described in 
Appendix C and the paths which are followed are illustrated in Appendix 
J. A list of Board members, including those who served during the 
period of this study, is provided in Appendix E.
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Significance of the Study
The significance of this study lies in the ability to model the 
political context in which Board decisions are made, 
the utility of the variables selected, the innovation of the 
investigation of the effects of stability below Board level, and the use 
of logit. Logit was used as a technique to overcome the shortcomings of 
regression analysis, the quantitative methodology previously
62predominating in studies involving dichotomous dependent variables.
Research concerning the National Labor Relations Board has begun to 
depart markedly from the traditional attention on the evolution and 
meaning of Board doctrines. A new approach which is more behavioral is 
gaining favor. Interest is shifting to objective ways of explaining 
decisional phenomena in terms of operationally defined concepts and 
empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning human behavior. While not 
ignoring Board doctrines entirely, research is tending to address the 
development of mathematical models of Board voting in unfair labor 
practice cases.
This emerging research promises to do much to revitalize an area of 
labor relations which some observers considered as going stale. Few 
academicians or practitioners, however, would downplay the importance of 
the NLRB in labor relations. Many would agree that the question of 
political bias in decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board 
in Unfair labor practice cases will continue to exist under the 
prevailing two-party system of government in the United States. Without
Discussion of logit and rationale for its selection as the 
analysis technique is included in Chapter 3.
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objective study of the type conducted here, there will be little 
movement toward gaining an answer to this question. Use of the appeals 
procedure of decisions rendered by an administrative law judge will 
continue at its high î ate as long as the employer-union litigants 
perceive the outcome to be more a matter of the pro-management or 
pro-union propensities of Board members rather than a matter of the 
facts of a cases and the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Unduly long periods of time and unwarranted delay in case resolutions 
will continue to pervade NLRB proceedings with their attendant inflated 
costs and inefficiencies of use of both time and human resources.
Further, the analysis of voting behavior could be applied in other 
judicial and quasi-judicial forums, such as arbitration, and in arenas 
other than labor relations, such as civil matters and consumer affairs. 
The methodology here is suitable for increased illumination of the 
complexities in those other areas.
Practitioners in business tend to focus their concerns on what 
decision-makers within their operating environments decide; academicians 
focus on the how and the why of such decisions; and political scientists 
tend to feel that the public has as much "right to know" what such 
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers do, and why, as what their 
elected officials (who create and fill these positions) do and why.
If National Labor Relations Board members view their decisions as 
public property, then students of decision-making behavior may be 
capable of testing hypotheses which are of practical value as well as 
theoretical value. Practical value will ensue when knowledge gained 
flows to the appointing authorities which nominate and confirm Board 
members; to NLRB administrators, and to the Board Members in their roles 
as decision-makers.
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PROCEDURES AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
This chapter begins with a brief description of the paths which
unfair labor practice (ULP) charges follow to reach Board level.
Familiarity with these paths enhances an understanding of the procedures
and method of investigation used in this study. Following this
description, Chapter 3 includes: (1) the hypotheses to be tested; (2)
methodology; (3) research data base; (4) data collection technique, and
(5) data analysis technique.
Procedure for Processing ULP Charges
The paths which ULP charges follow to reach board level may be
63described briefly as follows:
Charge, Investigate, Complaint and Answer. Unfair labor practice 
charges are received by the agency's regional and sub-regional offices 
and then are processed. A case may be closed at any stage of the 
process. At each stage, a case which is not closed advances to the next 
higher level. As an initial step, charges (filed by an employer, an 
employee, a labor organization or any person other than a board 
employee) are heard by a field examiner of the General Counsel's office. 
The field examiner decides which charges fall within the definition of 
an ULP and within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The General Counsel's staff investigates qualified charges and 
issues formal complaints as warranted on the basis of the findings of
These basic procedures are illustrated in Appendix C. Other 
background information, such as, Organizational structure, office 
locations, duties and function previously was provided in Chapter 1.
42
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the investigations. During a recent three-year period (fiscal 1980 
through 1982) 119,491 cases dealing with unfair labor practices were
closed (at all stages). These ULP cases represented nearly seventy-
f\ Aeight percent of the 153,494 total cases closed. Of these 119,491 ULP 
cases, eighty-four percent were closed prior to the issuance of a formal 
complaint. The number and percent of cases closed at each stage are 
shown in Appendix D.
Hearings and Report. Those ULP charges which advance and are subject to 
the issuance of a formal complaint receive a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). During the same three-year period, 
seventy five percent of the formal ULP complaints were settled at this 
stage prior to issuance of a decision by one of the Board’s 
approximately one hundred administrative law judges.
Board Review of Contested Cases. The ALJ may decide either to dismiss 
the charge or to issue a cease and desist order. At the next stage, 
a decision made by an ALJ may be appealed to the five-member Board.^ 
Historically, the appeal procedure has been pursued frequently in all 
decisions issued by an ALJ. Those cases which reach the stage of Board 
level are assigned to a three-member panel.^ Which three members are
64 The remaining twenty-two percent of the cases closed were 
concerned with representation.
^  In some cases, the parties may waive a hearing before an ALJ, 
the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by an ALJ and the 
issuance of an ALJ's decision, and instead submit the proceedings 
directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order.
^  The number of members on the Board was increased from three to 
five by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and Section 3(b) of 
the LMRA provides that "The Board is authorized to delegate to any group 
of three or more members any and all of the Powers which it may itself 
exercise."
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
44
included in the panel is determined on a random selection basis by the 
Executive Secretary. The full Board, however, meets only under special 
circumstances, primarily when requested by the three-member panel or by 
legal staff assistants.
Hypotheses
This section includes the hypotheses used to assess the 
validity of (A) the commonly reported belief that decisions at the 
Board-member level are strongly affected by the union-management 
philosophies of political parties in the U.S., and (B) the proposition 
that the effects of political influence on the Board's decisions are 
partially offset by stability below the Board-level.
In the U.S., political party affiliation is either Democratic or 
6 7Republican. Four combinations, therefore, are possible, as previously 
described in Chapter 2. Two of these four combinations are congruent; 
that is, the political party of the appointing authority and the party 
with which the member is affiliated are the same; namely, 
Democratic-Democratic and Republican-Republican. The remaining two
Other political parties do exist and have existed during the 
period of this study. The Democratic and Republican parties, however, 
are the only two parties with which the appointing authorities and the 
members have been aligned. The political philosophy of the Democratic 
party is defined as "pro-labor", whereas the political philosophy of the 
Republican party is defined as "pro-management". The philosophical 
classifications have been adopted from prior studies discussed in 
Chapter 2. Political affiliation is defined as the political party of 
which the Board Member or the appointing authority is a member. Don A. 
Zimmerman's political party is indicated (in NLRB personnel data 
records) as "Independent". Based on Mr. Zimmerman's generally-known 
pro-labor philosophical orientation, however, his political affiliation 
in this study has been coded as "Democrat". The President of the United 
States is the appointing authority. Appointments are made, however, "by 
and with the consent of the Senate", as discussed in Chapter 1.
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combinations are incongruent; that is, the political party alignments of
the appointing authority and the member are opposite; namely,
Democratic-Republican and Republican-Democratic.
It can be anticipated that in the two congruent combinations
reinforcing political philosophies would exist and that the vote of a
Board Member in an employer-union ULP case, would be either strongly
pro-union (in a Democratic-Democratic match) or strongly pro-management
(in a Republican-Republican match). These anticipated outcomes are
68consistent with the findings of DeLorme and Wood and Cooke and 
Gautschi^.
The hypotheses concerning the members' decision as a function of 
the political party of the appointing authority and the members' 
affiliation tested are:
Hypothesis 1:
Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic presidents 
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers 
than are Democratic or Republican members originally appointed by
presidents of opposite parties or Republican members originally
appointed by Republican presidents.
Hypothesis 2:
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents 
are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers 
than are Democratic or Republican members appointed by presidents
of opposite parties or Democratic members originally appointed by
Democratic presidents.
C. Q
Delorme and Wood, "NLRB voting", pp. 223-29.
69 Cooke and Gautschi, "Political Bias", pp. 539-49.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, it has been noted by Delaney, Lewin and 
Sockell^ that little if any attention in the fifty years of research of 
the National Labor Relations Act has been given to the aspect of 
stability below the Board level. It is to be recalled that both Board 
member and General Counsel are PAS positions (Presidential Appointment 
with £enate confirmation), and are for limited terms of five and four 
years, respectively, with re-appointment permissible. The position of 
Regional Director, however, is an "employment-type" position. As such, 
incumbency in the Regional Director position is surmised to follow a 
typical career-type model. This position is filled, for example, by 
advancement from within the agency or by recruitment of qualified 
individuals from without the agency. It seems reasonable, therefore, to 
speculate that political ideologies and pro-management/pro-union 
philosophical orientations do not play a major role in the selection 
process, and are subjugated to other personal specifications such as 
managerial skills and organization abilities and experience.
Within the division of the duties and functions of the Board and 
the General Counsel, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) plays a vital 
role as a linking pin between the Board/General Counsel and the Regional 
Director. A unique insight to the ALJ is provided by former Chairman of 
the NLRB, Edward B. Miller.^ The ALJ (formerly called trial examiners) 
are first-line decision makers in ULP cases. Unlike election cases 
(which are handled by a staff member from within the Region Office), the
^  Delaney, Lewin & Sockell, "The NLRA at Fifty", p. 51.
^  Edward B. Miller, An Administrative Appraisal of the NLRB 
(Philadelphia, PA, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1978) pp. 13-25.
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Administrative Law Judges are not organizational residents of a region 
in which the ULP trial occurs. Rather, the ALJ is a surrogate of the 
decision-making side of the agency (i.e. the five-member Board in 
Washington, D.C.). Administrative Law Judges are headquartered in four 
locations (Washington, D.C., New York City, Atlanta and San Francisco), 
with each of these locations serving sections of the United States.
After conducting the trial (which is done in much the same fashion as 
trials in a federal court, but with less adherence to strict rules of 
evidence) the ALJ issues a written decision. Miller candidly suggests, 
however, that the ALJ is in a very real sense a "make-believe judge". A 
decision by an ALJ has no teeth and cannot be enforced until the Board 
has reviewed and adopted it and it is taken to a court of appeals to 
secure an enforceable order.
The metamorphosis of "trial examiner" to "judge" and "Intermediate 
Report and Recommended Order" to "Judge's Decision" underscores the 
change in expectations of the involved parties (i.e. union, employer) 
from one of a mere administrative report to a judicial decision.
Miller summarizes the matter in this way:
Both the Board and the Bar now regard the hearing before the 
administrative law judge in very much the same light as they would 
regard, for example, a bench trial of a Title VII case by a 
district court judge. It is before the administrative law judge 
that the basic facts of the case will be established. It is by 
this officer that credibility resolutions will be made, which are 
rarely tampered with thereafter either by the Board or by a 
reviewing court. In short, the case for the Board or for the 
respondent will essentially be won or lost in this initial unfair 
labor practice hearing. Thus the judges, although without so much 
enforceable authority as even a justice of the peace, are 
nevertheless regarded by the parties as performing a critical 
judicial, not merely an administrative, function. Their role has, 
no doubt, grown in importance over the years. They are more than
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hearing officers. They are the bencl^sitters and have probably 
earned the right to be called judge.
Both the Board and its surrogate the ALJ may be viewed, so to
speak, as "outsiders". Their involvement with cases within a region is
percipitated by what occurs in the region. The Regional Director
becomes a gatekeeper of a fashion. Career-oriented Regional Directors
should be motivated more by long-term objective processing of cases with
reliance chiefly on factual content. As a result, Regional Directors
develop policies and practices to guide the affairs of their regions
accordingly. The composition and the clarity of such policies are
enhanced by stability in the position of Regional Director, with such
73stability serving an insulating function. The ebb and flow of 
politically inspired turnover (at the Board level) should be 
sufficiently removed from the operating level. Stability within the 
region provides an insulating affect against politically biased Board 
decisions. One may conjecture, therefore, that in novel cases the 
decisions of a Board Member will adhere more closely to case facts and 
be less influenced by pro-union/pro-management biases in a stable region 
than will such decisions in an unstable region. Although the literature 
is sparse to non-existent in this area (as Delaney, et al observed),
72 Miller, An Administrative Appraisal of the NLRB, p. 21.
73
The ALJ also could be a source of stability below Board level, 
as has been conjectured of the Regional Director. Stability contributed 
by the ALJ, however, has not been attempted for the sake of maintaining 
a manageable scope of this study and because of the intractability of 
the entry, movement and exit of hundreds of ALJ's throughout the 
regional network over the twenty-two year time period.
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developmental information was obtained through personal interviews. A 
third hypothesis tested, therefore, is as follows:
Hypothesis 3:
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers in unstable regions than in stable regions.
Stability is valued either as stable or as unstable. A stable 
region is one in which there was no turnover in the position of Regional 
Director within the fiscal year (of the decision) or within the 
preceding fiscal year. An unstable region is one in which there was 
turnover in the position of Regional Director within the fiscal year (of 
the decision) or within the preceding fiscal year. Under this 
definition, the assigned value (stable or unstable) of some regions 
remained constant over the entire period of this study whereas others 
changed one or more times. During the time period of this study, 
several new regions were established. The establishment of a new region 
was treated in the same manner as turnover; that is, the region was 
valued as unstable during the initial two years of its existence.
Region 30 (established at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June, 1964), for 
example, was coded as unstable for decisions made in fiscal years 1964 
and 1965.
Interviews were held with personnel in the Regional Director's 
office of Region 15, New Orleans (Fallon Bentz, Joseph Norton), 
attorneys of law firms representing both employers and unions before the 
NLRB (Samuel Lang, Joseph Vigurie, William Banta, John Ormond, Andrew 
Partee), a labor union official (Charles Godfrey) actively involved in 
Board cases statewide in Louisiana, and individuals with managerial 
responsibilities for labor relations in companies.
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Irrespective of the role of stability, the ALJ could exert a bias 
on the decision outcome. A decision by a Board member may involve 
deference to the decision of the ALJ which is under review. In this 
study, therefore, those decisions which affirmed the ALJ and those which 
were in disagreement with the ALJ were examined to determine if any bias 
could be suggested by this condition.
The literature has mentioned a number of personal characteristics 
(e.g. age, memberships) and environmental factors (e.g. political 
climate, trend) which it has been speculated as affecting members' 
votes. Investigations of these speculations (as reviewed in Chapter 2) 
have yielded mixed results. On the basis of my discussions in the 
aforementioned personal interviews, it appeared that the effects of such 
personal characteristics probably would be inconsequential compared to 
political affiliations and stability; whereas certain environmental 
factors may be important. Several personal characteristics, therefore, 
are included in the model (with a fourth hypothesis tested) as well as 
trend, with two environmental factors (with a fifth hypothesis tested).
Hypothesis 4A:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by age.
Hypothesis 4B:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by the type
of degree they have been awarded.
Hypothesis 4C:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by their
prior memberships in special interest organizations.
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Hypothesis 4D:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by the type
of their occupation prior to Board appointment.
In hypothesis 4A, age is defined as the age of the member measured 
in full years as of the year of the decision. A member with a date of 
birth in 1916, for example John H. Fanning (September 19, 1916), would 
have a measured age of forty-six for decisions made in 1962. The type 
of degree possessed by a member, in Hypothesis 4B, is defined as the 
undergraduate degree awarded to the member, with the types classified as 
either business administration/economics or non-business 
administration/economics (e.g. history, English, journalism). One 
member, Peter D. Walther, does not have an undergraduate degree.^ In 
Hypothesis 4C, a member's special interest organizational membership is 
defined as the primary type of organizations of which he or she was a 
member (prior to appointment to the Board), classified as management- 
CiTxcTiticd end noTi“”T!i3ii32smsnt 0Trl.sntiscl» A msmlDSir* s occup3til.cn is dciinsd 
in Hypothesis 4D as his or her principal type of occupation (prior to 
appointment to the Board), with the same classifications as used in 
organizational memberships (Hypothesis 4C).
Comments made by interviewees suggest that trends in the 
labor-management environment may influence decisions. Two observed
^  In a telephone interview, Member Walther explained that he 
attended the University of Virginia in an undergraduate/law school 
combined program in which the undergraduate degree is awarded during the 
second year of law school, provided all other requirements are met.
Upon receiving the law degree (in 1952), however, he lacked a course 
required for his program (in Biology) and was not awarded the 
undergraduate degree. Based on the undergraduate curriculum, Member 
Walther was classified as non-business.
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environmental factors, therefore, have been included in the model. The 
first, examined by Booker and Trafford, is the size of the union 
population (measured as a percentage of the labor force). The second 
factor used is the number of ULP charges filed, measured on a per-union 
member basis.^
Hypothesis 5, and its two sub-hypotheses, were tested:
Hypothesis 5:
Members' decisions will not respond to long-run time trend. 
Hypothesis 5A:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers as the size of the union population declines.
Hypothesis 5B:
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers as the rate of ULP charges filed by Unions increases.
In an early study by Asch^, the modification and distortion of 
individual judgments resulting from group pressure were tested.
Focusing on the concept of group consensus, Asch concluded that 
increasing group size leads to increased conformity, but only to the 
point where three additional confederates join the decision-maker.
Cooke and Gautschi experimented with several indices. Some of 
their experimental measures were too narrow. Their "annual percent of 
representation elections won by unions", for example, includes only 
"new" membership and representation issues. A broader measure and one 
that is more direct (vis-a-vis ULP decisions by Board members) was 
deemed desirable.
^  S.E. Asch, "Effects of group pressure upon modification and 
distortion of judgments." In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and 
men. Pittsburg, PA. Carnegie Press, 1951.
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Conformity does not seem to increase with the addition of more than
78three confederates. More recently, Latane has proposed a theory of 
social impact specifying the effect on an individual (such as a single 
member of a board or a panel) of other persons (such as co-members of a 
board or a panel). According to Latane's theory, when other people are 
the source of impact and the individual is the target, impact should be 
a multiplicative function of the strength (e.g. status, prior 
relationships), the immediacy (e.g. closeness in space or time, and 
absence of intervening barriers or filters), and the number of sources 
present (i.e. the number of people present).
Decisions made by the Board (Full Board or Panel) either can be 
unanimous or non-unanimous. In non-unanimous instances the decision 
outcome (i.e. who wins, employer or union) rests on the majority vote.
There could be some concern, therefore, regarding how the voting 
procedure used by the Board may affect the outcome. Some earlier 
studies discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Nagel and Lubin) defined samples to 
include only non-unanimous decisions. A sample composed exclusively of 
non-unanimous decisions, however, may introduce bias unnecessarily, with 
no offsetting benefits of conceptual value. Because the literature is 
sparse to non-existent in this area also, developmental information
78 Bibb Latane, "The Psychology of Social Impact," American 
Psychologist, Vol. 36 No. 4 (April 1981) pp. 343-356.
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again was obtained through personal interviews. Members were 
consistently characterized (by one another) as fiercely independent, 
coupled with a decision-making process, which essentially is void of 
face-to-face interaction and heavily reliant on written memoranda, 
reducing the effect of group pressure to a minimum.
In the decision-making process, a "sub-panel" system is used, 
within which each member chairs a three-member panel and serves as a 
member of two other three-member panels (one which he or she does not 
chair). Decisions are developed separately by each member (with the aid 
of his or her staff personnel). Written drafts of these decisions are 
circulated to the other two members of the sub-panel, with "courtesy of" 
copies sent to the remaining members (i.e. those members not included in 
a given sub-panel). Any member not on a given sub-panel may request 
(and summarily is granted) permission to participate in any decision. 
Written decisions (including dissents) of all sub-panel members (and 
participants) are assembled. Decisions are made by the use of 
"agendas", usually held twice monthly, and the results published.
It is conjectured, however, that members will not entirely be 
insulated from group pressure by the heavy reliance on written 
procedures in the formalized decision process. In this study, 
therefore, the sample includes both unanimous and non-unanimous 
decisions, to test a sixth hypothesis as follows:
Telephone interviews were conducted with Messrs. John Truesdale 
and Joseph Moore, Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary, 
respectively (Mr. Truesdale also is a former Board Member) and a number 
of former Board Members (included in Sources Consulted).
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Hypothesis 6:
Members* decisions, either favoring unions over employers or 
favoring employers over unions, which are unanimous, will 
differ from those decisions which are non-unanimous.
Cooke and Gautschi also found that Board members appear to give 
more weight to ALT decisions involving employer complaints than to ALJ 
decisions involving union complaints. In dealing with union complaints, 
however, they report that Board members to not appear to give any more 
weight to those ULP charges supported by ALJ's than to those dismissed. 
The following three hypotheses, therefore, were tested:
Hypothesis 7A:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers in ULP charges initiated by employers and supported 
by ALJ's, than in ULP charges initiated by unions 
(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated 
by employers and dismissed by ALJ's.
Hypothesis 7B:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers in ULP charges initiated by employers and dismissed 
by ALJ's, than in ULP charges initiated by unions 
(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated 
by employers and supported by ALJ's.
Hypothesis 7C:
Members are no more likely to make decisions favoring 
employers over unions or favoring unions over employers in ULP 
charges initiated by unions and dismissed by ALJ's, than in 
ULP charges initiated by employers (irrespective of support or 
dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated by unions and supported by 
ALJ1s.
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Methodology
The project is a field study or ex post facto inquiry aimed at 
discovering the relationship among variables in actual case decisions 
made by Board members.
As described above, for the most part, only those ALJ decisions 
which have been appealed reach Board level for resolution. The 
hypotheses were tested against a sample of such Unfair Labor Practices 
decisions made by the Board during the fiscal years 1962 through 1983. 
Furthermore, there are several specific aspects of the processing of ULP 
charges which bear directly on the sample developed. These aspects are 
identified here and the manner in which they were handled are covered in 
the following sections.
Motivations for Appeals
In some cases appeals stem from the genuine belief of the losing 
party that the facts were not properly interpreted by the ALJ or that 
legal precedent was unclear. In other cases the appeals may be 
motivated by considerations of a strategic nature. Examples of such 
strategic motivations would be: 1) an attempt by a union (or by an 
employer) to create an atmosphere (as it desires) in the climate of its 
relationships with the employer (or with the union); or 2) a company or 
union attempting to achieve a delay, notwithstanding clear legal 
precedent and/or proper interpretation of facts by an ALJ. The 
decision-making process required of the Board, therefore, could vary 
from a perfunctory level to a level of in-depth, systematic analysis and 
evaluation.
Identifying how many, and which, appealed cases fall into 
categories of genuine or ulterior motivations potentially could be 
difficult. Cooke and Gautschi suggest, however, that this problem can
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be circumvented by a sample delimitation. Each year the NLRB
identifies and discusses in its annual report a selection of cases
brought before the Board that involved "novel questions or that set
precedents that may be of substantial importance in the future
81administration of the Act." Delimiting the sample to include only 
such novel cases, therefore, minimizes the appeal-motivation problem and 
assures that true decision making on the part of the Board member is 
involved. During the three year period (1980-82) cited earlier in the
Introduction, some 207 novel cases were identified in the annual
„ 82 reports.
Categories of Charging Parties
As previously indicated, charges may be filed not only by employers 
and unions but also by employees or any persons other than NLRB 
employees. Because this study focuses on pro-union and pro-management 
political bias in Board decisions, the sample additionally was delimited 
to include only those cases in which the charging parties and the 
respondents are employers and unions. Of all ULP cases (119,491) and 
all novel cases (207) closed during the three years 1980-1982, the 
majority (fifty-three percent and seventy-one percent, respectively) 
exclusively involved employers and unions as charging parties. These 
statistics are included in Appendices H and I.
80 Cooke and Gautschi, Political Bias, p. 542.
81 See, for example NLRB, Twenty-Second Annual Report, p. 62.
82 These statistics are shown in Appendix I.
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Court Reversals
Some cases which come before the Board are cases which have been 
decided previously by a prior Board and are being heard again following 
appeal through the courts. As discussed earlier, Walther examined 
twenty-nine such cases which, upon a second hearing, involved reversals 
of decisions of prior Boards. Of those twenty-nine cases identified by 
Walther, all but two (Our Way, 268 NLRB 394 and American Navigation, 268 
NLRB 426) were decided in second hearings during 1984 or later years. 
Neither Our Way nor American Navigation, both of which were reversed in 
1983, were included in the sample of cases included in this study (the 
last year of which was 1983). These twenty-nine reversals cited relate 
to original decisions made during the late 1970's and early 1980's by 
the Carter Board. As indicated earlier, Walther describes the Carter 
Board as having deviated from established principles. Walther also 
indicates that in the early 1960's (e.g. 1961, 1962) there was a similar 
wave of reversals made by the Board of earlier decisions. Those 
reversals of the early 1960's predominantly involved decisions made by 
the Board following appointments by President Kennedy. As previously 
discussed, Petro explained that President Kennedy, with large unions as 
his principal supporters, quickly achieved a pro-union majority of 
members via his appointments. Walther does not list those reversals to 
permit checking the study sample for their chance inclusion, nor was 
there a method considered suitable to identify other comparable 
reversals. No special treatment, therefore, has been given to reversals 
in this study. If the Board in fact is motivated by a sense of 
obligation to honor the courts' decisions, then this source of such 
potential bias remains to be contemplated.
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Degree of Support by Board Members
In cases that reach Board level, a member may vote either in favor
of the charging party or against the charging party. The cases used in
the sample for the study, as indicated above, are limited to those
involving ULP complaints which have been filed either by the employer or
the union. Once filed, there are eight paths (2x2x2) which a complaint
ji this type may follow to culminate in a member vote; that is, filed by
employer or union, then supported or dismissed by the administrative law
83judge, and finally affirmed or disaffirmed by the Board member. Of
these eight outcomes, four are pro-union and four are pro-management.
The point of concern here is that in making a decision based on the 
facts of the case, a Board member's support at the decision outcome 
stage either can be (1) fully pro-union or pro-management or (2) 
partially pro-union or pro-management. Partial support is reflected 
primarily in two ways. First, by a case in which more than one ULP 
charge has been alleged and the member rendered a "split decision"; that 
is, did not vote exclusively one way, either pro-management or 
pro-union, on all charges. Additionally, partial support is reflected 
by a member who imposes some restriction or limitation to mitigate the 
scope of the order.
Because the dependent variable is a Member vote, and each member 
must vote on each alleged ULP charge, the first situation (i.e. "split 
decisions") poses no concern.
These paths and the eight decision outcomes are diagrammed in 
Appendix J.
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The opportunity for partial agreement in a member's decision by 
modifying the scope of the order of an ALJ however, does raise a 
potential problem of measuring the degree of support or the level of the 
pro-union or pro-management character of the decision. An analysis of 
Board members' actions relative to orders would necessitate an ability 
to gauge the magnitude of potential pro-union or pro-management biases 
which these display. Within the constraints of realism and feasibility, 
and because of the difficulty in achieving a suitable measure of degree 
of support, this was not attempted. When a member, therefore, decided 
that the respondent (employer or union) committed an ULP, the member's 
vote was classified as pro-charging party (union or employer), 
irrespective of the order.
Research Data Base and Sample Size
Two sources of data are decisions included (1) the National Labor
Relations Board Annual Report and (2) Decisions and Orders of the
84National Labor Relations Board. The former document is required under 
Section 3(c) of the National Labor Relations Act and the latter is a 
companion document.
The time period covered by the study is the twenty-two fiscal year 
period 1962 through 1983 (calendar period July 1, 1962 through September 
30, 1983). This twenty-two year period was chosen for several reasons. 
First, this period includes all conditions (e.g. reappointments of 
members, member carryovers, congruent and incongruent appointments). 
Second, four distinct changes from an incumbent Republican to an 
incumbent Democratic administration (i.e. from Eisenhower to
84 U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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Kennedy-Johnson and from Nixon-Ford to Carter) and from an incumbent 
Democratic to an incumbent Republican administration (i.e. from 
Kennedy-Johnson to Nixon-Ford and from Carter to Reagan) are included. 
Finally, 1983 (as the end of the selected time period) is the most 
current fiscal year for which the Annual Report (which includes the 
identification of novel cases) and Decisions and Orders both have been 
published.
The fiscal year period 1962-1983 includes the Twenty-Seventh 
through the Forty-Eighth Annual Reports. Decisions and Orders covering 
the period include Volumes Number 130 through 267. Hearings covering 
Board Members who served during the period of the study were used.
The Annual Report was the source of the sample selection of novel 
ULP cases from each fiscal year. Regional Directors tenure data and 
personal background data of members were obtained from the National 
Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. The Decisions and Orders 
provides the case variables as well as the votes of individual Board 
members for each decision. Where necessary, telephone interviews were 
used to obtain any missing variables of the Board members (e.g. school 
attended).
A sample of fifteen novel cases (novel cases were defined and the 
rationale for their use discussed in the Methodology section) was 
randomly selected from each of the fiscal years covered by this study. 
The total number of cases selected was 330 (15 novel cases per fiscal 
year x 22 fiscal years). The term "case" includes, in some instances,, 
combinations of one or more "filings" (case numbers) which have been 
aggregated. As discussed earlier (in Board Review of Contested Cases) a 
case involves the decision by each member (either for or against the
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union or management) and that any given case may be decided by either 
the Full Board (five members) or a Panel (three members). Some cases 
involved more than one alleged ULP charge, and each decision by the 
member is the sampling unit. The sample size, consequently, is 2147.
Data Collection Technique
Measures of the independent variables (member background, political 
party of the oppointing authority; political affiliation of the Board 
member, and stability of tenure of the Regional Director) and of the 
dependent variable (vote for management or vote for the union) were 
collected on individual Board members using a data collection form. The 
data collection form is discussed below.
The data collection form includes a series of items which traces a 
case from its initial filing at one of the regional or subregional 
offices, through its stage-wise processing until it reaches Board level 
for decision. Recall, any case may follow eight unique paths 
culminating in eight member decision outcomes. Four of these decision 
outcomes are pro-union and four are pro-management as illustrated in 
Appendix J. The items on the form specifically record and code the 
following: (1) Who the charging party was. Only employer-union cases,
as indicated earlier, were included in the sample. Item No. 9 codes the 
charging party as either the union or the employer. (2) Whether the 
decision of the ALJ was to support or to dismiss individual allegations. 
As indicated earlier, the sample was delimited to include only those 
cases in which the hearing by an ALJ was not waived. Item No. 10 codes 
the decision by the ALJ. (3) What the decision was of each Board 
Member. Item No. 13 codes the decision in terms of whether it was to 
affirm or to disaffirm the decision of the ALJ, whereas item No. 19
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codes the decision in terms of its pro-union or pro-management 
character. Item No. 11 codes the total number of charges involved in 
the case, while item No. 12 identifies the specific charge (from among 
the total). Item Nos. 14 and 15 tally the total number of votes 
affirming and disaffirming the decision of the ALJ, respectively. In 
combination, item Nos. 11 through 15 permit analysis of individual 
member voting relative to the majority vote. (4) In which region the 
case was decided. Regions are coded in item No. 16, while the stability 
of the region is coded in item No. 17. (5) Item No. 1 identifies the
individual member, with item Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 8 recording the personal 
characteristics of occupation, undergraduate degree, memberships and 
age, respectively. (6) Item No. 3 and Nos. 2, 18 and 20 record, 
respectively, the political affiliations of members and presidents 
(original appointing, incumbent and reappointing). (7) Year of the 
decision is coded in No. 8.
Data Analysis Technique
This study concerns a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. a 
pro-union or pro-management decision by a Board member) and independent 
variables that, to a large degree, are categorical in nature (e.g. 
political party membership, type of undergraduate degree). The analysis 
of criterion-predictor associative data of these types frequently is 
accomplished by techniques (e.g. regression analysis and analysis of 
variance) which are based on assumptions (e.g. that the dependent 
variable is continuous or at least ordinal) which are not appropriate to 
this study.
Alternatively, analysis of categorical data commonly has been 
accomplished by chi-square analysis. This technique, however, also has
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several shortcomings, particularly when more then two categorical
variables are considered simultaneously. One of these shortcomings,
which Fienberg points out, is that the chi-square approach treats all
pairwise relationships among variables as though there were no other
85variables to be considered. Fienberg also states that chi-square
examines only one such reltaionship at a time. Chi-square, therefore,
is not suitable for this study which involves multivariate relationship.
Another problem of chi-square, as indicated by Goodman, is the
requirement of large sample sizes to avoid empty cells and to maintain
86adequate degrees of freedom and power.
Under chi-square, the necessary sample sizes tend to be much larger
than those required when using regression or analysis of variance. As a
result, it is not uncommon to see these latter techniques substituted
for chi-square, even though they are not appropriate.
There is a technique available, however, that overcomes the
87problems of the aforementioned methods: logit. Logit is a nonlinear
probability model particularly suited to analyzing dichotomous
85 S.E. Fienberg, The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical 
Data, 2nd Edition, Boston, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 
1980.
86 L.A. Goodman, "The Analysis of Multidimensional Contingency 
Tables: Stepwise Procedures and Direct Estimation Methods for Building
Models for Multiple Classifications", Techometrics, Vol. 13, 1971, pp. 
33-61.
87 "Logit" stands for "logistical probability units", so named by 
T. Berkson, "Applications of the logistical functions to bio-assay", 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 39, 1944, pp. 
351-365.
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88variables. In the expression Y * = b X , + e., the dependent randomX X XtC X
variable (Y) is assumed to be binary, taking on only two values (e.g. 
0,1). The outcomes on Y are assumed to be mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. Interest, then, focuses on the value of the parameter P^.
P is the probability that Y equals one, or P = p(Y=l). Y is assumed to 
depend on K observable variables X^ (k = l...k). It is assumed that 
these variables X^ account for the variation in P, which may be written 
in probability terms P = P(y |x ), where X denotes the set of K
independent variables. This assumption is analogous to the standard OLS
regression model in which the independent variables account for the 
variations in the mean or expected value of Y.
The next assumption of the OLS regression would be that the
dependent variable (Y) is linearly associated with the independent 
variable'(X). In logit, the relationship between the variables Y and X 
is expressed as:
Exp
P<1 * 11» '  1 4- EKp(ZbkXk)
The unknowns which remain are the parameters b^. The parallel with 
the OLS regression is that a particular form of the relationship 
(between Y and X) is assumed, up to the unknown parameters b. As in OLS 
regression, it is assumed that the data are generated from a random 
sample (size n), with a sample point denoted by i (i = 1...N). This 
assumption requires that the observations on Y statistically be 
independent of each other to rule out serial correlation. An assumption
88 John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit 
and Probit Models, Sage University Papers, Series: Quantitative 
Applications in the Social Sciences, Number 07-045, Beverly Hills, Sage 
Publications.
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analogous to homoscedasticity (constant variance) in OLS regression is 
not needed in logit because it is implicit in the above equation.
Logit suffers the same problem of multicollinearity as does OLS 
regression. As in OLS, therefore, it is required that no exact or near 
linear dependence exist among the across k.
Logit parameters typically are estimated by a method called Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE), rather than the method of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) in the ordinary regression model. The conceptual 
difference between OLS and MLE is that, while OLS is concerned with 
choosing parameter estimates that provide the smallest sum of squared 
errors in the fit between the model and that data, MLE is concerned with 
choosing parameter estimates that provide the highest probability (or 
likelihood) of having obtained the observed sample Y.
The statistical inference from logit is the same as that of linear 
regression. Logit analysis measures the relationship between 
independent variables, X, and the dependent variable, Y. Estimated 
coefficients (b̂ ) are the (asymptotically unbiased and efficient) point 
estimates of the relationship. Estimated standard errors (Ŝ ) provide 
the usual measure of the likely-variation in the estimated coefficients 
that might be anticipated from sample to sample. The t-stastistic 
(bk/Sfc) is used (as in regression) to test the null hypothesis that a 
coefficient (e.g. b^) is zero (i.e. that the variable X^ has no effect 
on Y*).
In regression analysis, an F stastistic (with K-l and N-K degrees 
of freedom) is used to test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients 
(except the intercept) are zero. In logit, a statistic c, that suits 
the same purpose as the F-Statistic (but based on the likelihood ratio
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principle), is used. The method produces the c-statistic which follows 
(approximately) a chi-square distribution when the null hypothesis is 
true. The F-and c-statistic conceptually are identical. The only 
difference between these two statistics is their computational details. 
In practice, the statistic c (divided by its degrees of freedom, K-l) 
frequently is treated as an F-statistic (with K-l and N-K degrees of 
freedom), particularly in smaller samples because it makes the test more 
conservative (where it is dubbed the "asymptotic-F").
The likelihood ratio statistic is completed generally as:
OQ
c = -2(logLO - logLl), 
where LI is the value of the likelihood function for the full model as 
filled, and LO is the maximum value of the likelihood function if all 
coefficients (except the intercept) are zero. The computed chi-square 
value tests the hypothesis that all coefficients (except the intercept) 
are zero. This is exactly the hypothesis that is tested in regression, 
using the "overall" F-statistic.
In the regression model, the mean of the dependent variable, and 
its variance, are separate parameters. The proportion of the variance 
in the dependent variable that is "explained" by the independent 
variables, is of particular interpretive value in regression analysis. 
The coefficient of determination statistic (R2), therefore, frequently 
is calculated. It is logical in regression to adjust the fitted mean 
(which depends on the coefficients) to match the mean of the dependent 
variable (as observed in the sample data), and then choosing as
Commercially available computer software packages vary somewhat 
in terms of the statistics actually reported for this joint hypothesis 
test. The SAS package used by Cooke and Gautschi, for example, denotes 
it as "-2 x log - likelihood ratio".
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coefficient estimates those values which minimize variance in the fit.
Where the independent variables are qualitative, however, the mean 
and the variance are not separable parameters. In logit, therefore,
90there is no statistic with an interpretation comparable to that of R2.
In summary, logit analysis was used in this study because, in 
general, OLS regression estimates with a dichotomous dependent variable 
are not so-called "BLUE"— Best (in the sense of having the smallest 
sampling variance) Linear (in Y^) Unbiased Estimator. OLS estimates 
can, in fact, be misleading. Estimates of coefficient parameters would 
have been constrained artificially in this study by the imposition of 
the OLS assumptions (or their equivalent) where they, in fact, were not 
warranted. The assumptions which underlie logit (beyond that which 
specifies the relation between Y and X) are quite similar to (and no 
more restrictive than) the remaining assumptions in OLS regression. 
Because of the large sample in this study (n = 2147), all properties of 
OLS regression hold for logit. The one shortcoming of logit is that 
there is no ready equivalent to the coefficient of determination (R2) 
available in OLS regression. This shortcoming, however, was considered 
a nominal trade-off for the advantages gained by logit.
90 A number of "pseudo R2" measures (e.g. C/N+C) have been 
proposed, but none have been widely accepted, let alone used.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
This chapter presents and analyzes the findings of the study and 
includes the testing of the hypotheses concerning political bias in 
decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor 
practice cases. First, descriptive results are presented. These 
descriptions are followed by the results of the logit analysis.
Discussion of the results follows in Chapter 5.
Descriptive Results 
The sample includes 2147 decisions. Descriptive statistics 
concerning the sample are provided here in a series of tables. These 
tabular presentations of results are solely to provide an informational 
foundation for the subsequent analyses of results, using the logit 
technique, and the testing of the hypotheses. Because logit analysis was 
performed, only two-way tables are presented here. Even though some of 
these tables include variables (horizontal dimension) which are involved 
in hypotheses, it must be made clear that these tables are not intended 
to be (nor can they be) used to assess the hypotheses. Assessment 
remains the task of the logit analysis which follows. Other tables do 
not concern variables involved in hypotheses, but are included because of 
their added information value to the study. Tables 1 and 9 are examples 
of this latter type of table.
Decisions by Individual Members
The 2147 decisions included in the sample were made by seventeen 
members of the Board who served all or part of their terms
69
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TABLE 1
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBERS
MEMBER NO. OF DECISIONS YEARLY AVERAGE
YEARS PRO-■UNION PRO-•MGMT TOTAL NUMBER
NO. Z NO. Z NO.
1. Rodgers 2 16 45.7 19 54.3 35 17.5
2. Leedom 4 41 56.9 31 43.1 72 18.0
3. Fanning 22 349 70.9 143 29.1 492 22.4
A. McCulloch 10 102 57.6 75 42.3 177 17.7
5. Brown 11 123 61.5 77 38.5 200 18.2
6. Jenkins 20 252 62.2 153 37.8 405 20.2
7. Zagoria 5 56 56.0 44 44.0 100 20.0
8. Miller 5 49 50.0 49 50.0 98 19.6
9. Kennedy 6 40 45.5 48 54.5 88 14.7
10. Penello 10 98 59.0 68 41.0 166 16.6
11. Murphy 6 65 75.6 21 24.4 86 14.3
12. Walther 2 11 44.0 14 56.0 25 12.5
13. Truesdale 3 43 78.2 12 21.2 55 18.3
14 Hunter 2 17 50.0 17 50.0 34 17.0
15. Van de Water 7 19 73.1 7 26.9 26 13.0
16. Zimmerman 3 56 68.3 26 31.9 82 27.3
17. Dotson I 0 00.0 h 10.0 f. 6.0
TOTAL DECISIONS 1337 810 2147
PERCENT 62 .3 37 .7 100.0
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91during the twenty-two fiscal years 1962 through 1983. Table 1
provides a breakdown of the number of decisions made by each member, as
well as the number of fiscal years in which each member participated
during the study period.
The number of years in which each member participated ranges from
a low of one year (Member Dotson, 1983) to a high of twenty-two years
by Member Fanning (all years of the study, 1962 through 1983). Because
of their varying years of service, the total number of decisions by
members ranges from a low of six by Member Dotson (all decisions made
in the single year of service, 1983) to a high of 492 by Member Fanning
(over his twenty-two years of service). On an average-per-year-per
92member basis, the median number of decisions was eighteen.
Nearly two-thirds (62.3 percent) of all decisions made were 
pro-union, that is, were resolved by upholding the allegations of the 
union against the employer or resolved by dismissing allegations by the
91 During the study time period (July 1, 1962 through September 
30, 1983), nineteen Board members actually served. John Miller served 
for approximately three months (December 1982-March 1983) and the term 
of Patricia Diaz Dennis began late in the study period (May 1983). 
These two members participated only in a few cases which were 
identified as novel cases by the NLRB in its 1983 annual report, and 
none of the cases randomly selected from 1983 for the sample included 
members Miller or Dennis as participants.
92 This median is represented by Member McCulloch (ranked number 
nine of the seventeen members). It also is noted that the 
average-per-year-per member (eighteen, rounded) includes five of the 
seventeen members, Truesdale (rank number six) through Rodgers (rank 
number ten.)
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employer against the union. The remaining decisions (37.7 percent) 
were pro-management. On an individual member basis, the pro-union 
decision percentages of sixteen members ranged from a low of zero 
percent (All of Member Dotson's six decisions included in the sample 
were pro-management) to a high of slightly over seventy-eight percent 
(Truesdale, 78.2 percent), and a median of fifty-eight percent 
(McCulloch, 57.6 percent).
Decisions by Political Party of Original Appointing President 
Decisions made by members who were originally appointed by 
Democratic or Republican presidents were approximately equally 
distributed as is shown in Table 2. Of the 2147 decisions, 1019 
decisions (47.5 percent) were made by members originally appointed by 
Democratic presidents, and 1128 decisions (52.5 percent) were made by 
members originally appointed by Republican presidents.
Of the seventeen members rendering these 2147 decisions, six 
members were originally appointed by Democratic presidents and eleven 
by Republican presidents. The distribution of pro-labor and 
pro-management decisions by members originally appointed by either 
Democratic or Republican Presidents differ by 0.5 percentage points: 
Democratic appointees, 62.0 percent pro-union decisions; Republican 
appointees, 62.5 percent pro-union decisions.
Decisions by Political Party of Member
Table 3 shows that decisions made by Democratic members account 
for somewhat more than one-half (54.5 percent) of the 2147 decisions. 
Of those 1172 decisions made by Democratic members, however, nearly 
two-thirds (65.8 percent) were pro-union, whereas of the 975 decisions 
by Republican members, only 566 (58.1 percent) were pro-union.




PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 
POLITICAL PARTY OF ORIGINAL APPOINTING PRESIDENT




No. % No. Z No. Z






No. 7. No. 7. No. Z






No. 7. No. 7. No. Z






(a) Six Members: McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins, Zagoria, Truesdale, Zimmerman
(b) Eleven Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, Miller, Kennedy, Penello,
Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water, Dotson.
(c) Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages. 
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 3
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 
POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER
POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER . .
DECISIONS
PRO-UNION PRO'-MANAGEMENT TOTAL
No. No. X No. Z
DEMOCRATIC(a) 
MEMBERS
771 65.8 401 34.2 1172 100.0
Z 57..6 Z 49.5 Z 54.5
No. Z No. 7. No. 7.
REPUBLICAN(b) 
MEMBERS
566 58.1 409 41.9 975 100.0
Z 42..3 z 50.4 X 45.4
No. * No. 7. No. S
TOTAL 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
Z 100.0 Z 100.0 Z 100.0
(a) Six Members: Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Penello, Truesdale, 
Zimmerman.
(b) Eleven Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Jenkins, Zagoria, Miller,
Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water, Dotson,
(c) Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Political Party of Incumbent President
During the period of the study, after the appointment of a member 
by a president, that president making the appointment (either an 
original appointment or a re-appointment) may have left office. His 
replacement in some instances was by a president of the same 
political party, and in other instances by a president of a different 
political party. A given member, therefore, could serve all or a 
portion of his/her term or terms under one or more presidents of 
different political parties. At any given time, the appointing 
president and the incumbent president could have been the same 
individual. Only the political party, not the individual, is 
germaine.
Table 4 records the decisions under Democratic and Republican 
incumbent presidents. A review of Table 4 indicates that pro-union 
decisions made under incumbent presidents of the Democratic and 
Republican parties are virtually identical, differing by 0.5 
percentage points (62.0 percent vs. 62.5 percent).
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TABLE 4
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 
POLITICAL PARTY OF INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
DECISIONS









No. 632 62.0 387 38.0 1019 100.0











No. 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
TOTAL
7. 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages. 
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Political Party of Reappointing President
As explained in Chapter 3, the original appointment of a member 
can be either for a full term (five years) or to complete the 
unexpired time of a prior member's term. In either situation, a 
member is eligible for reappointment. The reappointment could be by a 
president whose political party is the same or is different from that 
of the original appointing president. Table 5 classifies the 
pro-union and pro-management decisions made by members under three 
possible categories. Two categories include decisions made by members 
during the study period when they were serving under a re-appointment 
status. The third category includes those decisions made by members 
when they were serving their original terms. The decisions of a given 
member, therefore, is categorized based on the status of that member 
at the time of the decision.
Table 5 indicates that pro-union decisions made under 
re-appointing presidents of the Democratic and Republican parties 
differ by 1.1 percentage points (66.0 percent vs. 64.9 percent).
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TABLE 5
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 




























No. 560 58.1 404 41.9 964 100.0










Note: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Charging Party and Decisions of the ALJ
In Chapter 3, the procedure for processing Unfair Labor Practice 
Charges was described. The decision paths of pro-union and 
pro-management decision outcomes by Board members are included in 
Appendix J.
Table 6 indicates that three-quarters of the 2147 decisions in the
sample had their origin in allegations initiated by the union against 
93the employer. Of the 1623 decisions originating in allegations by 
the union, 1168 (72.0 percent) were decided in favor of the union by 
Board members.
Table 7A shows that seventy percent of all allegations filed by 
charging parties were supported by Administrative Law Judges. Of 
those allegations receiving support of the ALJ, three-quarters were 
decided in favor of the union by Board members.
Table 7B shows that 69.3 of all decisions made by members are in 
agreement with the decisions made by the Administration Law Judges.
Of those decisions made which were in agreement with the ALJ, 68.8 
percent were decided in favor of the union.
This percentage is similar to filing origins of cases included 
in the three-year sample (1980-1982) of ULP cases closed during the 
fiscal years (80.1 percent) and novel cases reviewed by the NLRB (83.0 
percent) as shown in Appendices II and I, respectively.
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TABLE 6










































Note: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 7 A
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBER
CLASSIFIED BY 
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
DECISIONS BY MEMBERS
DECISIONS BY PRO-UNION PRO-MANAGEMENT TOTAL
ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES
No. Z No. Z No. Z
SUPPORT ULP
No. 1012 66.8 503 33.2 1515 100.0
ALLEGATIONS Z 75.7 62.1 70.6
DISMISS ULP
No. 325 51.4 307 48.6 632 100.0
ALLEGATIONS u 24.3 37.9 29.4
TOTAL
No. 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
7. 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages..
Percentages to the right o£ the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 7 B
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBER
CLASSIFIED BY 




































Note: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Unanimous and Non-Unanimous Decisions
As explained in Chapter 3, cases coming before the Board are
heard by either the Full Board (five members) or by a panel (three
9 Lmembers). Each allegation is decided on a majority vote basis.
Majorities may be either unanimous or non-unanimous to either uphold
94or to dismiss allegations. As indicated in footnote , cases heard 
by four-members which result in a tie vote on any allegation are not 
concluded. Fourteen vote combinations, therefore, are possible, of 
which six are unanimous (i.e., 3-0, 4-0, or 5-0) and eight are 
non-unanimous (2-1, 3-1, 4-1, 3-2).
Table 8 indicates that 1751 of the 2147 decisions, 81.6 percent, 
were decided by unanimous votes. Of those 1751 unanimous decisions, 
sixty-five percent were pro-union. Of the 396 decisions rendered by a 
non-unanimous vote, the pro-union and pro-management percentages were 
equally divided, 50.3 percent and 49.7 percent, respectively.
In some instances cases may be heard by four members. Such 
instances may arise, for example, if five members for a full Board are 
not available. Non-availability may result from existence of a 
vacancy or due to the absence, for various reasons, of a member. In 
other instances, a fourth member may be added to a three-member panel 
(as explained in Chapter 3). If each and every ULP allegation in a 
given case heard by four members cannot be resolved unanimously or by 
a majority, the case is held in abeyance until a fifth member is 
available, or if that fourth member participating by request 
voluntarily withdraws.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
34
TABLE 8
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
CLASSIFIED BY 
























49.7 396 100.0 
18.4
No. 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
TOTAL
" 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Number of ULP Charges Alleged in Case
Table 9 shows that the most decisions are accounted for (46.9 
percent) by cases involved two allegations of unfair labor practice 
violations, and that fully sixty-five percent of decisions are 
accounted for by cases involving no more than two alleged ULP 
violations.^
These results closely parallel the ratios of the three-year 
sample of cases included in Appendix K.
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TABLE 9
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
CLASSIFIED BY
NUMBER OF ULP CHARGES ALLEGED IN CASES
DECISIONS*
NUMBER OF ULP PRO--UNION PRO-MANAGEMENT TOTAL
ALLEGED CHARGES No. /o No. 7. No. (100%)
IN CASE
1 No. 188 48.3 201 51.7 389
/a 14.1 24.8 18.1
2 No. 645 64.1 361 35.9 1006
% 48.2 44.6 46.9
3 No. 368 66.1 189 33.9 557
7. 27.5 23.3 25.9
4 No. 93 61.2 59 38.8 152





100.0 - 0.0 15
0.7
6 No. __ _ _ _





100.0 - 0.0 28
1.3
TOTALS No. 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147
100.0 100.0 100.0
*
The number of decisions in a case is determined by Che number >'i alleeed L’LP
violations multiplied by the number of members deciding the case. The 
twenty-eight decisions in case size seven, for example, was a single case 
containing seven allegations decided by four Board memDers.
Percentages below numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages co right of number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions by Regions
As described in Chapter 1, administratively the NLRB is
structured on a regional basis. Currently there are thirty-three
regions; the territorial boundaries of which are indicated on the map
in Appendix B. In this study, every region was represented in the
sample of 2147 decisions.
The number of decisions varied from a low of three, in Regions 28 
96and 33, to a high of 160, in region 20. The percentages of 
pro-union decisions ranged from a low of zero percent (Regions 28 and 
33) to a high of ninety percent (Region 32), with a median of 64.2 
percent (Region 15).
Region 28 is in an area comprised of states with low 
population density and unionization (e.g., Arizona, Utah, New Mexico). 
Region 33 was not established until 1978.
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TABLE 10





No. Z No. 7. No.
1 56 53.3 49 46.7 195
2 61 46.2 71 53.8 132
3 23 53.5 20 46.5 43
4 32 86.5 5 13.5 37
5 69 66.3 35 33.7 104
6 53 61.6 33 38.4 86
7 34 43.6 44 56.4 78
8 34 45.9 40 54.1 74
9 64 68.1 30 31.9 94
10 61 79.2 16 20.8 77
11 21 63.6 12 36.4 33
12 47 65.3 25 34.7 72
13 46 78.0 13 22.0 59
14 47 51.6 44 48.4 91
15 31 64.6 17 35.4 48
16 86 73.5 31 26.5 117
17 61 61.0 39 59.0 100
18 25 89.3 3 10.7 28
19 27 35.5 49 64.5 76
20 104 65.0 56 35.0 160
21 36 83.7 7 16.3 43
22 44 78.6 12 21.4 56
23 61 73.5 22 26.5 83
24 7 38.9 11 61.1 18
25 23 39.7 35 60.3 58
26 15 31.2 33 68.8 48
27 21 65.6 11 34.4 32
28 0 0.0 3 100.0 3
29 46 85.2 8 14.8 54
30 47 72.3 18 27.7 65
31 19 63.3 11 3b.7 30
32 36 90.0 4 10.0 40
33 0 0.0 3 100.0 3
1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147
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Decisions in Stable and Unstable Regions
Nearly eighty-six percent (85.7 percent) of all decisions were
97made in regions which were stable. The percentage of pro-union 
decisions in stable and unstable regions are 62.4 and 61.2 percent 
respectively. These percentages are shown in Table 11.
97 Definitions of Stable and Unstable Regions have been provided 
in Chapter 3 with the discussion of Hypothesis 3.
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TABLE H
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 

















No. 't No. “ No. -
UNSTABLE 188 61.2 119 23.8 307 100.0
Z 14.1 7, 14.7 ' 14.,3
No. 7, No. I No.
TOTAL 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
7. 100.0 7, 100.0 7. 100,.0
NOTE: Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row 
percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Background Factors of Members
The pro-union and pro-management decisions of members have been 
classified by three factors in the backgrounds of members prior to 
their original appointments to the Board: 1) undergraduate degree, 2) 
membership in special interest organizations, and 3) type of 
occupation.
Undergraduate Degree 
Of the seventeen members in the study, the undergraduate degrees 
of three members were in the area of business or economics. The 
undergraduate degrees of the remaining fourteen members were in areas 
other than business or economics (e.g., history, oriental studies, 
journalism, political science). Table 12A shows that the pro-union and 
pro-management decisions of the members with either type of 
undergraduate degrees are similar. The pro-union decisions of members 
with business or economics degrees is 62.0 percent, whereas those 
members with non-business or economic degrees is 62.3 percent.
Membership and Occupation 
Prior to their original appointments, four of the seventeen 
members of the Board had been members in one or more organizations 
which were oriented to the special interests of management. These 
same four members were engaged in occupations oriented toward 
management, such as positions in personnel, labor relations or with 
law firms representing employers. Tables 12 B and C show that the 
pro-union decisions of members with membership/occupation backgrounds 
oriented toward management are twelve percentage points below 
non-management oriented members, (51.0 percent vs. 63.2 percent).
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TABLE I2A
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 




MEM3ER PRO-UNION PRO-MANAGEMENT TOTAL
No. 7. No. No. 7
BUSINESS/ECONOMICS 158 62.0 97 38.0 255 100.0
7, 11.8 *7 12.0 7. 11..9
No. No. 2 No. 7
NON-BUSINESS/ECONOMICS(b) 1179 62.3 713 37.7 1892 100.0
" 88.2 7. 88.0 7. 88,.1
No. «7 No. 7. No.
TOTAL 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
7, 100.0 % 100.0 .4 O o .0
(a) Three Members: Penello, Truesdale, Hunter
(b) Fourteen Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Miller, Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Van de Water, 
Zimmerman, Dotson
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
Note: Democrats originally appointed by Democratic presidents were:
McCulloch, Brown, Truesdale, Jenkins.
Republicans originally appointed by Republican presidents were:
Rodgers, Leedom, Miller Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water, 
Dotson.
Democrats originally appointed by Republican presidents were:
Fanning, Penello.
Republicans originally appointed by Democratic presidents were:
Jenkins• Zagoria.
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TABLE 12B
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 





No. 7. No. % No. 7.
MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(a) 79 51.0 76 49.0 115 100.0
% 5..9 % 9.4 Z 7.2
No. 7. No. 7. No. 7.
NON-MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(b5 1258 63.2 734 36.8 1992 100.0
7. 94..1 Z 90.6 Z 92.8
No. % No. 7, No. Z
TOTAL 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
Z 100.,0 Z 100.0 Z 100.0
(a) E. Miller, Walther, Van de Water, Dotson
(b) Fourteen Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Kennedy, Penello, Murphy, Truesdale, Hunter, 
Zimmerman.
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages. 
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 12C
PRO-UNION’ AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY 




No. 7 No. 7. No. 7.
MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(a) 79 51.0 76 49.0 115 100.0
; 5.,9 Z 9.4 7. 7.2
No. No. Z No. %
NON-MANAGEMENT ORIENTED^ 1258 63.2 734 36.8 1992 100.0
Z 94.,1 Z 90.6 7. 92.8
No. No. 7. No. 7.
TOTAL 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147 100.0
4 4 O O .0 Z 100.0 7. 100.0
(a) E. Miller, Walther, Van de Water, Dotson
(b) Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Kennedy, Penello, Murphy, Truesdale, Hunter, 
Zimmerman.
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages. 
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
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Decision by Age of Members
The ages of members at the time of their decisions ranged from a 
low of forty-one (Member Zimmerman, 1981) to a high of seventy-two 
(Member Penello, 1981). The pro-union and pro-management decisions at 
all ages (in five year brackets), as well as the number of members 
making decisions at each age bracket, is provided in Table 13.
The percentage of pro-union decisions range from a high of 69.0 
percent (age bracket 60 - 64) to a low of 56.4 percent (age bracket 45 
- 49). In the median age bracket (55 - 59), 62.9 percent of the 
decisions were pro-union. The median percentage of pro-union 
decisions (regardless of age bracket) also is 62.9 percent (occurring 
in the "under 45" and "55 - 59" brackets.)
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TABLE 13
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
CLASSIFIED BY 
AGE OF MEMBER DURING YEAR OF DECISION
AGc. OF 
MEMBER
NO. OF . 
MEMBERS U ' PRO-
DECISIONS
■UNION p r o-:MANAGEMENT TOTAL
No. Z No. * No.(100%)
Under 45 5 73 62.9 43 37.1 116
45 - 49 18 190 56.4 147 43.6 337
50 - 54 26 290 57.4 215 -2.6 505
55 - 59 27 313 62.9 185 37.1 498
60 - 64 17 229 69.0 103 31.0 332
65 - 69 16 222 67.5 107 32.5 329
70 or over 3 20 66.7 10 33.3 30
TOTAL 112 1337 62.3 810 37.7 2147
(a) The number of members is determined by summing the number of members at 
each age in each year. In che age category "70 or over", for example, 
the number (3) is the sum of one member '.Penello) at ages 70, 71 and 72 
(in years 1979-81).
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Decisions by Years
Over the twenty-two year period, the percentage of pro-union 
decisions was 62.3 percent. During the period, as shown in Table 14, 
the percentage of pro-union decisions varied from a high of 83.6 
percent in 1979 to a low of 39.5 percent in 1975. The median 
percentage of pro-union decisions is 63.6 percent, 62.9 (1962) - 64.4 
(1983).
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TABLE 14












1962 22.6 355.5 66 62.9 55 37.1 105
1963 22.2 384.0 50 50.5 45 49.5 99
1964 22.2 428.1 51 61.4 2 2 38.6 83
1965 22.4 447.3 44 51.8 _ 1 48.2 85
1966 22.7 444.3 50 49.0 21 51. G 102
1967 22.7 427.2 45 40.9 65 59.0 110
1968 23.0 413.1 65 60.7 -2 39.3 107
1969 22.6 417.4 69 73.4 2 5 26.6 94
1970 22.6 452.3 59 75.6 1 ■ 24.4 78
1971 22.1 513.4 81 64.8 -4 35.2 125
1972 21.8 576.1 44 45.8 Z - 54.2 96
1973 21.8 534,0 87 70.7 55 29.3 123
1974 21.8 538.4 40 50.6 55 49.4 79
1975 20.7 600.6 34 39.5 52 60.4 86
1976 20.3 686.9 104 78.2 59 21.S 133
1977 19.8 761.0 51 60.7 33 39.3 84
1978 19.7 754.4 74 71.8 59 28.2 103
1979 19.2 329.7 61 83.6 12 16.4 73
1980 19.1 891.8 53 77.9 15 22.1 68
1981 19.0 859.3 57 65.5 Z'J 34.5 87
1982 18.9 881.3 85 69.1 38 30.9 123
1983 18.9 561.1 67 64,4 3" 35.6 104
1337 62.3 S 1.U 37.7 2147
(a) L'.S. union membership, as a percentage of Total 1.3. Labor Force
1 See Appendix G).
(b) CL? Cases received by NLRB during year, per million union members 
(See Appendix G).
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LOGIT RESULTS
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, logit provides insights, 
where categorical data are involved, that are not available from more 
commonly-used techniques for analyzing contingency tables. The sample 
data presented tabularly in the preceding section of this chapter were 
analyzed using logit. The results are shown below in a series of 
tables, with each table representing one of three separate 
developmental models. Individual models are presented in alignment 
with the literature review in Chapter 2. The first model, Model 1 
(with its sub-set sample size model, labeled 1A), is a benchmark 
comparison to the seminal model of Cooke and Gautschi. Model 2 is an 
extension of Model 1 and incorporates the added dimension of 
stability. Stability is an issue raised by Delaney, Lewin and Sockell 
regarding the Cooke and Gautschi study. Model 3 is the full model de­
veloped in this study and tests the hypotheses included in Chapter 3.
In identifying those variables which are significant sources of
bias, the t-ratio is important. Kerlinger and Pedhazur explain that
the t-ratio, calculated by dividing the coefficient (b) by its
standard error, is assessed (with the appropriate degrees of freedom)
98for significance (at a specified level). In the table of each model, 
therefore, the t-ratio of each variable is shown. Those variables 
with b values (coefficients) assessed as significant (at p = .05 and
98 Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, Multiple Regression 
in Behavorial Research, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1973.
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p = .01) have been indicated as * and **, respectively. In the Data 
Analysis Technique section of Chapter 3 it was pointed out that logit 
parameters are estimated by a method called Maximum Likelihood 
Estimations (MLE), rather than the method of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) in the ordinary regression model. It also was indicated that 
the statistical inference from logit is the same as that of linear 
regression. Logit analysis measures the relationship between 
independent variables, X, and the dependent variable, Y. Estimated 
coefficients (b^) are the (asymptotically unbiased and efficient) 
point estimates of the relationship. Because of the parallelism 
between the logit and the ordinary regression techniques, the 
magnitude of logit coefficients can be interpreted in the same manner 
as coefficients derived using ordinary regression.
Each table is formated to provide the variables included (name 
and identification symbol), the sample proportion or mean of the 
variable, the coefficient of the variable and its t-ratio. The sample 
size (n) and the intercept also are included, as well as a goodness of 
fit statistic.
A summary comparison of all models is provided in Table 20. Table 
20 shows the variables included in each model as well as a 
cross-reference of the variables to the hypotheses tested.
To facilitate performing the logit analyses of each model, a new 
set of variables was created. Descriptions of the variables included 
in these three models are provided in Table 15. There are several 
types or classes of variables included in Table 15, based on their 
primary purpose or function. First, there are those variables which


























1 if Member is Democrat, originally appointed by 
a Democratic president, 0 otherwise.
1 if Member is Republican, originally appointed 
by a Republican president, 0 otherwise.
1 if Decision rendered in stable origin, 0 
otherwise.
Age of member at time of decision.
Year of Decision.
1 if member was previously employed in a 
management position or as a management 
attorney, 0 otherwise.
1 if member earned undergraduate degree in 
Business or Economics, 0 otherwise.
Percent of labor force unionized during year 
of decision.
Number of ULP cases filed (per million union 
members) in year of decision.
1 if all members decided the same way on ULP 
charge, 0 otherwise.
1 if ULP was initiated by employer and 
supported by ALJ, 0 otherwise.
I if ULP was initiated by employer and dismissed 
by ALJ, 0 otherwise.
1 if ULP was initiatea bv union and dismissed by 
ALJ, 0 otherwise.
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relate to the individual characteristics of the members (e.g., age,
political party) and to the selection process (e.g., political party
of originally appointing president). This classification includes
variables and X(political party affiliation of member and
original appointing president), X^q (age of member at time of
decision), X ^  (prior occupation) and X ^  (type of undergraduate
degree). The second group of variables are those which deal with the
process through which the allegations progress to be decided by the
members. This classification includes variables, C,, C.,, and CD
0 / o
(filing party of the ULP charge and decision by ALJ) and X ^
(unanimity of Board decision). Variables in this classification
hereinafter are referred to as "process" variables. A third group of
variables related to environmental conditions, both internally (i.e.,
internal to the NLRB organizational structure in which cases are
processed and decided) as well as externally (i.e., the environment of
the work place in which labor-management relations has its being).
This third classification includes variables X^ (stability), X ^  (year
of decision), X,c (size of the union population) and X , , (rate of IJ io
filings of ULP charges).
In the discussion of the results at each table, references are 
made to the sign of the coefficient (and of the t-value.) The manner 
in which the variables (in Table 15) were structured permits the signs 
of the results in the tables to be uniformly interpreted as a 
"pro-union" or "pro-management" effect, except in one instance. A 
positive sign implies pro-union and a negative sign implies 
pro-management in all results, except at Table 19 in the discussion of 
the variable UNIONPOP and Hypothesis 5A. In that instance, there is
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an inverse relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables, with a negative sign meaning pro-union.
Model 1A
As indicated above, Model 1A is a near-duplication of the model 
tested by Cooke and Gautschi (CG). The CG model included ten 
variables, eight of which are identical in Model 1A. The time period 
for Model 1A is 1962 through 1977, coincidental with with the latter 
sixteen years of the CG model, which covered 1954-1977. The sample 
size of Model 1A is 1589 (sixteen years) as compared to 852 for the CG 
model (twenty-four years).
The results of Model 1A are presented in Table 16. Model 1A 
includes five variables addressed to Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypotheses 4A 
and 4D, and Hypothesis 5, as well as three of the previously described 
control variables addressed to Hypotheses 7A, 7B and 7C.
Hypothesis 1 (stating that Democratic members originally 
appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to make decisions 
favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican 
members originally appointed by Presidents of opposite parties or 
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents) is 
tested by the variable DEMDEM (MOAP). In Model 1A, this variable has 
a t-value of 0.355, which is not significant. In other words, the 
data fail to support Hypothesis 1. The sign of the coefficient 
(positive), however, is directionally consistent (pro-union) with 
Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 (stating that Republican members originally 
appointed by Republican presidents are less likely to make decisions 
favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican 
members originally appointed by presidents of opposite parties or
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TABLE 16
ESTIMATION’ OF A DECISION MODEL OF 
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 1A
VARIABLE SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN COEFFICIENT t-values
Xj DEMDEM(MOAF) 2 42 0.028 0.355
X, REPREP(MOAP) 23% -0.138 -1.678
X. MANG 8% -0.163 -1.291
X,Q AGE 54.9 -0.005 -0.687
C . EMPYES 0 18%
kk-1.194 -14.559









Pearson Goodness-of--Fit Chi Square • 1585 DF - 1580 P = 0.459
Significant at or above .05 
Significant at or above .01
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Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents) is tested by the 
variable REPREP (MOAP). In Model 1A, the sign of the coefficient 
(negative) is directionally consistent with the hypothesis. The t-value 
(-1.678) here also is not significant, thereby providing no support for 
Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 4A (stating that age does not significantly impact the 
decisions of members) and Hypothesis 4D (stating that the type of 
occupation prior to appointment to the Board does not significantly 
impact the decisions of members) are both supported by the nonsignificant 
t-values of AGE (t-value = 0.687) and MANG (t-value = -1.291), 
respectively.
Hypothesis 5 (stating the Members' decisions will not respond to per 
se passage of time is not supported (t-value 4.435, p = 0.01). The 
positive sign of the coefficient (0.038) indicates that members more 
likely make decisions favoring unions over employers as time advances.
Hypotheses 7A and 7B, stating that members are less likely to make 
decisions favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by 
employers when the ALJ supports the charge (Hypothesis 7A) and when the 
ALJ dismisses the charge (Hypothesis 7B), than in ULP charges initiated 
by unions (irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) were supported. 
An alleged ULP charge filed by an employer and upheld by an ALJ (EMPYES) 
has a t-value of -14.559, which is significant (at p = 0.01). An alleged 
ULP charge filed by an employer, but dismissed by an ALJ (EMPNO) has a 
t-value of -4.010, which is significant (at p = 0.01).
Hypothesis 7C (Stating that members are no more likely to make
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decisions favoring employers over unions or favoring unions over 
employers in ULP charges initiated by unions and dismissed by ALJ's) is 
not supported. An alleged ULP charge filed by a union and dismissed by an
ALJ (UNIONO) has a t-value of -8.653, which is significant (at p = 0.01).
The (negative) signs of the coefficients of EMPYES, EMPNO, and 
UNIONO indicate that members are less likely to make decisions favoring 
unions over employers in each of these three specific combinations of 
charging party and decision of the ALJ. Why these three combinations, 
EMPYES, EMPNO and UNIONO, might all have negative coefficients 
(pro-management) is discussed in Chapter 5.
Model 1
Model 1 is the same as Model 1A, except that the full time period of
the study (1962-1983) was used rather than 1962-1977. The sample size of
Model 1, therefore, is 2147.
The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 17. The results shown 
in this table are, for the most part, the same as the results 
in Table 16 (Model 1A). There are differences, however, which are noted 
below.
Hypothesis 1 again is not supported. The t-value of variable DEMDEM 
(MOAP) is not significant. While the size of the coefficients and the 
t-values of this variable are nearly identical in Models 1 and 1A, their 
signs are reversed. In Model 1A the sign was positive, whereas in Model 
1 the sign is negative. The sample proportion of DEMDEM (MOAP) remained 
the same at twenty-four percent in both models 
1A and 1.
Hypothesis 2 again is not supported. The t-value of variable
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TABLE 17
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION MODEL OF 
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 1
VARIABLE SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN COEFFICIENT t-values
X1 DEMDEM (MOAP) 24% -0.054 -0.846
X, REPREP(MOAP) 22% -0.147 -1.932
X ^  MANG 77 -0.085 -0.765
“ 10 AGE 56.0 0.007 1.680
Cfi EMPYES 16% -1.253 -16.787









Pearson Goodness--of-Fit Chi Square = 2134 DF = 2138 P = .520
Significant at or above .05 
** Significant at or above .01
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REPREP (MOAP) is not significant. The sign of this variable has 
remained negative, as in Model 1A. Here, too, the size of the 
coefficents differ only slightly, -0.147 vs. -0.138, while the 
t-values are -1.932 vs. -1.678.
Hypotheses 4A and 4D regarding age and prior occupations are both 
supported in Model 1, as they were in Model 1A. The variable AGE has 
reversed signs, however, from negative to positive. In addition to 
the reversal of signs, the size of t-value has risen to (+) 1.680 from 
(-) 0.687. The positive sign of the variable AGE is associated with 
making decisions favoring unions over employers. In Model 1, with the 
change in sample size from Model 1A, the mean age of members has 
increased from 54.9 years to 56.0 years. The sign of the variable 
MANG has remained negative. The size of its t-value has declined (in 
absolute value) from -1.291 to 0.765.
Hypothesis 5 (stating the members' decisions will not respond to 
per se passage of time) continues to lack support. The sign of the 
coefficients has remained positive, but has been reduced in size by 
one-half, 0.016 compared to 0.038. The t-value has dropped to 3.670 
from 4.435. Members remain more likely to make decisions favoring 
unions over employers as time advances, but with lessening likelihood. 
Recall that Model 1 includes additional more-current years, with the 
mean of TREND advanced from 69.6 to 72.5.
Hypotheses 7A and 7B regarding ULP charges initiated by employers 
again is supported while Hypothesis 7C regarding ULP charges filed by 
unions and dismissed by ALJ's again is not supported.
Each of the three process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO, and UNIONO) 
has retained its negative sign, has remained significant, has a larger
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TABLE IB
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION KC3EL OF 
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 2
VARIABLE SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN COEFFICIENT t-values
DEMDEM(MOAP) 241 -3.053 -0.832
X2 REPREP(MOAP) 22.: -0.148 -1.950
Xj3 MANG -0.080 -0.725










X u  TRENT) 72.5
**
0.017 3.881
Xg STABLE 86: 0.112 1.543
Intercept 2.997 11.551
n 2147
Pearson Goodness--of-Fit Chi Square “ 2138 DF 3 2137 ? = 0.491
Significant at or above .05
Significant at or above .01
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coefficient, and a larger t-value.
At this stage, Model 1 covering the full time period (1962-1983) 
and with sample size (n = 2147) becomes the benchmark model (in lieu 
of Model 1A) for comparisons of the extended models (Model 2 and 3). 
Model 2
Model 2 is the same as Model 1, except that the variable for 
regional stability (STABLE) has been added. Model 2 includes the full 
time period, 1962-1983, (n = 2147). The results of Model 2 are 
presented in Table 18.
Model 2 includes variables addressed to Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
Hypotheses 4A and 4D, and Hypothesis 5, as well as three control 
variables (as in Model 1) addressed to Hypotheses 7A, 7B, and 7C, plus 
the new variable STABLE. STABLE addresses Hypothesis 3.
Again there is lack of support for Hypothesis 1 (concerning 
greater likelihood of pro-union decisions under Democratic congruency 
between members and original appointing presidents, compared to all 
other member-president combinations) in Model 2. In Model 2, 
directionality remains the same (negative sign).
Hypothesis 2 (concerning lesser likelihood of pro-union decisions 
under Republican congruency, compared to all other political 
combinations) again is not supported. Here again the results mirror 
those of Model 1: the sign remains negative, with the size of the 
coefficient and the absolute values of t-values changing only at the 
second decimal position or beyond -0.148 vs. -0.147, and -1.950 vs. 
-1.932, respectively). At a t-value of -1.950, REPREP (MOAP) 
approaches significance (p = 0.0512).
Hypothesis 3 states that members are more likely to make
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decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions than in 
stable regions. In Model 2, the results of STABLE (coefficient -0.112, 
t-value 1.543) do not support the hypothesis.
Hypotheses 4A and 4D regarding the anticipated lack of effect of 
age or prior occupation on decisions, respectively, are supported in 
Model 2. The t-value of AGE is 1.577 and of MANG is -0.725. Both of 
these t-values are of smaller size than in Model 1 (1.680 and -0.765 
respectively).
Hypothesis 5 (Members' decisions will not respond to per se 
passage of time) continues to lack support in Model 2. Members 
decisions do, in fact, respond to passage of time. The sign 
(positive) remains unchanged. The difference in the size of the 
coefficient and the t-value increased slightly (0.017 vs. 0.016, and 
3.881 vs. 3.401, respectively).
Each of the three process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO, and UNIONO) 
has retained its negative sign, has remained significant, and has 
retained approximately the same size coefficient (larger only at the 
third decimal position) and t-value (larger only at the first decimal 
position or beyond). Support of Hypotheses 7A and 7B, and non-support 
of Hypothesis 7C, therefore, again are the same as in Model 1.
At this point, Model 2 covering the full period (1962-1983) with 
full sample size (n = 2147), and with the inclusion of the variable 
STABLE, now becomes the benchmark Model (in lieu of Model 1). The 
results of Model 3, which is the final extension of Model 2, are 
discussed in the next section.
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Model 3
The final model, Model 3, is presented in Table 19. Model 3 was
developed from the literature review and addresses the hypotheses
promulgated and presented in Chapter 3. Model 3 covers the full time
period (1962-1983) and is an extension of the previously presented 
99Model 2. It includes the nine variables of Model 2 (DEMDEM, REPREP, 
STABLE, AGE, TREND, MANG, EMPYES, EMPNO, UNIONO) plus the four 
additional variables UGDEGREE, UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and UNANIMOUS.
99 Model 3 was derived via several paths of examination, each 
originating at Model 2. Each path resulted from various sequencing of 
the introduction of variables. This network approach facilitated an 
examination of the impact of each modification to Model 2. The 
variables involved in the process included redefined variables , 
substitute variables , and new variables. Variables excluded from 
Model 3 were selected on the criterion of the availability of a more 
poignant measure (e.g., the substitution of UNIONPOP and ULPRATE for 
TREND as a better measure of the atmosphere of iabor-management 
relations) coupled with attaining greater model elegance. Variables 
added or retained were selected on the criterion of significance 
obtained (e.g., in a prior study) coupled with improved specification 
based on theoretical consideration. In Model 3, TREND specifically 
was retained (in addition to UNIONPOP and ULPRATE) because it may 
capture some unobserved function or functions that over time may be 
affecting decisions but have been overlooked.
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TABLE 19
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION MODEL OF NLRB 
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 3
VARIABLES SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN COEFFICIENT t-values





X3 STABLE 36 7. 0.098 1.349
X10 AGE 56.0 0.008
*
1.973
X11 TREND 72.5 0.019 1.262
X13 HANG 72 -0.069 -0.601
X14 I’G DEGREE 127 -0.176 -2.098*
X15 UNIONPOP 21.22 -0.187 -1.920
X 16 ULP RATE 589.7 -0.001 -1.330
X17 UNANIMOUS 822 0.188
**
2.936
C6 EKPYES 162 -1.236
**
-16.376
C7 EMPNO 92 -0.731
**
- 8.823
C8 UNIONO -0.609 **- 9.957
INTERCEPT 3.481 3.567
n 2147
PEARSON GOODNESS -OF- FIT CHI SQUARE = 2145 DF = 2133 P = 0.424
Significant at or above .05
Significant at or above .01
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DEMDEM (MOAP) shows a t-value (-0.886) which is nonsignificant; 
There is no support, therefore, for Hypothesis 1, that Democratic 
members originally appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely 
to make decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic 
or Republican members originally appointed by presidents of opposite 
parties, or Republican members originally appointed by Republican 
presidents. Indeed, even the negative sign of the coefficient runs 
contrary to the anticipated directionality (positive, pro-union) of 
Hypothesis 1.
REPREP (MOAP) has a t-value of -2.221 which is significant at the 
0.05 level. This result provides support for Hypothesis 2.
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents are 
less likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers than 
Democratic or Republican members appointed by presidents of opposite 
parties, or Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic 
presidents.
Hypothesis 3 stating that members are more likely to make 
decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions than in 
stable regions is not supported. The t-value of STABLE (1.458) is not 
significant (p = 0.16).
The t-value of AGE (1.973) is significant (at p = 0.05). 
Hypothesis 4A, therefore, is not supported. Data suggest that members 
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers as 
they advance in age. Hypothesis 4B states that members' decisions 
will not be significantly impacted by the type of undergraduate degree 
they have been awarded. This hypothesis is not supported. UGDEGREE, 
t-value = -2.098, which is significant (at p = 0.05) indicates that 
members who have been awarded undergraduate degrees in
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Business/Economics are less likely to make decisions favoring unions 
over employers than are members who have been awarded 
non-Business/Economic undergraduate degrees. Hypothesis 4C stated 
that members' decisions will not be significantly affected by their 
prior memberships in special interest organizations. The discussion 
at Tables 12B and C pointed out that the four members who were engaged 
in management-oriented occupations prior to appointment were the same 
four members who had held memberships (prior to appointment) in 
management-oriented organizations. In Chapter 3 (Data Analysis 
Technique) it was indicated that logit suffers the same problem of 
multicollinearity as does OLS regression. As in OLS, therefore, it is 
required that in logit no exact or near-linear dependence exist among 
the X across k. Such was the case with the variables MANG and 
MSHIP. MSHIP was dropped and MANG retained. MANG was retained on the 
basis of preserving greater comparability with the Cooke and Gautschi 
model. With the removal of MSHIP, the task of showing support or lack 
of support for Hypothesis 4C has been relegated to the discussion in 
Chapter 5. The t-value of MANG (-0.601) is not significant.
Hypothesis 4D, therefore, is supported. Decisions by members are not 
significantly affected by the type of occupation prior to Board 
appointment.
Hypothesis 5 stated that members' decisions will not respond to 
per se passage of time. The t-value of TREND is 1.262 which is not 
significant (p = 0.33) and therefore supports this hypothesis of no 
difference over time. The positive sign indicates that the 
directionality is that of favoring unions over employers, as time 
advances. Hypothesis 5A stated that members are less likely to make 
decisions favoring unions over employers as the size of the union
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population decreases. This hypothesis does not receive support. The 
t-value of UNIONPOP (-1.920) is not significant. In this instance a 
negative sign is interpreted to mean "pro-union" as explained earlier 
in this chapter. The directionality of the results, therefore, is not 
as was anticipated by Hypothesis 5A. Hypothesis 5B stated that members 
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers as 
the rate of ULP charges filed by unions increases. This hypothesis 
does not receive support. The t-value of ULPRATE (-1.330) is not 
significant. The directionality of results (negative, pro-management) 
is contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 (stating that members' decisions, either favoring 
unions over employers or favoring employers over unions, which are 
unanimous will differ from those which are non-unanimous) is 
supported. The t-value of UNANIMOUS (t= 2.936) is significant at p = 
0.01. The positive sign of the coefficient (0.188) indicates that 
unanimous decisions of members are more likely to favor unions over 
employers than are non-unanimous decisions.
Each of the process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO and UNIONO) are 
significant (at p = 0.01) and carry negative signs. These results 
support Hypothesis 7A. Members are less likely to make decisions 
favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by employers 
and supported by ALJ's (EMPYES, t-value = -16.376), than in ULP 
charges initiated by unions (irrespective of support or dismissal by 
ALJ's) or initiated by employers and dismissed by ALJ's. Hypothesis 
7B also is supported. Members are less likely to make decisions 
favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by employers 
and dismissed by ALJ's (EMPNO, t-value = -8.823) than in ULP charges 
initiated by unions
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(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated by 
employers and supported by ALJ's. Hypothesis 7C is not supported.
The significant results (at p = 0.01) of variable UNIONO (t-value = 
-9.957) suggests that, contrary to what was hypothesized, members are 
less likely to favor unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by 
unions and dismissed by ALJ's than in ULP charges initiated by unions 
and supported by ALJ's or initiated by employers (irrespective of 
support or dismissal by ALJ's).
Summary and Comparison of Models
In the foregoing sections of this Chapter, Models 1A, 1, 2 and 3 
were individually presented in Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19, respectively, 
with commentary accompanying each of these Tables. In this section, 
these models are summarized and are compared, using the Pearson 
Goodness-of-Fit Chi Square statistic. These data on the models are 
presented in Table 20.
Model 3 is the full model developed from the literature review 
and addresses each of the Hypotheses promulgated in Chapter 3. As 
shown in Table 20, the model is well-specified, including three 
classifications of variables as discussed previously at Table 15: (1) 
those variables relating to individual characteristics of members 
(e.g., political party) and to the selection process (i.e., political 
party of the original appointing president), DEMDEM (MOAP), REPREP 
(MOAP), AGE, MANG and UGDEGREE; (2) those variables concerned with the 
process through which the allegations progress to be decided by the 
members, EMPYES, EMPNO, UNIONO, and UNANIMOUS, and (3) those variables 
related to internal and external environmental conditions, TREND, 
UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and STABLE.






VARIABLE MODELS AND INCLUDED VARIABLES ' 1
NUMBER MODEL 3 MODEL 2 MODEL 1 MODEL 1A
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
1 X 1 DEMDEM(MOAP) DEMDEM(MOAP) DEMDEM(MOAP) DEMDEM(MOAP)-0.057 -0.053 -0.054 0.028
(-0.886) (-0.832) (-0.846) (0.355)
2 X2 REPREP(MOAP)*
REPREP(MOAP) REPREP(MOAP) REPREP(MOAP)
-0.176 -0.148 -0.147 -0.138






4A X 10 AGE * AGE AGE AGE0.008 0.006 0.007 -0.005
(1.973) (1.577) (1.680) (-0.687)




AD X 13 MANG MANG MANG MANG-0.069 -0.080 -0.085 -0.168
(-0.601) (-0.725) (0.765) (-1.291)
5 X 11 TREND TREND ** TREND** TREND**0.019 0.017 0.016 0.038
(1.262) (3.881) (3.670) (4.435)

















(-16.376) (-16.809) (-16.787) (-14.559)















(-9.957) (-10.358) (10.3c71 (-8.653)
Pearson Goodness-o£- fit
Chi Square 2145 2138 Ill-
D.F. 2133 2137 ill 8
?-Value 0.424 0.491 0.520 1.-. >9
r. 2147 2147 21-7
^ F o r  Hypotheses, see Chapter 3 (b)For Descriptions of Variables, see Table 15
significant at or above .05 significant at or above .01
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Model 3 contains four variables (UGDEGREE, UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and 
UNANIMOUS) which were not included in Model 2. Prior models were 
included to present the developmental sequence culminating with Model
3. Model 1 (and its subset model 1A) was the benchmark replication of
the Cooke and Gautschi model, while Model 2 incorporated the
additional element of regional stability (STABLE) suggested by 
Delaney, Lewin and Sockell.
Model 3 includes four variables which are significant at P =
0.01; UNANIMOUS (coefficient 0.188, t-value 2.936), EMPYES 
(coefficient -1.236, t-value -16.376), EMPNO (coefficient -0.731, 
t-value -8.823) and UNIONO (coefficient -0.609, t-value -9.957) as 
well as three variables which are significant at p=0.05: REPREP (MOAP) 
(coefficient -0.176, t-value -2.221), AGE (coefficient 0.008, t-value
1.973), and UGDEGREE (coefficient -0.176, t-value -2.098).
Of these aforementioned seven variables in Model 3 which are 
significant (at either p= 0.01 or p= 0.05), two were included in one 
or more of the developmental models. Variables REPREP(MOAP) and AGE 
both were included in each of the developmental models 1A, 1 and 2. 
Neither of these two variables, which were significant in Model 3, 
were significant in any of these prior models. REPREP(MOAP) did, 
however, approach significance in Model 2 (t-value -1.950) and Model 1 
(t-value -1.932).
Variables UGDEGREE and UNANIMOUS included in Model 3, and 
significant, were not included in any of the prior models. The 
variable TREND (included in Model 3, but not significant) was included
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in all prior models. In those prior models, TREND was significant. 
Why TREND lacks significance in Model 3, while it was significant in 
prior models, is discussed in Chapter 5.
Variable DEMDEM (MOAP), included in Model 3 and not significant, 
was included and not significant in all prior models as well. STABLE, 
included in Model 3 and not significant, was also included in Model 2 
and not significant. Variables UNIONPOP and ULPRATE, included in 
Model 3 and not significant, were not included in any of the prior 
models. UNIONPOP and ULPRATE play a role in the discussion (in
Chapter 5) of why TREND was not significant in Model 3, whereas it was
in all prior models.
As indicated earlier, the dependent variable in this study is the
decision by a member in an unfair labor practice case. This decision 
may be either pro-union or pro-management, depending upon the specific 
combination of charging party (employer or union), the decision of the 
ALJ (to support or to dismiss the allegation) and the decision of the 
member (to agree or to disagree with the ALJ). These decisions also 
were illustrated in Appendix J. A measure of the ability of a model 
to predict the decision is the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Chi Square 
statistic. This Chi Square statistic, with its appropriate degrees of 
freedom (DF), is provided for each model in Table 20. As the table 
indicates, Model 3 (Chi Square 2145, DF 2133, p= 0.424) is the 
superior model in terms of predictability of decisions of members. A 
model with a p-value of 0.424 generally would not be regarded as a 
relatively good predictor. Recall, however, that the purpose of this 
study was not to develop a model for its overall predictive 
capability. The purpose rather was to develop a well-specified model
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of the process through which ULP charges are alleged by charging 
parties are decided by administrative law judges and, if subjected to 
review by the Board, are resolved by decisions of members. This model 
then was tested to evaluate suspected political bias in those 
decisions made by Board members. Individual variables within the model 
as sources of potential bias was the focal point rather than the model 
as an integrated whole. As indicated in the opening paragraphs of the 
Logit Results section of this chapter, the t-ratio is of prime 
importance in this task. The synergism of the variables and the 
model's ability to predict (and therefore the Chi Square statistic) is 
of peripheral interest only.
In summary, Model 3, as indicated in Table 20, contains a greater 
number of significant variables than either of the two developmental 
models of Delaney, Lewin and Sockell (Model 2) or Cooke and Gautschi 
(Model 1A/1). Additionally, Model 3 has somewhat greater predictive 
capability (albeit of peripheral import and of limited strength) than 
either of Model 2 or 1A/1.
An in-depth discussion of the results of Model 3 follows in 
Chapter 5.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapter, the results of the logit analysis of 
Model 3 were presented. The results for each variable were reported as 
those results provided support, or failed to provide support, to the 
hypotheses set forth in Chapter 3. The focus of this chapter, 
therefore, is to discuss those previously presented results within a 
framework of integration and interpretation.
Discussion
In examining the decisions rendered by members, this study centered 
around several sets of hypotheses involving influences on the decisions 
made by members of the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor 
practice cases. The hypotheses included several areas: political party 
affiliations, regional stability, personal factors, long-term time 
trend, the atmosphere of the labor-management relations environment, 
Board unanimity, and the process through which ULP charges progress to 
be decided by the Board.
In each of these areas, the following was hypothesized:
1. Political party affiliations of the member and the president 
will impact the decision. There will be differences in decisions 
made by Democratic members and Republicans members who 
originally are appointed by presidents of the same party.
Under congruent Democratic party affiliations there will be more 
pro-union decisions, whereas under congruent Republican party 
affiliation will be more pro-management decisions.
122
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2. Stability within regions at the Regional Director level, will 
impact the decisions. Members are more likely to make 
decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions 
than in stable regions.
3. Personal factors of age, type of undergraduate degree 
(classified as Business/Economics and non-Business/Economics), 
and prior occupations and organizational memberships 
(classified as business-oriented and non-business oriented) 
will not impact the decisions of members.
4. Long term time trend, the size of the union population 
(measured as a percent of the labor force) and the rate of ULP 
charges filed (measured as a ratio per million union members) 
will affect the decision. A decrease in union population will 
have a pro-management effect on decisions, while an increase 
in the rate of ULP charges filed will have a pro-union effect.
5. Pressures for unanimity among the members of the Board will 
result in decisions (either favoring unions over employers or 
favoring employers over unions) which, when unanimous, differ 
from those decisions which are non-unanimous.
6. The processing procedure will influence decisions of members. 
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring employers
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over unions when the ULP charge is initiated by employers
(irrespective of the decisions of the ALJ) or when the charge is
initiated by the union and dismissed by the ALJ.
Against the backdrop of the hypotheses in these areas, the
findings are summarized into three sections: 1) Evidence of political
bias; 2) Evidence of procedural bias, and 3) Evidence of other biases.
The findings in each of these sections are presented below.
Evidence of Political Bias
The first set of hypotheses considered in this research involved
political party affiliation:
Political party affiliation of the member and 
the president will impact the decision.
There will be differences in decisions made 
by Democratic members and Republican members 
who originally are appointed by presidents of 
the same party. Under congruent Democratic 
party affiliations there will be more 
pro-union decisions, whereas under congruent 
Republican party affiliations will be more 
pro-management decisions.
As previously indicated at Table 19, the t-values for the condition
of Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic presidents does
not support the contention (Hypothesis 1) that under such congruency of
political party affiliations (DEMDEM) members are more likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or
Republican members originally appointed by presidents of opposite
parties or Republican members originally appointed by Republican
presidents. Indeed, even the directionality (negative, pro-management)
is contrary to that anticipated by Hypothesis 1.
At the same time, the results, reported at Table 19, support
Hypothesis 2. In Table 19, REPREP (coefficient -0.176, t-value -2.221)
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is interpreted to mean that Republican members originally appointed by 
Republican presidents are less likely to make decisions favoring 
unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican members 
appointed by presidents of opposite parties or Democratic members 
originally appointed by Democratic presidents.
The results at Table 19 supporting Hypothesis 2 but, at the same 
time, not supporting Hypothesis 1 is a surprising finding. The Cooke 
and Gautschi results found support for both of these hypotheses and 
their discussion implied that the two essentially were "polar" in 
nature; that is, that one occurs automatically with the other.
In an attempt to determine why a "unilateral" effect was occurring 
in this study and to determine whether something was acting to confound 
the results, further investigation was undertaken. Cooke and Gautschi 
(discussed in Chapter 2 and at Tables 16 and 17 of Chapter 3) 
interpreted their results as providing strong support for their central 
hypotheses (i.e., that the presidential appointment process directly 
affects ULP decisions made by the Board). Significant t-values for 
their variables DEMDEM and REPREP they found provided support for both 
sides of the political congruency issue. Furthermore, the sign of their 
DEMDEM variable was positive (pro-union) and of REPREP, negative 
(pro-management).
How, then can the seemingly "one-sided" result of this study be 
explained? It is possible that a plausible answer to this question is 
rooted in several issues. First, it is possible to speculate that the 
age of DEMDEM members was greater than that of the REPREP members. If 
so, perhaps these older members had become more conservative (with
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"conservative" as a euphemism for "pro-management") than their younger 
REPREP counterparts. Upon inspection, it was found that the average 
age of the DEMDEM members (four members) over the tenures of their 
Board service was 55.7 years. In comparison, an average age of 51.5 
years was found for the REPREP members (nine members). Perhaps, an 
element of greater conservatism would partially explain the negative 
sign (pro-management) of the coefficient (-0.062) of DEMDEM, in this 
study.
To explore the possibility that age was interacting with party 
affiliation the data were analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 5 factorial design: 
political party of the original appointing president (Democrat, 
Republican) and political party of the member (Democrat, Republican), 
with age as a blocking factor. Age was grouped into five classes 
(under 50; 50 through 54; 55 through 59; 60 through 64, and 65 or 
older).
As shown in Table 21, the main effects were significant for both 
political natty of member and age of member, with value of P = 0.005 
and 0.007, respectively. These results are as were expected and are 
consistent with the logit results.
Of particular interest was the results of the two-way 
interactions. The two-way interaction between political party of 
member and age of member was significant, at p = 0.002. From an
examination of the means for member party and age (Table 22) it
appears that the liberalism (pro-union) of Democratic members remains 
fairly stable across all ages. In contrast, Republican members appear
to get less conservative (more pro-union) as they get older.
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TABLE 21 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND AGE OF MEMBER
SOURCE OF VARIATION SS DF MS F SIGNIFICANCE
MAIN EFFECTS 6.249 6 1.042 4.544 0.000
Partv or President 0.000 I 0.000 0.001 0.978
Partv of Member 1.774 1 1.774 7.742 0.005
Age of Member 3.262 4 0.815 3.558 0.007
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS 8.817 9 0.980 4.275 0.000
Pres. Party/Member Party 0.005 1 0.005 0.021 0.88b
Pres. Party/Member Age 4.983 4 1.246 5.435 0.000
Member Party/Member Age 3.983 4 0.996 4.345 0.002
THREE-WAY INTERACTION 1.643 3 0.548 2.390 0.067
Pres. Party/Member Party/ 
Member Age 1.643 3 0.548 2.390 0.067
EXPLAINED 16.709 18 0.928 4.050 0.000
RESIDUAL 487.701 2128 0.229
TOTAL 504.411 2146 0.235
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TABLE 22






Under 50 1.36a 1.47
(205)b (248)
50 through 54 1.40 1.45
(222) (233)
55 through 59 1.30 1.45
(261) (237)
60 through 64 1.31 1.30
(230) (202)
65 or older 1.35 1.28
(232) (127)
TOTAL NUMBER 1150 997
NOTES: a) Pro-Union Decision *> 1 Pro-Management Decision » 2
b) Bracketed Values indicates number in cell.
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The overall trend, therefore, is for Democratic members (DEM) to 
become more liberal with age (more pro-union), while the logit analysis 
indicated that Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents 
(DEMDEM) were evenhanded in their decisions. Since these DEMDEM members 
are included in the DEM classification, this finding concerning age of 
the members lends credence to the idea that DEMDEM members play by the 
rules. Their playing by the rules is occuring in spite of what is 
happening in the age of the member.
The overall trend, on the other hand, is for Republican members 
(REP) to become more liberal with age (less conservative), while the 
logit analysis indicated that Republican members appointed by 
Republican presidents (REPREP) were adherent to the party line of 
conservatism (i.e., pro-management). Since these REPREP members are 
included in REP classification, this finding concerning age of the 
members lends credence to the idea that the REPREP phenomenon is 
genuine, and not of a spurious nature. Apparently, the REPREP 
phenomenon is occurring in spite of what is happening in the age of 
the member.
Second, it is possible also to speculate that the expected 
political bias under congruency of political party (between member and 
original appointing president) need not be "two-sided". Perhaps there 
are factors that exist among REPREP members that are not replicated 
among DEMDEM members. If this were to be the case, such may also 
contribute to provide a plausible answer to the question posed earlier.
A search for other possible differences (beyond those of political 
party affiliations and average age) between the two groups was 
undertaken. In this vein, a previously reviewed finding of Cook is
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particularly germaine. Cook concluded from a study of judges that 
associations with policy - specific groups (e.g., a member of the 
management team) biases decisions in the direction of the commitment or 
philosophy of that group.
Cook additionally indicated that Republican judges were less 
flexible in the type of sentences they rendered than were Democratic 
judges. This finding by Cook is reinforced by the results of the study 
of commissioners of seven federal agencies conducted by Smith. Smith 
found that conservatives tended to follow the "party line". Liberals, 
on the other hand, tended to be more objective and showed a greater 
readiness to dissent.
A review of backgrounds of members revealed the following 
associations. Four members were included in the DEMDEM classification, 
whereas the REPREP classification included nine members. The remaining 
four members were equally divided in the two classifications 
of incongruency (i.e., two members each in REPDEM and DEMREP). In the 
DEMDEM classification, the backgrounds of two of the four members 
included stints of short duration in the managerial hierarchy of their 
organizations, McCulloch with a university and Truesdale with the 
National Academy of Sciences. In the REPREP classification, only two of 
the nine members had been engaged in occupations which were 
management-oriented, Van de Water as president of a management 
consulting firm (1949-1981) and Dotson as labor counsel for several 
firms (e.g., Westinghouse, Western Electric and Wheeling-Pittsburg 
Steel).
Prior association with a management-specific group exerts a 
pro-management force (negative sign), whereas prior association with a
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union-specific group exerts a pro-union force (positive sign).
Occupations which are neither management-specific nor union-specific, or 
"neutral", would not be expected to produce either a positive (pro-union) 
or a negative (pro-management) force on the sign of the DEMDEM and REPREP 
variable.
As discussed above, the composition of both of these groups in 
this study are, by in large, neutral. With so few members in 
management-oriented occupations (and none of those Democrats) and no 
members in union-oriented occupations empty cells in ANOVA precluded 
the running of interactions. On the basis of cell means as shown in 
Table 23, however, it seems reasonable to speculate that there would 
be no important differences among Democratic members.
While the results reported at Table 19 (supporting Hypothesis 2, 
but not supporting Hypothesis 1) are surprising, the preceding 
discussion provides insights into why such unexpected results may have 
occurred. The results in this study indicate an alternative 
interpretation to that of a "polar" situation. The results at Table 19 
suggest quite plausibly that even though they become more "liberal", 
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents are 
staunch "party-liners". REPREP members, in fact, are less likely to 
make decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or 
Republican members appointed by presidents of opposing parties or
Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents.
On the other hand, the results also plausibly show that Democratic 
members originally appointed by Democratic presidents appear (to their 
credit) to "play by the rules". With an apparent greater willingness to
dissent and to show flexibility in their perspectives, they seem to make
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TABLE 23












nor Management 1.34 1.40
(1150) (841)
TOTAL 1150 ftftl J J t
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decisions in an evenhanded fashion. DEMDEM members in this study are 
not more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers than 
are Democratic or Republican members originally appointed by 
presidents of opposite parties or Republican members appointed by 
Republican presidents.
A final caveat is important. In Model 3, the variable REPREP was 
significant (t = -2.221). In the three developmental models ( Model 
2, 1 and 1A) this variable was not significant, even though in Models 
2 and 1 significance was approached (t-values -1.950 and - 1.952, 
respectively; p value = .06). There is some concern, accordingly, that 
significance of this variable may be of a spurious rather than 
substantive nature. This concern exists notwithstanding the evidence 
of the genuineness of the REPREP phenomenon presented earlier at the 
discussion of age.
Evidence of Procedural Bias
In Chapter 2 hypotheses 7A, 7B, and 7C were fashioned to address 
issues of possible bias in the process through which allegation of ULP 
charges are filed and progress in stage-wise fashion for decision by 
Board members. The functions and the roles played by the Regional 
Directors and by the Administrative Law Judges in the process were 
discussed. In Chapter 3 (Logit Results section), a group of variables 
(labeled as "process" variables) were described and defined (in Table 
15). The results included in Table 19 concerning process variables are 
extremely interesting and are discussed below.
In the study sample, fifty-five percent of the ULP charges were 
initiated by unions and supported by the Administrative Law Judges; 
whereas twenty-one percent of the charges were initiated by unions,
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but dismissed by the ALJs. The latter of these two components is 
reported in the variable UNIONO. Sixteen percent of the ULP charges 
were initiated by employers and supported by ALJs (variable EMPYES) 
and nine percent of the charges were initiated by employers but 
dismissed by ALJs (variable EMPNO). These four combinations of filing 
parties and ALJ decisions are illustrated in Appendix J.
Irrespective of whether the allegation of the charging party was 
supported or was dismissed by the ALJ, the results in Table 19 indicated 
that Board members are more likely to decide in favor of the charging 
party rather than the respondent (e.g., EMPYES, t = -16.376 and EMPNO, 
t = -8.823). These findings support Hypotheses 7A and 7B as well as 
those of Cooke and Gautschi. It may be intimated from these results that 
the Regional Director (in the "gate keeper" role discussed in Chapter 2, 
at Hypothesis 3) could impact the proportion of pro-union and 
pro-management decisions. This impact could be achieved through the 
style of management of NLRB personnel in regional offices. Directives, 
for example, could be issued by the Regional Director to region staff 
personnel to give greater emphasis or attention to either complaints of 
unions or to complaints of employers and therefore skew the number of 
complaints (union or employer) which reach the level of ALJ. A similar 
result could be achieved through more subtle, but equally effective, 
techniques, such as informal and non-written communication.
Board members appear to have given no more weight to those charges 
dismissed by the ALJs which were initiated by the unions than those 
dismissed by the ALJs which were initiated by the employers suggests that 
they may be doing their job properly, in an impartial manner. Cooke 
and Gautschi interpreted their results of UNIONO as infering that the
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Board generally treated ALJ decisions about union complaints 
differently than ALJ decisions about employer complaints. In their 
study, however, the sample proportions for EMPNO and UNIONO were 
fifteen percent and eleven percent respectively. In contrast, the 
sample proportions in Model 3 were nine percent (EMPNO) and twenty-one 
percent (UNIONO), roughly the reverse of Cooke and Gautschi. This 
finding is particularly striking when viewed in terms of REPREP bias 
discussed earlier. This is evidenced by the significant results of
EMPNO (t = -8.823) and UNIONO (t = -9.957). It further can be
inferred that the members generally have treated ALJs' dismissals of 
charges differently than they have treated ALJs' affirmations of 
charges (EMPYES, coefficient -1.236, t = -16.376 vs. EMPNO, 
coefficient -0.731, t = -8.823).
As indicated in Table 1, most decisions by members are pro-union 
(62.3 percent). It is also possible to speculate that (below the level 
of Board member) the organizational structure and the procedure through 
which charges are processed to be decided by members (i.e., the levels of 
Regional Director and ALJ) is pervaded by liberalism. If such were to be 
the case, members may, over the years of their service react to a 
wear-down or capitulation process and "go with the system". Such a 
reaction would be more noticeable in Republican Members (REP) than in
Democratic Members (DEM), the latter characteristically already being
liberal (pro-union).
The preceding discussion of the significant results of the process, 
variables sheds a new light on the concern for potential bias in ULP 
decisions by Board members. The magnitude of the impact of political 
party affiliation bias transmitted through the appointment process
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begins to pale in the light of these results concerning the process 
variables. A much greater potential bias appears to reside within the 
NLRB organizational structure and its procedural process below the level 
of Board member. The Regional Director is located at a critical nexus 
in the process. In the prior-described gatekeeper role, Regional 
Directors are able to "adjust" the gate settings to influence the 
process flow. The role of ALJs, in the next stage of the process, 
imparts an additional impact which is manifested in the members' 
decisions. This impact of the ALJ was greatest when a decision 
involved an allegation of an ULP filed by the union.
Evidence of Other Biases
The remaining sets of hypotheses are discussed here. The third 
hypothesis considered in this research involved stability within the 
region in which the decision by the members were made:
Stability within regions at the Regional 
Director level. Members are more likely to 
make decisions favoring unions over employers 
in unstable regions than in stable regions.
In the opening section of Chapter 3 the procedure for processing ULP 
Charges was described with a supporting illustration provided in Appendix 
C. This process, it was explained, takes place within a network of 
regions which subdivide the task of covering the fifty States and 
Puerto Rico. A map showing the areas included within the 
jurisdiction of each region is provided in Appendix B. The roles of 
the Regional Director and the ALJs also were previously reported.
The impact of the roles of these positions was discussed in the prior 
section of this Chapter.
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The issue of stability within regions at the level of the 
Regional Director raises the question as to the what happens if that 
role is interrupted as the result of a change in the incumbent in the 
position. The hypothesis encompasses the idea that a change puts the 
role into a hiatus. The "gatekeeping" function of the Regional 
Director will be immobilized until the new Regional Director can put 
into place and communicate to the Regional staff personnel his or her 
"style of managing" the function. During this transition period of 
time (defined as instability, in Table 15) the impact of the Regional 
Director is removed or at least lessened. Any potential impact 
resulting from political bias (at the member level) therefore, can be 
more fully transmitted during the period of regional instability.
The results are contrary to expectation. The variable STABLE 
(coefficient 0.098, t-value = 1.135) is not significant. What could 
explain these unexpected results? There is a plausible explanation.
In the previous section, the results of the process variables 
were shown to be significant. Pro-management decisions of members 
were shown to be strongly associated with charges in which the 
employer was the initiating party, regardless of the decision by the 
ALJ to support or to dismiss the allegations (EMPYES, t-value = 
-16.376 and EMPNO, t-value = -8.823). During periods of instability, 
the ALJ's (as surrogates of the Board and as "outsiders" independent 
of the regions in which they render their decisions) continue to 
function normally in their roles. Regional Directors are positioned 
between the filing parties and the ALJs. Which cases are referred to 
the ALJ's may be skewed by the policies of the Regional Director. 
Periods of turnover in the position of Regional Director (i.e.,
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unstable) disrupt the flow pattern. Indeed, the nature of charges 
heard by ALJ's during instability may change. A determination of 
whether or not the nature of charges heard do change with changes of 
gatekeepers, however, was beyond the scope of this study. During such 
periods, the significant influence of the employer as filing party, 
regardless of the ALJ decision (EMPYES and EMPNO), and the 
significant influence of the dismissals by the ALJ's of charges filed 
by unions (UNIONO), however, appears to be sufficiently forceful to 
impede the influence of political party affiliation at the member 
level. This strength of the impedance to avoid being succumbed by 
political bias is suggested by the lack of significance of STABLE 
(t-value = 1.135).
The findings in the preceding section concerning the NLRB 
processing procedures, coupled with the findings in this section 
concerning the issue of stability at the level of Regional Director, 
illuminate the robustness of the system. The functions and 
responsibilities of the position of Regional Director, indeed are 
important. Execution of these functions and responsibilities, 
however, do not come to a halt during periods of a vacancy or other 
indisposition of a Regional Director. Continuity during changes (or 
during temporary caretaking by acting Directors) is an attribute of 
the system structure. Changeovers are no more perceptible than 
perhaps the flicker associated with a changeover of the electrical 
power of a hospital from its primary source to an emergency auxiliary 
source.
From the foregoing discussion we are able to shed still more new 
light on the concern for potential political bias in decisions by the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
139
Board members. Some political bias does exist, as indicated earlier 
at the discussion of the variable REPREP. The importance of such 
political bias, however, must be relegated to a lesser position than 
the concern for biases residing within the process itself. The 
unexpected results of the variable STABLE contributes an important 
thread to the fabric of this evidence.
The third set of hypotheses considered in this research involved
personal factors of members:
Personal factors of Age, type of 
undergraduate degree (classified as 
Business/Economics and 
non-Business/Economics), and prior 
occupations and organizational membership 
(classified as business-oriented and 
non-business oriented) will not affect 
the decisions of members.
Four separate hypotheses were fashioned in Chapter 3 each addressed 
to one of the individual factors of age, type of undergraduate degree, 
prior occupation, and organizational memberships. These four hypotheses, 
identified as 4A through 4D respectively, anticipated that none of these 
personal factors would affect the decisions of members. Contrary to what 
was anticipated, the factors of age and type of undergraduate degree were 
significant.
The significant results for age in this study support the findings 
by Nagel that the age of judges was one of the factors which contributed 
to the type of decisions they rendered in both criminal cases and civil 
cases involving economic issues. The results of this study indicated 
that age is significant, with older Board members displaying a pro-union 
bias in their decisions, as revealed by the positive sign of the
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coefficient of variable AGE and its t-value in Table 19. Booker and 
Trafford, on the other hand, indicated in their study that younger 
members appeared to display a pro-union bias. Some differences between 
the Booker and Trafford study and this study could account for these 
opposing findings. The Booker and Trafford study, for example, covered 
decisions in an earlier time period in the history of the NLRB, 1937 
-1963, Eleven of the twenty-six years of that period preceded a 1947 
amendment (i.e., Taft-Hartley amendment) to the Act; whereas, this study 
covered a time period (1962-1983) which was fully after the 1947 
Amendment.) The Taft-Hartley Amendment enumerated and prohibited union 
unfair labor practices in the same way that the employer practices had 
been, prior to the Amendment. As in the case of unfair employer labor 
practices prior to 1947, interpretative difficulties marked the post-1947 
treatment'of some of the newly included provisions.
The anticipated lack of significance of age in this study 
(Hypothesis 4A) was founded primarily on the Cooke and Gautschi results. 
The results of this study, as previously discussed, indicates that age is 
significant and supports the results of Nagel. The positive sign of the 
coefficient of AGE is indicative of a pro-union bias, which is contrary 
to the Booker and Trafford findings. Older individuals, however, 
generally display characteristics of greater security-mindedness than do 
younger individuals. Decisions by members in this study (mean age 56 
years) therefore may reflect more empathy with union security precepts. 
The mean age of members in the Booker and Trafford study perhaps could be 
reconstructed, but such a task was not within the scope of this study.
The significant results for the variable UGDEGREE reported in Table 
19 was unexpected. It can be speculated, however, that the curriculum
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followed in one's undergraduate education creates philosophical ties to a 
profession (e.g., business management) not unlike the emotional ties to 
one's "alma mater". The strength of such ties frequently is manifest, 
for example, by athletic coaches being drawn to their ultimate ambition 
in returning to coach at "their school".
In cases where issues involving ULP allegations are not clearcut, 
members with degrees in business/economics could be swayed to decide in 
favor of employers over unions. The sample in this study, recall, 
included only those cases which involved novel questions or that set 
precedents that may be of substantial importance in the future 
interpretations of the Act. Cases fitting this requirement were 
identified as such in the annual reports of the NLRB. The possession of 
a business/economics degree, therefore, could represent a possible 
confound with Republican party affiliation.
Earlier, the results of an examination of the prior occupational 
backgrounds of members in the DEMDEM and REPREP classification was 
discussed. A similar examination was made of the educational background 
of members in these two groups to determine if undergraduate degrees 
represented a confound. The results show the following. None of the 
four members in the DEMDEM group had undergraduate degrees in business 
administration. Of che nine members in the REPREP group, the 
undergraduate degree of only one member (Hunter) was in business. The 
threat of a confound, therefore, was minimal to nonexistent.
The personal factor of prior occupation was not significant, as 
reported in Table 19. These results support the findings of Cooke and 
Gautschi as well as those of Gormley. Even though the results in this 
study were not significant, the directionality of the variable is worth
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noting. A negative sign (coefficient -0.078, t-value -0.677) indicates a 
pro-management direction.
It was explained in Chapter 4 at the discussion of Hypothesis 4C, 
that the variable MSHIP (defined in Table 15) was dropped because of a 
problem of multicollinearity. With the dropping of this variable, no 
direct evidence was available to test the hypothesis that prior 
membership in policy-specific organizations affect decisions.
The final set of hypotheses considered in this research involved 
temporal trend and trends in the general environment in which the NLRB 
functions:
Long term time trend, the size of the 
union population (measured as a percent 
of the labor force) and the rate of ULP 
charges filed (measured as a ratio per 
million union members) will affect the 
decision. A decrease in union population 
will have a pro-management effect on 
decisions, while an increase in the rate 
of ULP charges filed will have a 
pro-union effect.
During the twenty- two year period covered by this study 
(1962-1983), the size of the unionized segment of the labor force in the 
United States has steadily declined, from 22.6 percent to 18.9 percent. It 
was hypothesized (Hypothesis 5A) that as the union population declined, 
members would be less likely to make decisions favoring unions over 
employers. The results in Table 19 do not support this hypothesis 
(UNIONPOP, t-value = -1.702). The lack of significance is surprising.
What is even more surprising is that the directionality of the results is 
opposite of what was anticipated in Hypothesis 5A. The negative sign of 
UNIONPOP, as explained at the outset of Chapter 4, and reiterated at 
Table 19, is interpreted as "pro-union". Why would there be a pro-union
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directionality as the size of the union population decreased? Several 
directions of speculation provide plausible explanations. One explanation 
lies in the speculation that the strength of unions is waning and they may 
be perceived less as a threat (i.e., to the prerogatives of management) 
than in earlier years. Under such changing perceptions and increased 
frequency of deciding for unions over employers may not carry as high 
stakes as before. Another speculation is the often-cited notion of the 
Americans pulling for the "underdog". As the size of the union population
declines, unions may begin being perceived as the underdogs in the
labor-management relationship and the administration of the National Labor 
Relations Act. This posturing of unionism would provide another plausible 
explanation for the surprising pro-union directionality of UNIONPOP. Still 
again, perhaps unions (for whatever motivation) simply are violating the 
law more frequently than in the past and the NLRB merely is performing its
function in the manner it's supposed to be.
Although the size of the union population was declining over the 
time period of the study, the rate at which ULP cases were filed by
unions more than doubled, as indicated in Table 14. Hypothesis 5B states
that as the rate of ULP charges filed by unions increased, members will
more likely make decisions favoring unions over employers. This
nypotnesxs also was net supported, as zndiCaCcu in Taule 19. here, as> x»» 
Hypothesis 5A, the directionality of results, again is contrary to 
expectations. As filings have increased, the direction is 
pro-management. What is happening here may be explained plausibly by the 
same speculations as in union populations. In this instance, union are 
cognizant of their strength being perceived (by management) as declining. 
As a response, perhaps partially out of a sense of frustration and
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partially out of a strategy of showing strength, the rate of filings of 
ULP charges is stepped up. As the rate of filings is stepped up, the 
perception of strength of one party in an adversarial relationship is 
perceived by the other party. The status of underdog, accordingly is 
diminished (along with the diminishing ability to elicit sympathy). It 
may also be plausible that unions simply are filing more-frivolous 
charges.
What we have as a result are two forces acting upon each other 
in essentially opposite directions. The outcome of these 
countervailing forces is somewhat akin to a tug-of-war between two 
closely matched, but unequal, teams. In this instance, one team
(UNIONPOP) has a pro-union pull, and the other (ULPRATE) has a
pro-management pull. The pro-management pull of ULPRATE is consistent 
with the findings of Freeman and Medoff. Their findings showed that 
the rate of union filings of ULP charges against employers had a 
significant depressant effect on union success rates in organization of 
new workers in NLRB elections. ULPRATE was used by Freeman and Medoff in 
context and setting different than that of Model 3. The directionality 
of results, however, are similar- as the union filing rate increases, the 
effect is pro-management (NLRB elections/NLRB cases won by employers. 
Because they are unequal, there as a residual movement. Because they are 
closely matched, however, the residual movement is not significant.
To explore the possibility that the size of the union population was
interacting with party affiliations, the data were analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 4
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, (New 
York. Basic Books, Inc., 1984) pp. 232-239.
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factorial design: political party of the original appointing president 
(Democrat, Republican) and political party of the member (Democrat, 
Republican) with the size of the union population as a blocking factor. 
Size of the union population (measured as a percent of the labor force) 
was grouped into four classes sized to include approximately an equal 
number of decisions in each class (under 19.8 percent; 19.8 through 21.7 
percent; 21.8 through 22.1 percent, and 22=2 percent or more).
As shown in Table 24, the size of the union population is 
significant in and of itself (p = 0.000) but does not interact with 
political party of the member (p = 0.393) nor with political party of the 
president ( p = 0.063). The absence of interaction with political party 
of either the member or the original appointing president suggests that 
as the size of the union population changes, the decisions of members do 
not change differentially.
In a similar manner, the possibility that the rate at which unions 
file unfair labor practice charges was interacting with party affiliation, 
the data were again analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 4 factorial design: political 
party of the original appointing president (Democrat, Republican) and 
political party of the member (Democrat, Republican) with the rate of 
filings of ULP charges by unions as a blocking factor. The rate of 
filings o f ULP charges by union (per million union members) was grouped 
into four classes sized to include approximately an equal number of 
decisions in each class (430.0 or less; 430.1 through 570.7; 570.8 
through 768.0, and 768.1 or more).
As shown in Table 25, the rate of filings of ULP charges by unions 
is significant in and of itself (p = 0.000) but does not interact with 
political party of the member ( p = 0.891) nor with political party of
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TABLE 24 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND SIZE OF UNION POPULATION
SOURCE OF VARIATION SS DF MS F SIGNIFICANCE
MAIN EFFECTS 9.608 5 1.922 8.331 0.000
Party of President 0.146 1 0.146 0.633 0.426
Party of Menber 3.187 1 3.187 13.817 0.000
Size of Union Population 6.621 3 2.207 9.568 0.000
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS 2.928 7 0.418 1.813 0.080
Pres. Party/Member Party 0.798 1 0.798 3.461 0.063
Pres. Party/Union Pop. 0.408 3 0.136 0.590 0.622
Member Party/Union Pop. 0.691 3 0.230 0.998 0.393











EXPLAINED 12.636 14 0.903 3.913 0.000
RESIDUAL 491.775 2132 0.231
TOTAL 504.411 2146 0.235
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TABLE 25 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND FILING RATE OF ULP CHARGES
SOURCE OF VARIATION SS DF MS F SIGNIFICANCE
MAIN EFFECTS 7.745 5 1.551 6.689 0.000
Party of President 0.029 I 0.029 0.125 0.724
Partv of Member 2.969 1 2.969 12.804 0.000
Filine Rate of L'LF
Charges 4.767 3 1.589 6.854 0.000
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS
Pres. Party/Member Party 
Pres. Partv/UL? File Rat 





















THREE-WAY INTERACTION 0.373 3 0.124 0.536 0.658
Pres. Party/Member Partv1
ULP Filing Rate 0.373 3 0.124 0.536 0.658
EXPLAINED 10.362 15 0.691 2.980 0.000
RESIDUAL 494.048 2131 0.232
TOTAL 504.411 2146 0.235
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the original appointing president (p = 0.553). The absence of 
interaction with political party of either the member or the original 
appointing president suggests that as the rate of filings of ULP charges 
by unions changes, the decisions of members do not change differentially.
There is nothing inherently associated with the per se passage 
of time, that would affect members' decisions. This concept is 
embodied in Hypothesis 5. The results provided in Table 19 support 
this hypothesis and support the findings of Cooke and Gautschi. As 
explained in Chapter 4,however, the retention of the variable TREND in 
the model serves a definitive purpose. It is not an infrequent 
occurrance for things in the environment to be changing and yet to go 
unnoticed, or to be noticed much later than should be. Inclusion of 
trend is an early-warning device. If it takes on significance, where 
there should be none logically, this could be a bellwether of other 
changes that have gone unnoticed. The sources of such changes, therefore, 
should be explored.
As suspected, the per se passage of time, as measured by the 
variable TREND, is not significant (t-value = 1.032). The study has 
isolated two important variables which are homogenized within the 
passage of time; namely, the changing size of the union population and 
the rate at which unions are filing ULP charges against employers. 
Admittedly, both of these variables over the selected time period of 
this study are not significant as shown in Table 19. Of the two, 
however, variable UNIONPOP does approach significance (t = -1.920; p = 
0.06) and the directionality of both as discussed earlier is plausible.
One final issue must be discussed. A concern for any possible 
meaning that might be associated with unanimity of decisions by Board
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members was raised in Chapter 3. Concerning this issue, Hypothesis 6 was
formulated as follows:
Members1 decisions, either favoring 
unions over employers or favoring 
employers over unions, which are 
unanimous, will differ from those which 
are non-unanimous.
As previously indicated at Table 19, the t-value of UNANIMOUS (t = 
2.936) is significant (at p = 0.01). The positive sign of the 
coefficient (0.188) indicates that unanimous decision of members are more 
likely to favor unions over employers than are non-unanimous decisions.
Significance can perhaps be interpreted as evidence that the members 
are not (as they self-evaluated themselves) "fiercely-independent". The 
NLRB decision process, which relies heavily on non-personal contacts, may 
provide insulation from direct peer pressure. The insulation, however, may 
not be impervious to pressures which exist in less formal contacts as are 
certain to occur in the normal course of interpersonal relationships 
within the performance of duties of the position. At the same time, 
however, these results could imply that the issues in these cases were 
seen in the same perspective by all members and the provisions of the Act 
uniformly applied. This latter speculation would suggest that the Board 
was functioning in accordance with its stated role.
Conclusions
This study was designed to examine political bias in the 
decisions made by members of the National Labor Relations Board in 
unfair labor practice cases. Personal factors of age, education and 
prior occupation and membership in policy-specific organizations
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prior to appointment also were examined as sources of bias, along with 
the effects resulting from the procedures through which ULP charges are 
processed for decision by the Board. How decisions are affected by 
passage of time, changes in the size of the union population and the rate 
at which unions are filing unfair labor practice charges, and stability 
at the level of Regional Director were investigated.
One set of hypotheses was partially supported in this study.
Results suggest that for this sample of decisions, Republican members 
originally appointed by Republican presidents were staunch 
party-liners who were less likely to decide in favor of unions over 
employers than members of all other congruent and incongruent 
political affiliations. While there was evidence that this phenomenon is 
genuine, there were some indications that significance may only be 
spurious. On balance, this finding is guardedly accepted. Results also 
suggest that Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic 
presidents are no more likely to decide in favor of employers or unions, 
but play by the rules and render decisions in an evenhanded manner.
Results further suggest that age and the type of degree which a 
member possesses affect decisions. Older members appear more likely 
to decide in favor of unions over employers, while members with 
undergraduate degrees in business/economics are more likely to decide in 
favor of employers over unions. There was little evidence that decisions 
by members are influenced by the type of prior occupations or memberships 
in policy-specific occupations.
Another set of results suggests that decisions of members are 
influenced by the employer as filing party (regardless of whether the
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charges were upheld or dismissed by the ALJ's) and by ALJs' dismissals of 
allegations which were initiated by unions.
Members appear to be affected by peer pressure of their co-members. 
There was evidence that a relationship existing between unanimity and 
decisions by members. The hypothesis that regional instability 
(resulting from turnover at the Regional Director level) would affect 
decisions found no support in the evidence. Pro-union decisions made in 
unstable regions were not significantly different from those made in 
stable regions. This lack of significant difference was speculated to be 
the result in part of the role of the Regional Director being played by 
the ALJ during the period of instability and in the robustness of the 
organizational system in assuring continuity of policies and procedures 
during staffing changes.
A final set of hypotheses concerning time and environmental 
trends received mixed support. Evidence supported the hypothesis 
that there is nothing inherently associated with the per se passage 
of time that would affect members' decisions. The evidence did not 
support either of the two hypotheses that declining union population 
and an increasing rate of ULP charges filed by unions would affect 
members' decisions.
Implications
There are several implications of the findings in this study as they 
relate to the presence or absence of political bias in decisions made by 
NLRB members in ULP cases. The presence of politically biased decisions 
should, sine qua non, be avoided. The findings are that Democratic 
members originally appointed by Democratic presidents appear to play by
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the rules and make decisions in an evenhanded manner. On the other hand, 
the finding (tentative though it may be) is that Republican members 
originally appointed by Republican presidents appear to be staunch 
party-liners who make decisions which are influenced by political party 
philosophy. This latter finding supports that of Cooke and Gautschi. The 
former finding of this study, however, does not support their reported 
political bias in decisions made under Democratic congruency between 
member and appointing president.
As discussed, the National Labor Relations Act delineates unfair 
labor practices of both unions and employers, and is aimed at achieving 
regulation coupled with neutrality. Decisions rendered by non-neutrals 
undermines the central purposes of the Act. Republican presidents should 
be cautioned, therefore, to be particularly selective in their choices of 
nominees. The Senate, likewise, is well advised to submit nominees to 
close scrutiny. The Senate's responsibility in the confirmation process 
should not be permitted to take on a perfunctory character. A "rubber 
stamp" posture by the Senate would be tantamount to abdication of its 
responsibility under the Act. Also, as indicated in Chapter 2, unlike 
other major regulatory agencies ( e.g., Civil Aviation Board, Federal 
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade 
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and Securities and Exchange 
Commission) the authorizing statute of the NLRB does not require some 
bipartisan appointments. The exposure to political bias in Board 
decisions, consequently, is particularly threathening. Notwithstanding 
the lack of evidence of political bias in decisions, an added safeguard 
would be an amendment to the act to require bipartisan appointments.
Success of the Act hinges on maintaining an atmosphere of goodfaith
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by both employers and unions in resolving their differences. Differences 
between unions and employers which are resolved through a decision 
process laced with inconsistencies and ambiguities flies in the face of 
goodfaith dealings. As a result both unions and employers may be 
discouraged in their desires and attempts to uphold their sides of the 
goodfaith obligation.
Both employers and unions look to the NLRA for swift, fair and 
economical resolutions of differences. Again, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in interpretations of facts in accordance with the terms 
and guidelines of the Act, may foster a greater incidence of appeals to 
the Board to review decisions by ALJ's. Unduly long periods of time and 
unwarranted delays in case resolutions may become the norm.
Such a norm results in inflated costs and inefficiencies of use of both 
time and human resources.
It was found that when an unstable condition exists within a 
region (as the product of turnover in the position of Regional 
Director), the decision by members is not affected. A significant 
effect on decisions appears to be warded off because the ALJ fills in the 
void during the transition period. The implication here underscores the 
importance of the ALJ's in achieving fairness in decisions. The quality 
of the results achieved under the Act go tongue and groove with the 
quality (vis a vis evenhandedness) of the ALJ. The NLRB, therefore, must 
be particularly attentive to all facets of the staffing process, from job 
description/job specifications through recruiting, screening, selection 
and evaluation.
Limitations of the Study
There are two kinds of limitations related to this study.
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First, there are general limitations common to all studies of the type 
conducted. Second, there are limitations relative to this study in 
particular. Limitations of each kind are indicated here.
As an ex post facto study, there are inherent limitations 
because there is no control over independent variables. Any 
inferences made must be done without an ability on the part of the 
researcher to intervene. In addition to this inability to manipulate 
independent variables, there is no ability to randomize which carries with 
it the risk of bias. As a field study, the variation of many of the 
variables is large particularly when compared to variables in laboratory 
experiments or even field experiments. On the other hand, as a 
field study, it is strong in realism and significance.^^
The specific limitations relative to this study in particular 
are concerned with sample selection and the difficulty of dealing 
with confounds. The NLRB will conclude its fifty-second year in 
September of this year. This study includes only twenty-two of those 
fifty-two years. As indicated in Chapter 3, however, this choice of 
years included members in all political combinations (congruent and 
incongruent) as well as four periods of alternating 
Democratic-Republican administrations. Additionally, twenty-two 
years is sufficiently long to permit treatment of trends.
Dealing with confounds is always a difficult task. This study 
was no exception. Those situations in which potential confounds were 
involved, however, were investigated and resolved plausibly through the 
use of ANOVA.
Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behaviorial Research Second 
Edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1973, p.390.
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Recommendations for Future Research 
While the findings in this study upheld some prior research, 
there were a number of findings that were contrary to other prior 
research. These findings also provided indications for further work 
needed along previously unexplored avenues.
In broad terms, the results of this study lead to the belief that 
decisions of members are heavily impacted by the workings of the system. 
While the position of Board member certainly is far more than perfunctory 
or titular, there is much going on below the member level. There is need, 
therefore, to examine these lower levels more thoroughly. Such an 
examination should include the same type of issues, such as turnover, 
political affiliation, prior occupation and education, but at the level of 
Administrative Law Judge and Regional Director.
In more specific terms recommendations include matters relating to 
periodic updating of data, a search for new and better measures of 
stability, and the use of trend as an early warning device for hidden 
variables.
This study was for a specific time period. From time to time, the 
data base should ba extended. Members may be reappointed to additional 
five year terms. Historically, however, of the seventeen most recent 
members whose service on the Board commenced subsequent to 1963, only one 
member (Penello) served more than five years. This number seventeen 
includes the current five members (Cracraft, Stephens, Babson, Johansen 
and Dotson), all of whom have thus far served less than five years, plus 
those twelve members commencing with Zagoria (4/65 - 12/69) and extending 
through Dennis (5/83 - 8/86). If the data base is extended at five-year 
intervals, therefore, it is likely that an all-new group of members will
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be involved. As the sample size increases, better generalization is 
possible.
The enormity of the role of the ALJ's was indicated in this 
study. The difficulty of tractability of ALJ's was indicated in the 
discussion. If a manageable technique can be devised to collect data 
(e.g., political affiliation and other personal characteristics) on 
the ALJ's, a study similar to this one could yield some interesting 
results and provide further insights in the decisions concerning ULP 
cases.
This was the first-known study concerning stability at the level 
of the Regional Director. As such, it has developed some baseline 
findings. Other measures of stability (i.e., other than turnover) 
should be explored. Such measures may include changes in funding levels. 
The issue'of stability still holds promise as a possible source of added 
understanding of the decision process
One final recommendation concerns trend. This study has 
isolated two important variables within the labor-management relations 
arena: union population size and rate of ULP charges filed by unions. 
Neither UNIONPOP nor ULPRATE individually were significant. These two in 
combination and with something else, however, synergistically resulted in 
TREND being significant. Decomposing time series data in a manner such 
as this is an important step toward a more meaningful understanding of 
the likelihood of a member to make a certain decision (i.e., pro-union or 
pro-management) in one year as compared to another year. It is important 
that alertness be maintained to detect newly developing factors. 
Candidates here may include changes in the rate of incidences of 
concession bargaining, of decertification elections, and of inclusion of 
two-tier compensation provisions in agreements.
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APPENDIX A
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The National Labor Relations Board 
is an independent agency created by 
the National Labor delations Act of 
1935 (Wagner Act), as amended by 
the acts of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 
1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), and 
1974.
The act affirms the right o f employ­
ees to self-organization and to bargain 
collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing or to refrain from 
such activities. The act prohibits cer­
tain unfair labor practices by employ­
ers and labor organizations or their 
agents and authorizes the Board to 
designate appropriate units fo r collec­
tive bargaining and to conduct secret 
ballot elections to determine whether 
employees desire representation by a 
labor organization.
As of July 1, 1971, the Postal Reor­
ganization Act (84 Stat. 719; 39 
U.S.G. Prec. 101 note) conferred 
jurisdiction upon the Board over un­
fa ir labor practice charges and repre­
sentation elections affecting U.S. 
Postal Service employees. As of Au­
gust 25, 1974, jurisdiction over all pri­
vately operated health care institu­
tions was conferred on the NLRB by 
an amendment to the act (29 U.S.C. 
152 et seq.).
FUNCTIONS A N D *A C n\TnE S
The Board has two principal functions 
under the act: preventing and remedy­
ing unfair labor practices by employers 
and labor organizations or their agents, 
and conducting secret ballot elections 
among employees in appropriate col­
lective-bargaining units to determine 
whether or not they desire to be rep­
resented by a labor organization. The 
Board also conducts secret ballot elec­
tions among employees who have been 
covered by a union-shop agreement to 
determine whether or not they wish to 
revoke their union’s authority to make 
such agreements; in jurisdictional dis­
putes. decides and determines which 
competing group of workers is entitled 
to perform the work involved; and con­
ducts secret ballot elections among em­
ployees concerning employers’ final 
settlement offers in national emergency 
labor disputes.
The General Counsel in unfair labor 
practice cases has final authority to in­
vestigate charges, issue complaints, and 
proicm ie such complaints before the 
Board. The General Counsel, on behalf 
of the Board, prosecutes injunction 
proceedings: handles courts of appeal' 
proceedings to enforce or review Boa id 
orders: participates m miscellaneous 
court litigation; and obtains com­
pliance w ith Board orders and court 
judgments. The General Counsel is 
responsible for the processing by field 
personnel of the several tvpes of em­
ployee elections referred to above.
Under general supervision of the 
Oenoinl Counsel. 32 regional dirertors 
and their staffs process representation, 
unfair labor practice, and jurisdic­
tional dispute cases. (Some regions 
'nave subregional or resident offices.; 
They issue complaints in unfair labor 
ptactice cases; seek settlement of un­
fair labor practice charges: obtain 
compliance with Board orders and 
court judgments: and petition district 
courts fur injunction-, to prevent or 
remedy unfair labor practices. The re­
gional dirertors also direct hearings in 
representation cases; conduct elections 
pursuant to agreement or the decision­
making authority delegated to them bv
die Board, or pursuant to Board direc­
tions; and issue certifications o f rep­
resentatives when unions win or certify 
the results when unions lose employee 
elections. They process petitions for 
bargaining un it clarification, for 
amendment of certification, and for 
rescission o f a labor organization’s au­
thority to make a union-shop agree­
ment. They also conduct national 
emergency employee referendums. .
The Board can act only when it  is 
formally requested to do so. Individ­
uals, employers, or unions may initiate 
cases by filing charges of unfair labor 
practices or petitions for employee rep­
resentation elections w ith the Board 
field offices serving the area where the 
case arises.
In  the event a regional director de­
clines to proceed on a representation 
petition, the party filing the petition 
may appeal to the Board. Where a 
regional director declines to proceed 
on an unfair labor praclire charge, the 
fiiine party may appeal to the General 
Counsel. For details concerning filing 
such appeals with those Washington, 
IXC.. offices, parties may communicate 
w ith the field office most convenient 
to them. Field office addresses and tele­
phone numbers are listed on page 597.
Administrative law judges conduct 
hearings in unfair labor practice cases, 
make findings, and recommend 
remedies for violations found. Their 
decisions arc revicwablc by the Board 
if  exceptions to the decision arc filed.
Source: Excerpt from United States Government Manual, 1978/79)
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APPENDIX C
BASIC PROCEDURES IN CASES INVOLVING CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
CHARGE
F iled  w ith  N LR B  R eg ional D ire c to r;  
a lle g e s  u n fa ir  lab o r p ra c tic e  
by re s p o n d e n t.
IN JU N C TIO N  | IN VESTIG A TIO N
R eg io n a l D ire c to r m u st a s k  D is tric t  
C ourt lo r te m p o ra ry  re s tra in in g  i 
o rd e r in u n la w fu l Jpoycott an d  ! 
s tr ik e  c a s e s . i 
1 
1 1
R eg io n a l D ire c to r d e te rm in e s  
w h e th e r fo rm a l ac tio n  sh o u ld  be 
ta k e n .
— I
IN JU N C TIO N  j C O M P L A IN T  ANO A N S W E R
R egional D irec to r m a y  a s k  D is tric t f - < - -  
C ourt fo r te m p o ra ry  re s tra in in g  j 
o rd er a fte r  c o m p la in t is issu ed  in i 
a ll cases o f an  u n fa ir  la b o r  p rac tice . !
ii
R eg io n a l D ire c to r issues c o m p la in t  
and n o tice  o f hearin g . R esp o n d en t 
files  a n s w e r  in 10 days.
W IT H D R A W A L  - R E F U S A L  TO 
IS S U E  C O M PLA IN T -  S E T T L E M E N T
C h a rg e  m a y  be w ith d ra w n  before  
o r a f te r  co m p la in t is  issued . 
R e g io n a l D irec to r m a y  re fu s e  to  
is s u e  a  c o m p la in t; h is  o r h er re fusal 
(d is m is s a l o f ch a rg e ) m a y  be 
a p p e a le d  to G enera! C ounsel. 
S e ttle m e n t o f cas e  m a y  o c c u r a t  
th is p o in t or a t la te r  s ta g e s  (in ­
fo rm a l ag re e m e n t su b je c t to  
a p p ro v a l ot R e g io n a l D irec to r: 
fo rm a l se ttle m e n t a g re e m e n t 
ex e c u te d  s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  or  
a fte r  is s u a n c e  ot c o m p la in t, sub ject  
to a p p ro v a l o f B o ard ).
D IS M IS S A L
N LRB fin d s  re s p o n d en t n o t g u ilty  
of u n fa ir  la b o r p ra c tic e  and  
d ism isses  case.
H E A R IN G  AND REPORT
A d m in is tra tiv e  L a w  Judge co n d u cts  
h e a rin g  an d  file s  report re c o m m e n d in g  
e ith e r (1 ) o rd e r to  cease ano  o e s is t  
from  u n fa ir  la b o r p ra c tic e  o r (2) 
d is m is s a l o f co m p la in t.
D IS M IS S A L  BY  
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E  L A W  JUDGE
A d m in is tra tiv e  L a w  Ju d g e  m a y  
g ra n t m o tio n  to  d is m is s  co m p la in t.  
If so. a p p e a l m a y  b e  ta k e n  to  
NLRB.
CEASE AND DESIST
N LRB fin d s  respondent g u ilty  o f 
u n fa ir  la b o r p ra c tic e  an d  o rd e rs  
him  to  c e a s e  and desist.
OTHER DISPO SITIO N
NLRB sends cas e  b ack  to R eg ional 
D ire c to r for fu rth e r  a c tio n .
COURT R EVIEW CO URT ENFO RCEM ENT
D ism issa l o rd e r m a y  be a p p e a le d  to A N D  REVIEW
the C irc u it C ourt o t A p p e a ts  and C irc u it C o u rt o l A p p ea ls  en fo rc e s
from  th e re  to the U .S . S u p re m e NLRB o rd e r o r rev ie w s  a p p e a l by
C ourt. a g g rie v e d  p a r ty  U.S. S u p re m e  
C o u rt re v ie w s  a p p ea ls  fro m  CCA.
Source: Twomey, David P.: Labor Law and Legislation, Seventh Edition,
South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1985. p. 550.
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APPENDIX D
Disposition by Stage of Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed During Fiscal Year
Column: 1 2  3 4
FISCAL YEAR THREE YEARS
Line Cases 1980 1981 1982 COMBINED
1.
Cases
Cases Closed during Fiscal Year 55, 537 52,804 45,103 153,494
? ,
ULP Cases 
Cases Closed during Fiscal Year 42, 047 41,020 36,424 119,491
As a percent of Line 1 75 .62 77.7% 80.8% 77.8%
3.
Stage of Disposition: ULP Cases 
Cases Closed prior to issuance of formal 
complaint 35, 543 34,357 30,328 100,228
As a percent of Line 2 84 .52 83.82 83.3% 83,9%
/.. Cases remaining to be processed 
(Line 2 less Line 3) 6, 504 6,663 6,096 19 263
5. Cases closed after issuance of complaint, 
but before issuance of decision by ALJ 4, 719 5,080 4,703 14,502
As a percent of Line 4 72 .62 76.2% 77.1% 75.3%
6. Cases remaining to be processed 
(Line 4 less Line 5) 1,885 1,583 1,393 4,861
7.
8.
Cases closed after issuance of ALJ decision 
but before decision by Board 
Cases remaining to be processed 












Cases closed after Board decision 
Adopted ALJ recommendation absence of exception 219 266 405 890
10. Before Circuit Court decrees 930 902 472 2,354
11. After Circuit Court decree, before Supreme Court 526 308 300 1,134
12. After Supreme Court p 54 15 75
13. Adjustment (See author's note, below) 1C 8 - - 108
TOTAL 1,393 1,530 1,192 4,561
Note: This adjustment made to equal total on Line 8. Errata appear in various issues of
the Annual Report to correct tables in reports of prior years. It Is anticipated
that such an eratum to correct correct Table No. 5 (1980) will appear in an Annual
Report of a year subsequent to 1982.
Source: National Labor Relations Board Annual Report, Fiscal Years 1980, 1981 and 1962
Line 1 (Table No. 1) Lines 2,3,6,7,9-12 (Table Na. S).




N ational L abor R elations B oard  
M em bers off th e  B oard
Edwin S. S m ith ......................................... ............. July 1935 Aug. 1941
*  J. Warren M adden................................... ............. Aug. 1935 Aug. 1940
John M. C a rm o d y ................................... Aug. 1936
Donald Wakefield S m ith ......................... (day 1939
William M. Leiserson............................... Feb. 1943
* Harry A. M il l is ......................................... ............. Nov. 1940 July 1945
Gerard D. R e illy ....................................... ............. Oct. 1941 Aug. 1946
John M. H ouston ..................................... Aug. 1953
*  Paul M. Herzog ....................................... ............. July 1945 June 1953
James J. Reynolds, J r.............................. ............. Aug. 1946 Dec. 1951
Abe M u rd o c k ........................................... ............. Aug. 1947 Dec. 1957
J. Copeland Gray ................................... ............. Aug. 1947 Dec. 1949
Paul L. S ty le s ........................................... ............. Feb. 1950 Aug. 1953
Ivar H. Peterson....................................... ............  Mar. 1952 Aug. 1956
* Guy Farmer ............................................. ............  July 1953 Aug. 1955
Philip Ray Rodgers................................... Aug. 1S63
Albert C. Beeson..................................... ............. Mar. 1954 Dec. 1954
* Boyd S. Leedom ..................................... Dec. 1964
Steo'nen S. Bean ..................................... ............. Dec. 1955 Aug. 1960
Joseph Alton Jenkins ............................. ............  Mar. 1957 Mar. 1961
* John H. Fanning ..................................... ............. Dec. 1957 Dec. 1982
A rthu r A. Kimball ................................... Mar. 1961
* Frank W. M cColloch. {■Sic.’)..... ............. Mar. 1961 Aug. 1970
Gerald A. B ro w n ..................................... Aug. 1971
Howard Jenkins, J r.................................. ............. Aug. 1963 Aug. 1983
Sam Zagoria . :......................................... Dec. 1969
* Edward B. Miller ..................................... ............  June 1970 Dec. 1974
Ralph E. K e n n e d y ................................... ............  Dec. 1970 July 1975
John A. P en e llo ....................................... ............. F e b .1972 Jan. 1981
* Betty Southard M u rp h y ........................ ............. Feb. 1975 Dec. 1979
Peter D. W a lth e r ..................................... ..............  Nov. 1975 Aug. 1977
John C. Truesdale................................... ..............  Oct. 1977 Jan. 1981
Don A. Zimmerman................................. ............... Aug. 1980 Dec. 1984
Robert P. H u n te r..................................... ............... Aug. 1981
* John R. Van de W a te r ........................... Dec. 1982
* John C. M ille r........................................... ..............  Dec. 1982 Mar. 1983
* Donald L. Dotson ................................... ..............  Mar. 1983
Patricia Diaz D e n n is ............................... ..............  May 1983
* Chairman
National Labor Relations Board, A Commemorative Publication, (pages 
unnumbered).




N ational L abor R elations B oard 
G enera l C ounsels
Charles Fahy ..................................... ..................... Sept. 1935 Sept. 1940
Robert B. W a tts ................................. Jan. 1944
Alvin J. R ockw ell............................... Sept. 1945
David A. M o rs e ................................. June 1946
Gerhard P. Van A rk e l....................... July 1947
Robert N. Denham ........................... Sept. 1950
George J. B o t t ................................... Dec. 1954
Theophil C. Kam m holz.................... Jan. 1957
* Kenneth M cG uiness......................... ..................  Jan. 1957 Mar. 1957
Jerome D. F e n to n ............................. ..................  Mar. 1957 June 1959
Stuart R o thm an ................................. May 1963
Arnold O rd m a n ................................. ..................  May 1963 June 1971
* Eugene G. G os le e ............................. Aug. 1971
Peter G. Nash ................................... Aug. 1975
* John C. M ille r..................................... ..................  Aug. 1975 Nov. 1975
John S. Irv in g ..................................... ..................  Dec. 1975 Oct. 1979
* Norton J. C om e................................. ..................  Oct. 1979 Dec. 1979
William A. L u b b e rs ........................... ..................  Dec. 1979 April 1984
* Wilford W. Johansen......................... ..................  April 1984 Oct. 1984
Rosemary M. Collyer ....................... ..................  Oct. 1984 •
* Acting General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board, A Commemorative Publication, 
unnumbered).
(pages
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APPENDIX G
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND ULP CASES FILED
YEAR UNION U.S. LABOR PERCENT ULP CASES RECEIVED DURING YEA!
MEMBERSHIP FORCE UNIONIZATION FILED BY ULP PER MIL.
(000 omitted) UNION UNION MEMBERSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(2) v (3) (5) t (2)
1962 16,586 73,442 22.6 5897 355.5
1963 16,524 74,571 22.2 6346 384.0
1964 16,841 75,830 22.2 7209 428.1
1965 17,299 77,178 22.4 7737 447.3
1966 17,940 78,893 22.3 7771 444.3
1967 18,367 80,793 22.3 7846 427.2
1968 18,916 82,272 23.0 7814 413.1
1969 19,036 84,240 22.6 7946 417.4
1970 19,381 85,903 22.6 8766 452.3
1971 19,211 86,929 22.1 9862 513.4
1972 19,435 88,991 21.8 11,197 576 .1
1973 19,851 91,040 21.8 10,601 534.0
1974 20,199 93,240 21.8 10,876 538.4
1975 19,611 94,793 20.7 11,778 600.6
1976 19.634 96,917 20.3 13,487 686.9
1977 TQ 3241 —
1977 19,695 99,534 19.8 14,988 761.0
1978 20,246* 102,537 I11. 7VC* 15,2731979 20,475* 106,559 19-2** 16,988 829-7**1980 20,705* 108,544 18,464 891-8**
1981 20,935* 110,315 19. Oj. 17,989 859.3**
1982 21,165* 111,872 18-9** 18,653 88!.3**1983 21,395 113,286 18.9 18,424 861.1
SOURCES: Handbook of Labor Statistics, U.S . Depc. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Studies,
Washington D.C., 1980, Table 165, p. ^12. N.L.R ,B. Annual Repurcs,
Fiscal Years, 1962-1983.
* **
Estimates Imputed using estimated union memberships
(a) Transitional Quarter (i.e., change oi fiscal year end dace from June JO to
September 30.
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APPENDIX H 
UL? Cases Classified by Charging Parties
Cases Identified by Complainant or Petitioner  FISCAL YEARS  Combined
Line Closed During Fiscal Year 1980 1981 1982 1980-1982
1. Total Cases Closed During Fiscal Year 55,587 52,804 45,103 153,494
2. Total ULP Cases Closed During Fiscal Year 42,047 41,020 36,424 119,491
3.
ULP Cases 
Filed by Employers 5,082 4,126 3,400 12,608
4. Line 3 as a percent of Line 2 12.1% 10.1% 9.3% 10.6%
5. Filed by Unions 17,207 16,709 16,731 50,647
6. Line 5 as a percent of Line 2 40.9% 40.7% 45.9% 42.4%
7. Subtotal Lines 3 and 5 22,289 20,835 20,131 63,255
8. Line 7 as a percent of Line 2 53.0% 50.8% 55.3% 52.9%
9. Filed by Individuals 19,758 20,185 16,293 56,236
10. Line 9 as a percent of Line 2 47.0% 49.2% 44.7% 47.1%
11. Total Lines 3, 5 and 9 42,047 41,020 36,424 119,491
12. Line 11 as a percent of Line 2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: NLRB Annual Report (Fiscal Year), Table 1 p.240 p.173 p.260 __
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APPENDIX I 
Novel Cases Reviewed by NLRB
Novel Cases Reviewed that were FISCAL YEARS_____  Combined
Line Closed During Fiscal Year 1980 1981 1982 1980-1982
1. Total Novel Cases Reviewed with Decisions 86 52 69 207
2. Cases Reviewed involving Unanimous Decisions 60 42 5_1 153
3. Filed by Employers 9 5 ; 16
4. Filed by Unions 30 27 32 89
5. Filed by Individuals 21 10 17 48
6 . Cases Reviewed involving Non-Unanimous Decisions 26 10 18 54
7. Filed by Employers 3 3 3 9
8. Filed by Unions 17 4 12 33
9. Filed by Individuals 6 3 3 12
Source: NLRB Annual Report (Fiscal Year)
Compilation Primary.
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APPENDIX J
Decision Paths of Pro-Union and Pro-Management 
Decision Outcomes by Board Members





Disaffirms ALJ Pro Management
Filed by Union 
Against Employer Pro Management
Rejects Chargevs s£C£riIjS ;.lj
Disaffirms ALJ Pro Union
Pro Management
Affirms ALJ
Filed by Employer 
against Union Supports Charge




P ro  M anagem ent
*In making a decision a Board Member's support can be either:
(1) Fully pro-union or pro-management or (2) Partially pro-union or 
pro-management. Treatment of partial support is discussed in Chapter III.
Source: Primary
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APPENDIX K
Number of Charges in Cases Filed under Sections 8(a) and 8(b)
Number of Cases Showing Specific Fiscal Year_____  Combined
Line Allegations Received During the Fiscal Year 1980 1981 1982 1980-1982
1.
CHARGES FILED AGAINST EnFLOYERS UNDER SEC 8(, 
Total Cases
a)
31,281 31,273 27,749 90,303
2.
Cases Alleging Violation of Section: 
8(a)(1) 31,281 31,273 27,749 90,303
3. 8(a)(2) 979 869 858 2,706
4. 8(a)(3) 18,315 17,571 14,732 50,618
5. 8(a)(4) 1,321 1,409 1,147 3,877
6. 8(a)(5) 9,866 9,815 10,898 30,579
7. Total of Lines 2 through 6 61,762 60,937 55,384 173,083
8. Ratio of Line 7 to Line 1 1.974 1.949 1.996 1.972
9.
CHARGES FILED AGAINST UNIONS UNDER SEC 8(b) 
Total Cases 12,563 11,882 10,230 34,675
10.
Cases Alleging Violations of Section: 
8(b)(1) 8,206 8,382 7,354 23,942
11. 8(b)(2) 1,690 1,513 1,514 4,717
12. 8(b)(3) 913 945 778 2,636
13. 8(b)(4) 2,987 2,392 1,911 7,290
14. 8(b)(5) 46 37 37 120
15. 8(b)(6) 42 40 29 111
16. 8(b)(7) 600 4 54 375 1,429
17. Total of Lines 10 chrough 16 14,484 13,763 11,998 L0,245
18. Ratio of Line 17 to Line 9 1.153 1.153 1.173 1.161
Source: NLRB Annual Reports, Various Fiscal Years p.243 p. 176 p.263 —
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where he received a B.B.A. in Marketing in 1954. He received a M.B.A. 
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